Cortes Generales

INFORME SOBRE LA X CONFERENCIA INTERPARLAMENTARIA DE LA POLÍTICA EXTERIOR Y DE SEGURIDAD COMÚN Y DE LA POLÍTICA COMÚN DE SEGURIDAD Y DEFENSA, CELEBRADA EN LA VALETA, MALTA, DEL 27 AL 29 DE ABRIL DE 2017

La X Conferencia Interparlamentaria para la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común (PESC) y la Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa (PCSD) tuvo lugar en el marco de la dimensión parlamentaria de la Presidencia maltesa del Consejo de la Unión Europea, en La Valeta, Malta, del 27 al 29 de abril de 2017. En representación de las Cortes Generales, asistieron a esta reunión los siguientes parlamentarios, miembros de la delegación en esta Conferencia:

- **Excmo. Sr. D. Carlos ROJAS GARCÍA, Diputado, GP Popular**
- **Excmo. Sr. D. Juan Carlos CAMPO MORENO, Diputado, GP Socialista**
- **Excmo. Sr. D. Pablo BUSTINDUY AMADOR, Diputado, GP Unidos Podemos-EC-EM**
- **Excmo. Sr. D. Andrés GIL GARCÍA, Senador, GP. Socialista**

Acompañaron a la delegación la Ilma. Sra. Sª. Sara Sieira Mucientes, Letrada de las Cortes Generales, y la Sra. Dª. Almudena López Garrido, Secretaria de la delegación. Asimismo, se contó con los servicios de interpretación a cargo de la Sra. Dª. Cristina García Ohlrich y el Sr. D. Fernando González Fernández.

Lo relativo a esta reunión, carta de invitación, programa, lista de asistentes, documentos de trabajo de las distintos talleres y conclusiones pueden consultarse en la página siguiente página web:

http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do?id=082dbcc55898c90b01589adfe78c014b

El programa de la reunión puede consultarse en el **Anexo I** al presente Informe.

Miércoles 26 de abril de 2017

Reunión informal de las delegaciones de Parlamentos de los países del Sur. (De 15 a 16.30 h.)

Asisten:

- **Excmo. Sr. D. Carlos ROJAS GARCÍA, Diputado, GP Popular, Jefe de la Delegación.**
- **Ilma. Sra. Dª. Sara Sieira Mucientes, Letrada de las Cortes Generales.**

El **Sr. Konstantinos DOUZINAS (Grecia)** presidió la reunión. Parte del gran avance que ha supuesto la Declaración de Madrid (de 10 de abril de 2017), la tercera de los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los países del Sur de la Unión Europea (Chipre, Francia, Grecia, Italia, Malta, Portugal y España), que puede consultarse en el **Anexo II** a este Informe.

En ella, se reafirma el compromiso con el proyecto común europeo y de ser constructivos en el debate sobre el futuro de la Unión, partiendo de los resultados de la Cumbre de Roma de 25 de Marzo de 2017, cuya Declaración fue firmada por 27 Estados (todos salvo el Reino Unido: http://es.euronews.com/2017/03/25/texto-completo-lea-la-declaracion-de-roma). Se valora el Libro Blanco de la Comisión sobre el futuro de la Unión, y se hace hincapié en la necesidad de preservar los intereses de la Unión Europea y mantener unidos a sus Estados miembros en el escenario que se ha abierto tras el referéndum favorable al *brexit.* Se vuelve a subrayar, como ya se hizo en las Cumbres previas de los países del Sur en Atenas y Lisboa, la necesidad de cooperar entre los países Mediterráneos para enfrentar el problema de la inmigración, en línea con el programa de acción de Valeta, y de fortalecer la solidaridad con los países afectados por la presión migratoria, acentuando, a este respecto, la necesidad de una implementación no discriminatoria del acuerdo entre la Unión Europea y Turquía de 18 de marzo de 2016. Asimismo, la promoción de un crecimiento económico sostenible, empleo de calidad (con especial atención a los jóvenes) y conservación y mejora de del estado de bienestar así como la convergencia económica entre Estados miembros. En relación con esta cuestión, se menciona la necesidad de fortalecer la unión monetaria y el mercado interior, en los sectores tecnológico y energético, así como promover la extensión del Fondo Europeo para Inversión Estratégica. Se mencionan también, como herramientas necesarias, completar el proceso de Unión Bancaria con la creación de un sistema de seguro de depósitos bancarios a nivel europeo, o la integración fiscal, respetando las competencias nacionales, para hacer posible un mayor desarrollo del Estado social en la Unión. En seguridad, la Declaración de Madrid subraya la importancia de la nueva Directiva para la lucha contra el terrorismo, de la Directiva sobre armas de fuego y la reforma de la regulación del sistema Schengen para un mayor control de seguridad en las fronteras. También se destaca la importancia de la adopción de la Resolución 2347 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas en lucha contra el terrorismo, incluyendo sus fuentes de financiación.

Sobre seguridad y defensa, se apoyan las conclusiones del Consejo Europeo de 15 de diciembre de 2016, y de la Presidencia del mismo de 9 de marzo de 2017, que establecen una mayor interrelación, en cuanto a cooperación y responsabilidades compartidas, entre la Unión Europea y la OTAN. También se destaca el papel de la Unión por el Mediterráneo (UfM) como actor clave en la cooperación regional euromediterránea, sobre todo con vistas a la revisión de la Política Europea de Vecindad, destacando las conclusiones del Segundo Foro regional celebrado en Barcelona en enero de 2017. También se reitera el apoyo a la reunificación de Chipre, en línea con lo establecido en las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, y la más firme condena al empleo de armas químicas el pasado 4 de abril en Idlib (Siria). Termina afirmando la Declaración de Madrid que sólo una solución política creíble en línea con lo establecido en la Resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas 2254 y en el Comunicado de Ginebra de 2012 podrán conseguir la paz y la seguridad en Siria.

El **Presidente**, tras hacer un resumen de lo establecido en esta Declaración, señala que este documento es la base del consenso actual de los países del Sur. Seguidamente abre un turno de intervenciones para que los distintos países que han presentado enmiendas a las

Conclusiones de esta X Conferencia PESC y PCSD puedan exponerlas para fortalecer el consenso inicial, antes de la reunión de Jefes de Delegación. (Pueden verse las enmiendas aceptadas y rechazadas en documento en **Anexo III** al presente Informe).

El **Presidente** pide concentrarse en aquellas enmiendas nuevas o que hayan sido rechazadas por la troika, para defenderlas conjuntamente, como grupo de los países del Sur (Grupo MED).

El **Sr. Paolo ALLI (Italia)** se refiere a las enmiendas presentadas por su delegación. Respecto de la enmienda al punto 2, habla de la necesidad de cofinanciar los grupos de combate y una cooperación más estrecha en defensa y seguridad común.

El **Sr. Luciano BUSUTTIL (Malta)**, como representante de la troika, señala que otras enmiendas italianas han resultado aceptables para la troika, pero están en contra específicamente de este inciso, en relación con la defensa. Señala que la troika ha aceptado, además, casi todas las enmiendas italianas, incluso moviéndolas del preámbulo a la parte dispositiva, salvo una al punto 6 en relación a Turquía que podría ser conflictiva por intromisión en asuntos internos de terceros Estados , y otra que suponía un incremento en el gasto, al anterior punto 20 (actual punto 21 de las Conclusiones), en cuanto prevé una posible excepción al Pacto de Estabilidad para inversión en defensa; junto con la sueca, y la del Parlamento Europeo, al mismo punto.

El **Sr. ALLI (Italia)** echa de menos en el documento de conclusiones una referencia explícita al tráfico de seres humanos, como crimen contra la humanidad, reiteradamente mencionado por la Alta Representante, **Sra. MOGHERINI**, por lo que debería introducirse.

El **Presidente** señala que es delicado definir la tipificación de crimen contra la humanidad, necesitaría algo más de estudio por la comisión de derecho internacional.

El **Sr. ALLI (Italia)** insiste en que ese trabajo está hecho ya, pues existen Convenciones internacionales sobre esta materia, y que ahora se trataría de una introducción simplemente preliminar, a nivel parlamentario, abriendo paso posteriormente al trabajo interministerial.

El **Sr. Luciano BUSUTTIL (Malta)** señala que existen ciertamente Convenciones internacionales sobre trata y pero hay que estudiar el tema, que es complejo, para un tratamiento adecuado del mismo en este foro.

Posteriormente el Presidente, **Sr. Konstantinos DOUZINAS (Grecia)**, señala que la delegación griega ha visto rechazada una enmienda, la número 8 al punto 15 (actual 19) de las Conclusiones, que ya gozó de un previo consenso en Bratislava (ver conclusiones de la pasada IX Conferencia PESC-PCSD de Bratislava, en **Anexo IV**), de que un solo Estado no puede enfrentar él solo la crisis migratoria, y en este sentido, debe demandarse una mayor solidaridad. La enmienda griega señalaba, además, que debe haber un sistema compensatorio para aquellos países que respetan las cuotas acordadas por la Comisión Europea, por parte de aquellos que no lo hagan. Señala asimismo que este es un problema común a Italia, Malta, Grecia, España.

El **Sr. Carlos ROJAS (España)** señala que esto es, efectivamente, una cuestión de solidaridad europea, y de normativa europea también.

El **Presidente** indica la oportunidad de que esto pueda presentarse como una demanda común de los países del Sur para defenderlo en la reunión de los Jefes de delegación. No se acuerda así, sino se queda a la expectativa de la defensa que hagan de esta enmienda los autores y los Parlamentos que individualmente quieran pronunciarse sobre la cuestión.

El **Presidente** señala que como parlamentarios podrían encontrarse vías para consolidar y reforzar la Unión Europea, y que la presente coyuntura es una buena oportunidad para los Parlamentos del sur, para organizar una gran conferencia, para discutir el futuro de la Unión Europea, quizá en Madrid, o París.

El **Sr. Carlos ROJAS (España)** expresa que esto es una idea interesante y oportuna, habida cuenta del sesenta aniversario de los Tratados de Roma, puede ser el momento de crear un marco de dialogo sobre democracia, vecindad, valores de la Unión Europea, colaboración parlamentaria en la profundización de la normativa europea. También ve interesante contar con la Universidad, agentes sociales, periodistas, que enriquezcan este debate.

Italia se muestra interesada, con el matiz general de que deben usarse instrumentos existentes, no crear nuevas estructuras. El **Sr. Carlos COSTA NEVES (Portugal)** indica que el Grupo MED sólo está funcionando para la PESC-PSCD, y no para la COSAC, por ejemplo, por lo que las reuniones deben centrarse exclusivamente en los temas relativos a la seguridad y defensa, para no incurrir en extralimitaciones competenciales. **Chipre** apoya esta idea.

El **Presidente** concluye, tras todas estas aportaciones, que sería interesante hacer circular un papel de tres o cuatro puntos para dar forma a esta propuesta, hacerlo llegar a los Parlamentos y estudiarlo. Anuncia asimismo que la próxima reunión será en Estonia. El **Sr. Carlos ROJAS (España)** responde a la invitación lanzada por el Presidente griego para que la delegación española organice, para entonces, esta reunión de los países del Sur.

Reunión de los Jefes de delegación (17.15-18.00h)

Asisten:

- **Excmo. Sr. D. Carlos ROJAS GARCÍA, Diputado, GP Popular, Jefe de la Delegación.**
- **Ilma. Sra. Dª. Sara Sieira Mucientes, Letrada de las Cortes Generales.**

Preside el **Sr. Luciano BUSUTTIL (Malta)**, quien presenta el texto consensuado acordado por la troika sobre las enmiendas, procedentes de un total de ocho delegaciones, presentadas a las Conclusiones (Véase nexo III, ya citado).

El **Sr. Olle THORELL (Suecia)** se muestra disconforme con la expresión “convergencia de las políticas de defensa nacionales” del punto 2. La delegación portuguesa se muestra en este mismo párrafo en contra del término “semestre europeo”.

El **Presidente** constata el consenso en eliminar ambas referencias.

El **Sr. Wolfgang HELLMICH (Alemania)** tiene una observación sobre el punto 5, en Bratislava (ver **Anexo IV**, ya citado) se dio una formulación a esta idea que les gusta mucho más, porque cuando existan crisis internacionales debe existir la colaboración por parte de Rusia, en definitiva, un diálogo fluido con Rusia para que pueda pedirse que colaboren con la Unión Europea en caso de crisis. El Presidente señala que es mejor dejar este debate para más adelante, en los puntos 10 a 13.

El Jefe de la delegación griega, **Sr. DOUZINAS,** se refiere a la última parte de la enmienda griega en el párrafo 16, a la que en la reunión informal de los países del Sur se ha hecho referencia, que no se ha aceptado por la troika, y ya se había aceptado en la declaración de Bratislava. Se acepta su inclusión por todas las delegaciones en este momento, aunque, como más adelante se expondrá, finalmente no se integró esta enmienda en el texto final de las Conclusiones.

El **Sr. Luciano BUSUTTIL (Malta)** indica que al punto 19 (actual 21) se aceptan todas las enmiendas menos la italiana porque este no es el foro adecuado para hablar con el pacto de estabilidad y crecimiento.

La **delegación sueca** no puede aceptar las referencias a los primeros pasos para establecer acuartelamientos civiles y militares, pero sí están de acuerdo con el Plan de acción de defensa.

El **Sr. Luciano BUSUTTIL (Malta)** le responde que esto ya está asentado como parte de la política liderada por la **Sra. MOGHERINI**. En Suecia, insiste la **Sra. Lotta OLSSON**, se ha debatido mucho, se conoce esta problemática, pero no pueden estar de acuerdo.

El **Sr. ALLI (Italia)** aduce que el nivel parlamentario en el que se enmarca esta Conferencia debería mostrar algo más de audacia respecto del nivel gubernamental. La relación entre el pacto de estabilidad y la defensa abre muchas perspectivas por lo que defiende de nuevo la oportunidad de la enmienda italiana.

El **Sr. Wolfgang HEIMLICH (Alemania)** señala que son conocidos los debates mantenidos en relación con los acuartelamientos civiles y militares. Pregunta a la delegación sueca si puede mantenerse una redacción alternativa como texto de consenso con una reserva de la delegación sueca.

El **Sr. Luciano BUSUTTIL (Malta)** señala que la objeción radica en la formulación. La delegación sueca señala que prefieren la propuesta alemana. La delegación sueca menciona la conveniencia de la expresión “debe ser considerado como un primer paso”, pero no puede estar de acuerdo en la expresión “acoge con satisfacción”, por lo que propone añadir en nota al pie que no todos los países aprueban esto. Letonia dice que habría una propuesta intermedia, plantearlo como en condicional, “podría ser considerado como un primer paso”.

El **Sr. Carlos COSTA (Portugal)** señala que sería bueno eliminar la referencia al pacto de estabilidad y crecimiento.

El **Sr. Luciano BUSUTTIL (Malta)**, en representación de la troika, señala que ni este foro ni este texto negociado son adecuados para recoger cuestiones que afecten a la estabilidad presupuestaria, pero, no obstante, si hay acuerdo sería posible reflejarlo.

El **Sr. ALLI (Italia)**, respecto del problema de la referencia al pacto de estabilidad, insiste, pero desde la troika se repite que no es el foro adecuado por lo que esto finalmente no se acepta.

Sr. Wolfgang HEIMLICH (Alemania) propone en los puntos 10 a 13, adicionar "reconoce la importancia de acciones selectivas, el diálogo con Rusia para que pueda rendir cuentas, incluyendo la opción de colaborar para actuar en interés de Europa", como en la formulación de Bratislava.

La **Presidencia** le invita a presentar el texto. El **Sr. Wolfgang HEIMLICH (Alemania)** lo encuentra en la declaración de Bratislava (n. 15), que se adicionaría a las conclusiones como un nuevo punto.

El **Sr. Soren ESPERSEN (Dinamarca)** señala dudas respecto del procedimiento. El **Sr. Luciano BUSUTTIL (Malta)** señala que, conforme a las reglas de funcionamiento de esta Asamblea, pueden hacer llegar las enmiendas indicadas a las Conclusiones, a efectos de lo cual procede a una nueva apertura del plazo de enmiendas hasta las 7 de la tarde del día de hoy.

Jueves 27 de abril de 2017

Asisten:

- **Excmo. Sr. D. Carlos ROJAS GARCÍA, Diputado, GP Popular**
- **Excmo. Sr. D. Juan Carlos CAMPO MORENO, Diputado, GP Socialista**
- **Excmo. Sr. D. Pablo BUSTINDUY AMADOR, Diputado, GP Unidos Podemos-EC-EM**
- **Excmo. Sr. D. Andrés GIL GARCÍA, Senador, GP. Socialista**

Acompañan a la delegación la Ilma. Sra. Sª. Sara Sieira Mucientes, Letrada de las Cortes Generales, y la Sra. Dª. Almudena López Garrido, Secretaria de la delegación. Asimismo, se contó con los servicios de interpretación en esta sesión a cargo de la Sra. Dª. Cristina García Ohlrich y el Sr. D. Fernando González Fernández.

Sesión de apertura de la Conferencia (9-30 a 10 h)

El **Sr. Censu GALEA**, Vicepresidente del Parlamento Maltés, da la bienvenida. Destaca la oportunidad del debate de los Parlamentos nacionales en PESC Y PESD, sobre todo, en cuestión de vecindad. En la coyuntura actual destaca el problema de Libia y la sangrienta guerra civil de Siria que en 6 años se ha cobrado 400.000 vidas. También los problemas de vecindad se han centrado en Ucrania. Asimismo señala la urgencia de que este foro contribuya a la estabilización de la democracia en Túnez, así como a profundizar en las relaciones con la liga árabe. Y, finalmente, a las relaciones de cooperación con Rusia-Ucrania.

El **Sr. Luciano BUSUTTIL**, Presidente de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Parlamento maltés, señala que esta sesión se está emitiendo en streaming. Hay traducción a alemán,

inglés, francés, italiano, croata, español y maltés. El texto revisado con las enmiendas, se adoptó ayer por los Jefes de delegación, permitiéndose la presentación de enmiendas hasta las 7 de la tarde del día de ayer. Estas nuevas enmiendas pueden consultarse en el **Anexo V** al presente Informe.

El **Sr. David McALLISTER**, Presidente de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Parlamento Europeo, destaca las dificultades sobrevenidas en la situación internacional actual, y especialmente en el contexto actual en Europa tras el referéndum en el Reino Unido favorable al *brexit*. Parece haberse olvidado el porqué de la construcción de Europa, fue por la paz, una construcción de la paz, unidos en la diferencia. Hace un llamamiento a que no se olvide por qué los padres fundadores tuvieron esta idea que se plasmó en los Tratados fundacionales, para trabajar por la paz y a participar de forma activa y cooperativa en la seguridad y defensa. Se trata de responder a los retos actuales. Termina deseando a todos buena suerte con esta Conferencia.

Sesión 1. Estado de la cuestión de la Política de Vecindad europea. (10h a 11.45h)

Intervención a cargo del **Sr. George VELA**, Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de Malta.

Comienza dando la bienvenida a la Alta Representante, **Sra. MOGHERINI**, agradeciéndole su trabajo en favor de la presidencia maltesa.

La globalización ha aportado la necesidad de mayor cooperación. La Unión Europea ha apostado por crear vínculos económicos con sus vecinos, de ahí surge la política de vecindad en 2004, de la necesidad de una vecindad resiliente para alcanzar la estabilidad y la seguridad. Es preciso ayudar a nuestros vecinos en la consecución de sus objetivos y aspiraciones. El Consejo de Asuntos Exteriores ha tenido en el centro de su Agenda esta problemática. En 2015 se revisó la Política Europea de Vecindad, (PEV, en adelante) y en ella se dio mayor importancia al principio de diferenciación y a aportar mayor flexibilidad. Se trataba de asegurar que la Unión Europea fuese un socio fiable para sus países vecinos. Los países vecinos son socios, son parte activa que debe entender sus compromisos. También hay que diferenciar entre los socios del Este y los del Sur. La idea del principio de diferenciación no es crear rivalidad entre regiones, sino que se apunten diferentes desafíos y perspectivas para trabajar desde las diversas circunstancias de cada región.

La PEV es estratégica dentro de la PESC. La Alta Representante se ha manifestado en este sentido. La resiliencia es un concepto que se incorpora en la Agenda 2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible, aprobada en Nueva York en Octubre de 2015, y en los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible que esta Agenda incorpora. Se refiere a la inestabilidad en Siria, en Libia, en Oriente próximo. Los vecinos del Sur deben hacer frente a sus propios problemas económicos, sobre todo en la cuestión del desempleo juvenil, y apunta el peligro de perder una generación entera. También apunta el problema del terrorismo y el radicalismo violento.

El partenariado con el Sur, y con el Este es clave en la política de vecindad. La cumbre de Riga fue un logro en este sentido, partenariado con el Este: países como Georgia, Moldavia,

Ucrania, con ellos ya existe un acuerdo y se han abierto negociaciones con otros países del Este. En la próxima presidencia de Estonia se profundizará en este partenariado con el Este que se inauguró en la cumbre de Riga.

La Unión por el Mediterráneo es clave para la cooperación entre la Unión Europea y los países de las orillas del Mediterráneo, cuestión que entra de lleno en los objetivos de la PEV. Las misiones de seguridad y defensa son respuestas a la crisis. La costa de Libia y en el Egeo, las islas griegas y la costa de Turquía, representan apremiantes retos en migración.

También ha de tenerse en cuenta el cuidado de las relaciones culturales, "los vecinos de nuestros vecinos" tienen también un papel clave, en este sentido, importa el diálogo intercultural e interreligioso.

A continuación tiene lugar el debate (5 minutos máximo para el turno de intervención).

-**Lituania. Sr. Jouzas BERNATONIS**. Habla de la situación en Ucrania, de su deseo de desarrollo económico y de defensa, y que es la mejor respuesta que cabe dar al expansionismo ruso. Habla de los documentos que se han distribuido respecto de la situación de Ucrania e invita al debate de estos documentos en los Parlamentos nacionales (véase **Anexo VI.A** y **Anexo VI.B** al presente Informe).

-**Parlamento Europeo. Sra. Anna Elzbieta FOTYGA**. Preside la Comisión de Seguridad y Defensa. Pide evaluar la situación de Ucrania, y también la terrible situación por la presencia rusa en Georgia, que trata de que se insubordinen dos territorios. Habla de la operación Sofía y hace un llamamiento a la coordinación para estabilizar las fronteras.

-**Rep. Checa. Karel SCHWARZENBERG**. La situación en los Balcanes se agrava. Macedonia, Kosovo con desempleo del 60%; el que se posponga su incorporación al mercado europeo, supone una importante pérdida económica para ellos, pues desanima la inversión. Respecto de Ucrania, se está haciendo un progreso considerable, la sociedad civil se ha desarrollado mucho, pese a su situación complicada.

-**Países Bajos. Sr. Menno KNIP**. La PEV debe basarse en la igualdad entre los socios y Europa. Debe ser flexible frente a las crisis, para ser efectiva. Debe aplicarse combinada con otras políticas de la Unión Europea con un enfoque integral y coherente. No debe confundirse aquí la cuestión del acceso de nuevos Estados.

-**Eslovaquia. Sr. Lubos BLAHA**. Critica las maniobras norteamericanas que han supuesto una vulneración del derecho internacional. Menciona a Irak y Libia. Son lugares más violentos que antes de que la OTAN interviniera, antes de que la administración americana interviniera en Irak. Otros ejemplos son Siria y Yemen. Israel ocupa territorios palestinos, lo que es también una vulneración del Derecho internacional. Incriminar a los rusos no es suficiente. Nuestro objetivo común es eliminar a Daesh. En Europa debemos ser más activos, mostrando al Sr. Trump que "no puede bombardear lo que él quiera".

-**Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Mario BORGHEZO**. Habla de la situación humanitaria en Turquía y Libia. En Turquía se ha detenido a un periodista italiano, que sólo tras la intervención del cuerpo diplomático ha sido liberado, pero no se sabe por qué. La intervención de la **Sra. MOGHERINI** llegó tarde en este caso. Respecto de Libia, pregunta cuál es la posición de nuestras autoridades, y qué va a ocurrir de cara al verano cuando se incremente el flujo ilegal de inmigrantes. Cuál es la posición de Europa, en definitiva.

-**Alemania. El Sr. Wolfang HELLMICH** menciona los contactos en favor de la solución del conflicto de Israel del Gobierno alemán, a través del principio de respeto de la soberanía de los Estados. En Ucrania, el fallecimiento de un observador en las últimas semanas ha evidenciado la necesidad de tratar este problema de modo distinto. Hay que ejecutar los acuerdos de Minsk sin lo cual no va a solucionarse el conflicto de Ucrania. Este conflicto se está congelando. Se alegra de que **SCHWARZENBERG** haya tocado la cuestión de los Balcanes, hay que revisar nuestra política en relación con esta región. Lo mismo en relación con África del norte y Túnez. La política que hemos acordado supone una mejora de estabilización de las fronteras y de desarrollo económico.

- **España. El Sr. Carlos ROJAS** señala que debemos felicitarnos por la fortaleza de la nueva Política europea de Vecindad. En Malta, una de las puertas del Mediterráneo, debe destacarse que el mantenimiento de la paz y la estabilidad en África tiene que estar en el centro de la política común de la Unión Europea. El sur del Mediterráneo es una de las zonas con mayor inestabilidad. El África occidental, el Sahel, el cuerno de África, son hoy importantes retos para la política de la Unión Europea. Malta es un escenario muy adecuado para hacer un llamamiento a los Estados miembros y a sus Parlamentos a que refuercen su interés en la seguridad y en la estabilidad de los países en el Este y Sur del Mediterráneo. Debe tenerse en cuenta que el 80 % de las operaciones de la Unión Europea a escala mundial tiene lugar en África. Por supuesto necesitamos mayor cooperación y mayor esfuerzo presupuestario pero, como ha señalado el **Sr. VELA**, la Unión Europea, en esto va por buen camino.

- **Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Michael GAHLER**. Se refiere al conflicto que supondrá un segundo referéndum para la salida de Bosnia Herzegovina, deberíamos actuar contra esta fragmentación antes de que se adelante el Sr. Donald Trump. Hay que mantener tropas a las afueras de Bosnia. Si dejamos que se celebre este referéndum, habrá reconocimiento por parte de Moscú, por lo que tendremos tropas rusas en el centro de Europa. La vecindad con los países del Sur exige concreción. Propone añadir a las conclusiones una exigencia a Marruecos y Argelia para que abran fronteras y que a largo plazo trabajen en un acercamiento. Pide mayor concreción en el punto 12 de las Conclusiones. Sobre la operación Sofía, si los inmigrantes siguen entrando en esta cantidad, propone solución del conflicto en origen, en Libia.

- **Grecia. Sr. Konstantinos DOUZINAS** agradece la reunión de ayer, del Grupo MED. Se refiere a la situación de “divorcio” del Reino Unido. En este debate, el nivel de autocomplacencia es muy claro, puesto que se habla de Libro Blanco, como si nada. Los Balcanes occidentales, Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina, la Unión Europea no posee una política coordinada en estos

temas. Respecto de Siria, tenemos una guerra mundial “por poderes”, y hace referencia a la exportación de armas. Los vecinos sufren las consecuencias, se echa en falta una política de fomento de la paz coordinada, incluyendo que la Unión Europea pueda instar a los rusos y americanos que muestren una mayor contención en la región. Recuerda que también Rusia ha conculcado el derecho internacional, en referencia a la intervención de Eslovaquia. Termina señalando que hay países de la Unión Europea que tampoco están respetando las normas de la propia UE en relación con los refugiados, lo que también supone una vulneración del derecho internacional.

- **Reino Unido. Sr. Crispin BLUNT** se refiere a las intervenciones de **DOUZINAS** y **SCHWARZENBERG** respecto a la posición de Rusia. Como asegurar la participación de Rusia en este espíritu ilustrado europeo respecto del respeto al derecho internacional. En la necesidad de seguridad en Europa del este hay que centrarse en Ucrania. Allí hay gente que ha muerto por la bandera europea. La Comisión parlamentaria de Asuntos Exteriores en la Cámara de los Comunes, presidida por él, concluyó la pasada semana que Ucrania debe sentirse segura y con su situación garantizada por la Unión Europea. Quiere instar al acuerdo en torno al apoyo a Ucrania. 20 millones de Libras aporta su país a este objetivo, debería ser más, tanto en el Reino Unido como en toda Europa, pues es un objetivo clave. También en Reino Unido se aporta formación militar gracias a la cual se ha logrado una mejora de la calidad en el ejército ucraniano.

- **Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Thomas MESZERICS**. No hay que confundir política de adhesión y política de vecindad, para no repetir los problemas que ha habido en los Balcanes. Se refiere también a la necesidad de equidad en los instrumentos financieros. Si se elabora un enfoque estratégico en la defensa en la Unión Europea, hay que tener en cuenta implicar activamente a los Estados miembros.

- **Croacia. Sr. Miro KOVAC**. Pregunta si somos eficaces realmente con la PEV. Un ejemplo perfecto, hay muchos refugiados procedentes de Siria, pero la influencia de la Unión Europea en Siria no es fuerte. En los Balcanes Occidentales, el **Sr. SCHWARZENBERG** ha señalado que hay mucha más influencia rusa, turca, que de la Unión Europea. La influencia Rusia en Bosnia Herzegovina es palmaria, hay más de 80 fallos de su Tribunal Constitucional que no se han ejecutado, y uno de ellos es el relativo a la ley electoral, que debe reformarse antes de las elecciones del próximo año en Bosnia Herzegovina, y la influencia de Turquía en este aspecto es crítica, según los actores principales, allí, pero lamentablemente no lo es la de la Unión Europea.

- **Polonia Sr. Szymon SZYNOWSKI**. Habla de la revisión a medio plazo de la PEV, para fomentar la cooperación en relación con la inmigración y el terrorismo, apoyan plenamente la cooperación con los países del sur. También es importante el reto del Este y la amenaza rusa, la guerra híbrida y sus políticas de desinformación en los países del Este, en estos asuntos la posición de la Unión Europea es vital.

- **Italia. Sra. Stefania GIANNINI**. Subraya la importancia de la diplomacia en investigación, formación y contactos. Los gobiernos de los Estados miembros deben enfatizar esta política como pilar europeo, trabajar en una estructura euromediterránea de investigación como la propuesta italiana respecto de la investigación en agua y alimentos. La Presidencia maltesa va a lanzar este programa, que implica a 15 países mediterráneos. Echa de menos una inclusión de los aspectos de investigación en las conclusiones finales.

- **Parlamento Europeo. Sra. Anna GOMES**. Pregunta por Libia, si no hay una política común en esta cuestión. Las fronteras en Libia son una prioridad, unido a la cuestión del gobierno en Libia. Financiar campos de internamiento y detención en Libia no va a ser la solución, y no se va a entender por la ciudadanía de la Unión Europea.

- **Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Javier NART**. Habla del reto de la eventual autodeterminación en Bosnia Herzegovina, en el que ciertamente no ayudan los vecinos, y en relación con esto mismo, apunta el problema de Chipre. En Moldavia y Ucrania existe una corrupción generalizada en las instituciones. La república de Nagorno Karavaj y su derecho a la autodeterminación. En Ucrania, el Acuerdo de Minsk supone que se tomará en consideración la opinión de los ciudadanos respecto de su estatuto. El derecho de autodeterminación que se plantea para Nagorno también debe plantearse para Osetia y Absjasia.

- **Parlamento Europeo. Sra. Sabine Bárbara LÖSING**. Habla de la necesidad de un círculo de amigos en torno a Europa, pero apunta que ahora lo que tenemos es un círculo de fuego, y se pregunta qué hemos hecho mal. Una política que responde a intereses particulares no lleva a la paz. La Agenda 2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible incorpora la equidad, la igualación social, como base imprescindible para la paz. Que se creen zonas de libre comercio no ayuda necesariamente a la paz. Mucho menos el proteccionismo. Habla de Túnez, los conflictos se deben a la pobreza, cuál es nuestra estrategia en este aspecto? El instrumento de la estabilidad presupuestaria es importante, pero se está dedicando cada vez más presupuesto al control de fronteras, y una parte del mismo está yendo a los bolsillos de gobiernos dudosos. Esta financiación debería dedicarse a la equidad, y no al rearme.

- **Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Knut FLECKENSTEIN**. Señala que el problema de los Balcanes occidentales. Habla que hay que aunar las dimensiones económica, política, social, pero también simbólica. Turquía, Rusia, Arabia Saudí están muy presentes en estos países. Lo importante es el enfoque centrado en las personas, como establece la Agenda 2030. Queremos apoyar a estos países y su adhesión a la Unión Europea, aunque quizá más tarde de lo ellos que habían previsto.

- **Grecia. Sr. Ioannis KEFALOGINNIS**. Es Turquía la que establece barreras, respecto de la unificación de Chipre. Y señala que el colega español del Parlamento Europeo está mal informado. Hay que aprovechar sinergias para posicionarse frente al islamismo radical. Es grave la amenaza. Debe haber actuación coordinada contra el terrorismo y contra las fuentes de información y financiación de grupos terroristas. Grecia está comprometida con los acuerdos de la Unión Europea, menciona el asunto de los refugiados: Esperan una mayor

colaboración por parte de Turquía. Manifiesta preocupación, en nombre de Grecia, por el incumplimiento de los mecanismos de reasignación de refugiados por parte de los Estados miembros. Especialmente preocupa el tema de los menores no acompañados.

- **Polonia. Sr. Rafal TRZASKOWSKI**. Sorprendimos a Putin con nuestra unidad en la cuestión de Crimea. Es necesario vigilar a Rusia. Ucrania debería ser la prioridad principal, reconociendo otras prioridades. Debe hacerse un esfuerzo en la ciberseguridad. En Ucrania no hemos enviado señales claras, pero esto no puede pasar de nuevo: hay que anticiparse al conflicto de los Balcanes. Sobre el referéndum de Turquía, se pregunta si no habría que renegociar nuestra política respecto a Turquía, reevaluar nuestros valores europeos, sabiendo que le necesitamos como socio.

Toma la palabra en turno de réplica el **Sr. VELLA**, Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de Malta, para conclusiones.

Advierte que podemos estar solapándonos con la siguiente sesión pero es lógico porque está todo enlazado. Da las gracias por el interesante debate. Constata la preocupación en qué deberíamos haber hecho para evitar llegar a la situación presente, en lo relativo al "círculo de fuego" en lugar de "círculo de amigos". Capta duda en el auditorio en relación con qué debemos hacer.

También advierte dudas en relación con la migración, salvando la idea de base de la solidaridad presente en todas las intervenciones. Ha habido más preocupación respecto de los Balcanes que respecto de los países del sSur. Cuando se planteó el problema de Ucrania, olvidamos a Libia, por ejemplo. Hay que prestar una atención uniforme a Libia, y a Ucrania.

La Conferencia Interparlamentaria para la PESC-PCSD no es una alianza militar por lo que no pueden tomarse aquí decisiones militares. En las relaciones con la nueva administración americana, con los aliados OTAN del otro lado del Atlántico, también existe una importante dosis de incertidumbre. Nadie ha mencionado este problema. La nueva administración americana está ausente de estos problemas del sur y este del Mediterráneo, incluso esta ausencia puede decirse que viene ya de la administración Obama, hay ausencia de compromiso de EEUU respecto a Libia.

También respecto de los problemas de trata, debemos ser respetuosos con el derecho internacional. También constata con frustración del incumplimiento del derecho internacional, de las resoluciones de Naciones Unidas.

Otro capítulo importante es el desarrollo, especialmente al hablar del sur, de África, el nexo entre seguridad y desarrollo es directo.

Recoge la intervención de Polonia, la gestión de la información correcta en los países de conflictos. Debe haber inversión pero también darles la oportunidad de producir.

Finaliza afirmando que contribuir a la estabilidad de los países vecinos, es una contribución decisiva para la seguridad en la Unión Europea.

Sesión 2. Respuesta europea a la inestabilidad y amenazas en el sur del Mediterráneo y en el Oriente medio (13.30-15h**)**

El **Presidente** señala que hay delegaciones que se han acercado para presentar nuevas enmiendas al borrador final de las conclusiones acordado ayer en la reunión de Jefes de delegación. Pregunta si hay objeciones a la ampliación de plazo hasta las 5 de la tarde de hoy.

La **delegación polaca** señala que esto es un procedimiento atípico. No puede aceptar el que no puedan debatirse suficientemente las enmiendas.

El **Presidente** señala que tenemos un Reglamento y que por supuesto hay que cumplirlo. La vía correcta es la ampliación del plazo, hasta las 5 de la tarde, pero teniendo en cuenta que estas nuevas enmiendas sólo podrán ser aceptadas es con el consenso de todos.

Un representante de los **Países Bajos** pide una nueva ampliación hasta las 7 de la tarde.

La **Presidencia** concede ampliación de plazo hasta las 7 de la tarde, lo que se aprueba por asentimiento. El Presidente abre el turno de intervenciones de los expertos en terrorismo y estado de derecho.

Interviene en primer lugar el **Sr. Kahin ISMAIL**, representante del Alto Comisario de Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados.

Existe un vínculo cada vez mayor entre los refugiados y la estabilidad y la seguridad. Desde la Guerra Mundial no se ha visto un desplazamiento de esta magnitud, con 15 conflictos iniciados o reactivados en este momento en el mundo. La escalada de violencia hace que la situación de cada refugiado repercuta en una pluralidad de dimensiones. Es un fenómeno complejo, hay que garantizar la protección de los derechos fundamentales según la Convención de 1951 y también la seguridad regional y de nuestras fronteras. En 2015 cruzaron de Turquía a Grecia un número de personas sin precedentes y posteriormente han iniciado la entrada por la ruta de los Balcanes, hoy cerrada. Es preciso encontrar vías legales y seguras de entrada, como ha instado ACNUR, para luchar contra la inmigración irregular, así como remover obstáculos y trabas al proceso de reunificación. Es una medida crucial para luchar contra el tráfico irregular de personas. Sigue habiendo escasa coherencia entre los sistemas de registro nacionales y los registros internacionales. Se requiere compartir información e inteligencia, comunicación entre Agencias de asilo y autoridades, y también con los países de origen cuando las circunstancias lo permitan.

A continuación toma la palabra el **Sr. Gilles de KERCHOVE**, Coordinador de lucha contra el terrorismo.

La amenaza es compleja, diversa, en cuanto al perfil de personas sospechosas de actividad terrorista, desde su procedencia del ISIS-Daesh hasta lobos solitarios inspirados por Internet, que están frustrados, no pocas veces son personas vulnerables. La diversidad de blancos, desde las Iglesias o confesiones religiosas, hasta las personas que sufrieron los ataques en Berlín, diversidad también de armas homicidas, avión, camión, cuchillo, etc. El vínculo con el

crimen y la delincuencia es creciente, en cuanto a antecedentes policiales. También el número de mujeres. Este año quizá veremos más tramas, no más atentados, porque se es menos vulnerable, pero como el Califato físico de ISIS está hundiéndose, esto hace pensar en una diversificación de estrategias. En cuanto a los retenidos por los terroristas presentan también un escenario de gran incertidumbre. También hay incertidumbre respecto de Daesh, y se pregunta si veremos el Daesh 2.0, si van a plantar la semilla en Libia, Sinaí, Cáucaso, etc. Es un error pasar por alto a Al Qaeda, ya no tienen un objetivo inmediato, pero tienen más paciencia. Se calcula que unos 20.000 combatientes sirios, sunníes en su mayoría, establecen en la actualidad diversas sucursales de Al Qaeda.

Insta a continuar y profundizar Europa, por la vía **JUNCKER**, la Unión de seguridad, con cita de **Julian KING**, comisario británico. Ha visto lo que se ha logrado al respecto en dos años. El Presidente del Consejo Europeo, **D. TUSK**, seleccionó, con acierto, como tema principal la seguridad, lucha contra el terrorismo, control de las fronteras exteriores.

También hay que profundizar en la dimensión de la prevención e impedir cualquier signo de radicalización en prisiones, en Internet, incluyendo programas efectivos de rehabilitación.

Se pidió a la **Sra. MOGHERINI** que se centrase en los problemas de seguridad interior tras los atentados de París, del Charlie Ebdó. Se le pidió que negociase un acuerdo con Argelia, Túnez, Balcanes Occidentales, para la lucha contra el terrorismo. Ya se ha empezado una primera fase con Túnez, posteriormente se comenzará con Argelia y Marruecos. Se le ha invitado para asesorar como la OTAN podría mejorar en la lucha contra el terrorismo. El Presidente Obama se basó mucho en el multilateralismo, Foro Mundial contra el Terrorismo, y los partenariados en este ámbito. La lucha contra el extremismo estaba en el centro de la Agenda. La primera parte, la prevención, es algo que debemos liderar la Unión europea. La segunda parte, Irán, Arabia Saudí, llegará posteriormente; si no, seguirá siendo una guerra por poderes. Hay en el Mediterráneo un enorme problema de radicalización, el incremento del salafismo. La radicalización viene a veces inducida por brechas en el Estado de derecho.

Sr. Valerio de DIVITIS. Representa al Instituto internacional de Justicia y Estado de Derecho, lanzado en Malta, dependiente del anteriormente citado Foro internacional de lucha contra el terrorismo, y ha sido creado por la Decisión conjunta de la Comisión Europea y de la Alta Representante de la Unión Europea para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad sobre la participación de la Unión Europea en diferentes organismos de cooperación para la prevención y la lucha contra el terrorismo que puede consultarse en:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:3ab6318d-4cad-11e5-9f5a-01aa75ed71a1.0007.03/DOC_1&format=HTML&lang=es&parentUrn=CELEX:52015JC0032

Es una institución parlamentaria. Han celebrado 5 talleres: En Malta, Rabat, Bruselas, Estambul y se concluyó en Malta en año pasado. Desde un enfoque práctico todos los parlamentarios comparten su visión y compromiso, base para las prácticas parlamentarias y normas básicas que se ejecuten a nivel nacional. Todo ello ha desembocado en la Declaración de La Valeta:

http://www.theiij.org/wp-content/uploads/14June18_New_Draft_Valletta_Declaration_FINAL.pdf

Esta iniciativa va a continuar, fortaleciendo el nexo con las instituciones de justicia. La actuación de los legisladores en justicia penal es básica, que se entiendan bien las recomendaciones de Valeta. Están intentando que el Parlamento árabe se sume a esta iniciativa y acoja una reunión este año.

El Presidente abre el debate, dos minutos por portavoz.

- **Polonia. Szymon SZYNKOWSKI VEL SEK**. Hace un recuerdo al movimiento Solidarnosk, que comenzó en 1980. El problema de la migración debe atajarse mediante escuelas, hospitales, trabajo en los países de origen de los refugiados. Si vienen a nuestros países no podrán trabajar por sus propios países. En Polonia, han incrementado la ayuda financiera a Siria, hasta 4 veces más que hace un año.

- **Portugal. Sr. Carlos COSTA**. Se interesa por el problema de la estabilidad del Sur y Este, cierto que hay que ir al Sahel, pero también al sur del Sahel, la amenaza llega mucho más allá de las costas mediterráneas. Qué tipo de colaboración con la OTAN tendríamos que tener?

- **Parlamento Europeo. Sra. Ramona MANESCU**. El intercambio de información de pasajeros, es un ejemplo de mejora en seguridad y defensa, también la directiva de blanqueo de dinero, comparación de los programas de financiación UE-EEUU, todo son logros, pero es necesaria mayor coordinación para enfrentar los retos, coordinación entre política interior y exterior, para eliminar las causas de raíz, no es suficiente la ayuda humanitaria. La intervención en Jordania, Turquía, Egipto, debe ser orientada a estabilizar estos países.

- **Lituania. Sr Audronius AZUBAKUS**, señala la importancia de trabajar en los países de origen y tránsito. Las cifras son decepcionantes en cuanto a retorno de inmigrantes, muchos se quedan en la Unión Europea, cuando no tienen derecho a ello. El asilo va de la mano de las políticas de retorno. No deberían emprender este viaje de modo ilegal. Debe haber mayor cooperación en readmisión por parte de terceros Estados. Debería haber un registro de aquellos Estados que cooperan y los que no.

- **Eslovaquia. Sr. Lubos BLAHA**. El incremento de la inmigración es una consecuencia de las guerras de Irak y Siria. Dudan de la eficacia de aplicar el principio de cupos o cuotas, los inmigrantes no quieren vivir en los países pobres; quieren abandonar el Este para irse al Oeste.

- **Parlamento Europeo. Sra. Anna GOMES**. Pregunta la valoración del procedimiento de comparación de listas de pasajeros. También las medidas de blanqueo de dinero en relación con la lucha contra el terrorismo. Señala la importancia de la inversión en prevención de la radicalización en las prisiones, son nuestros conciudadanos los que se radicalizan y pregunta si está progresando la inversión en inteligencia.

- **Francia. Sr. PUEYO.** Sobre la necesidad de formación de personal militar y medios para la misión de Mali.

- **Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Javier NART**. Alerta de la amenaza para la seguridad que supone el cinturón del Sahel, Niger, Mali, que puede constituir una amenaza peor que Boko Haram. Apunta la necesidad de actuar conjuntamente en Libia.

- **Suecia. Sr. Pyry NIEMI**. Es importante la integración socio laboral de los inmigrantes. La población de algunos Estados está creciendo. Es necesaria una combinación de instrumentos. La delegación sueca está sorprendida de que determinados países pongan en tela de juicio la ejecución de instrumentos ya aprobados.

- **Finlandia. Sr. Matti VANHANEN.** Apela a la solidaridad europea en lucha contra el terrorismo. Turquía, Irán y Rusia parecen estar ocupándose de todo, pero Europa está ausente, ha de comenzarse desde el principio en Oriente Medio.

- **Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Mario BORGHEZIO**. Existen lagunas en la estrategia de lucha contra el terrorismo, pregunta si en la prevención de su financiación, existe suficiencia de mecanismos. Sobre la conexión entre milicias libias próximas a Daesh y la trata de personas, bajo la ayuda de pretendidas ONGs, que usan barcos que ostentan pabellones de conveniencia, se pregunta si existe colaboración suficiente éntrelos servicios de seguridad de los Estados miembros.

- **Eslovaquia. Sr. Juraj DROBA**. Plantea el problema de las cuotas como sistema de acogida e inserción social de refugiados pues aunque se cumpliesen las cuotas en su país, desean marcharse a otros países más ricos, por lo que la presión que se coloca sobre su país es injusta, la propuesta es organizar campamentos fuera del territorio europeo, y todos los que busquen asilo, por la Unión Europea, lo soliciten. Vivir en la Unión Europea no garantiza un derecho a todo. Apuesta por la seguridad en las fronteras.

- **Países Bajos. Sr. Thierry BAUDET**. Apoya al interviniente anterior. Su Gobierno habla de la necesidad de reforzar las capacidades militares y acción más eficaz en Europa en inmigración. Es un debate abierto entre euroescépticos. Hoy parecen mayoría. No podemos dejar entrar a tantas personas

-**España. Sr. Carlos ROJAS** considera que la inmigración irregular es un fenómeno complejo, que requiere un enfoque global e interdisciplinar, centrado en eliminar las causas en origen, particularmente problemas de gobernanza y pobreza en origen. Afirma que es necesaria una mayor cooperación, diplomacia y ayuda presupuestaria al desarrollo; todo ello son retos para la Unión Europea en este momento. Enfatizar la cooperación para el desarrollo significa crear oportunidades económicas de desarrollo en nuestros vecinos. La cooperación a ambos lados del Mediterráneo es más necesaria que nunca, y debemos mostrar la presencia europea y la ayuda europea. Se necesita diálogo con los países de origen, tránsito, y destino, especialmente reforzar la lucha contra la trata de seres humanos, reforzando el control en las fronteras exteriores, los medios al servicio de la Agencia FRONTEX, aprovechando nuevas herramientas tecnológicas, como el nuevo Sistema de control y autorización de desplazamientos que garanticen la protección internacional. La política migratoria de la Unión Europea debe basarse en la cooperación y en la solidaridad internacional, teniendo en cuenta que la ruta central está

bajo una presión migratoria extrema, por lo que el principio de solidaridad es tremendamente importante en esta cuestión.

Sra. AKLESTEN (Suecia). Agradece especialmente las muestras de apoyo por el último atentado Estocolmo.

En turno de réplica, el **Sr. De KERCHOVE** indica que se han hecho progresos con FRONTEX, Europol, es un ingente trabajo el que se ha hecho. La Alta Representante y la Comisión van a presentar al Consejo conjuntamente, por primera vez, la Estrategia de acción contra el terrorismo, no solo considerando la importancia de la ayuda humanitaria sino atajando las causas últimas. Es necesario hacer más en el Sahel. En Irak, es importante la formación de la policía. La OTAN tiene operaciones de vigilancia marítima, podría darse un fructífero intercambio, Europol puede llegar a importantes acuerdos con la OTAN. La ciberdelincuencia nos sitúa ante la realidad de que no estamos ante compartimentos estancos. La Comisión está trabajando en un informe sobre el sistema europeo de control y autorización de desplazamientos, sobre los puntos que la **Sra. GOMES** ha puesto de manifiesto. Es preciso poner de nuestra parte a los países musulmanes.

Sr. ISMAIL. Sobre solidaridad, se muestra a favor de un mecanismo que preste ayuda a los países que más sufren el flujo migratorio, para que puedan atender sobre todo a los más vulnerables. Menos del 1 % han sido reubicados. Para detener las acciones ilegales que acompañan al fenómeno migratorio hay que adoptar medidas concretas. También apunta el riesgo de la generación perdida, jóvenes con un futuro incierto, que están en campos de refugiados, y no saben cuándo van a salir de allí, así como la importancia de atajar las causas de los flujos migratorios. En Libia, ya es tarde para solucionar la cuestión relativa a personas que llevan viajando muchos kilómetros hasta llegar allí. Ha de haber una intervención seria y persistente en este ámbito.

Sr. De DIVITIS. En un mundo globalizado, la economía no lo es todo. Apunta la importancia de la inversión en los sistemas penitenciarios, en rehabilitación. Hace referencia a la intervención del **Sr. NART** en relación con Libia, su posición habitual (y con razón) es que si no actuamos conjuntamente los Estados no conseguiremos nada, necesitamos implicarnos con las distintas partes que se dan cita en el problema de Libia.

Sesión 3. Intercambio de puntos de vista sobre las prioridades y las estrategias de la Unión Europea en las áreas de seguridad y defensa (16.00h-17.30h).

Sr. Carmelo ABELA. Ministro de Interior y Seguridad Nacional de Malta.

A pesar de los avances en las conversaciones de paz de la ONU, Libia no ha salido de la situación difícil que vive. Su estabilidad es una condición fundamental para su calidad de vida pero también para sus vecinos de la Unión Europea. La Unión Europea, según sus Tratados, habilita a la PESC y PCSD, para promover la paz y prevención de conflictos, como parte de sus instrumentos y su enfoque integral. Hoy existen misiones de paz en respuesta a diferentes tipos de crisis. No sólo es una cuestión de gestión de fronteras, sino también de guía a las

autoridades locales implicadas. Menciona la operación Sofía, la intervención en aguas internacionales en la costa de Libia para luchar contra la trata de personas y la ayuda de la Unión Europea a las autoridades palestinas en la seguridad interna, pues en la franja de Gaza hay una misión de asistencia desde 2005, de tal modo que la Unión Europea es co-ejecutora del acuerdo palestino-israelí. Hoy está detenida esta operación pero desearíamos reactivarla para facilitar la libertad de circulación y establecimiento de personas y bienes. La Unión Europea ha trabajado con sus países vecinos para mejorar la seguridad.

El mecanismo europeo de paz contiene una serie de elementos de respuesta, sobre la base de la experiencia y la profundización en nuevos medios de acción, basado en la cooperación con sus socios para solucionar las crisis.

Sra. Federica MOGHERINI, Alta Representante de la Unión Europea para asuntos exteriores y de seguridad común y Vicepresidenta de la Comisión Europea.

Recuerda que es la sexta vez que comparece ante esta Asamblea, desde que comenzó el mandato, que ahora se encuentra en el ecuador, sin haber faltado nunca a una sola cita, pues lo que se trata aquí y el presente Foro es fundamental. Recuerda que tenemos que trabajar juntos en todas las instituciones. Necesitamos la propiedad de nuestra Europa común. La Unión Europea no es algo ajeno, somos todos juntos y lo que hagamos de ello, y la responsabilidad de responder a nuestros ciudadanos es nuestra. El diálogo entre las instituciones, los Parlamentos nacionales y el Parlamento Europeo es el lugar desde donde se hace la PESC. Somos más fuertes como Unión cuando movilizamos coordinadamente todos nuestros instrumentos de política exterior. Es mucho más eficaz la ayuda conjunta de la Unión Europea, para conseguir los objetivos de desarrollo, y ha de trabajarse en una programación conjunta de estos objetivos.

Plantea una serie de cuestiones clave que acaban de debatirse en la reunión de los Ministros de Defensa, que han trabajado en la definición del componente estratégico. En junio se presentará un proyecto estratégico, para hacer efectiva la Estrategia global que la Alta Representante presentó dos o tres días tras el referéndum del Reino Unido, pese a las críticas de quien dudaba que aquel fuera el momento adecuado, ella no lo entendió así, porque el mundo crece y necesita interlocutores fiables. En aquel momento se habló de lo que nos une, los valores e intereses que todos queríamos que avanzaran.

En seguridad y defensa, en 9 meses se ha avanzado más, en pasos concretos hacia una verdadera unión en estos temas, que en los 16 años anteriores. La seguridad puede lograrse a través del valor añadido que aporta la Unión Europea, y esto es algo que los ciudadanos entienden. Esto tiene que ver con la adecuada comunicación de cómo se gastan los recursos en seguridad y defensa en Europa, y en los presupuestos nacionales. EEUU tiene 27 sistemas de armas en uso, en Europa 154, sería necesaria una mayor racionalización de las inversiones. El debate del 2% es clásico a nivel nacional respecto de la OTAN, además hay que analizar cuánto se ejecuta realmente; invertimos la mitad de lo que invierten los americanos, pero los resultados son equivalentes a un 15%; independientemente de que en los Parlamentos

nacionales se valore cuánto se va a gastar, hay que intentar racionalizar. Tenemos 15 operaciones militares en Europa. En Asia se nos ve como un socio comercial, pero cada vez más como socio en defensa; de militares a militares, el contacto hace que haya una mayor eficacia, porque somos fiables y previsibles. Un poder fuerte es lo que piden nuestros interlocutores en el mundo, y más en tiempos duros como los actuales.

Hace un mes y medio hemos creado un nuevo Centro de mando en estructuras militares, se está trabajando en una estructura permanente de cooperación, PESCO, también una programación anual de defensa conjunta, lo que redundará en beneficio de la Agencia europea. La Comisión está desarrollando un Fondo común de defensa, en cooperación y en materia industrial. También se trabaja como mejorar la respuesta rápida conjunta, civil y militar. Es el décimo año desde que existen estos grupos de combate. Los obstáculos que había estaban más en el mecanismo de financiación que en su operatividad concreta.

Podemos fortalecer el poder europeo en defensa, pero desde un enfoque de multilateralidad, de visión conjunta con un desarrollo sostenible, trabajo humanitario, resiliencia, todo ello es parte de nuestro sistema de seguridad. Debemos también reforzar la integración con el Sistema de seguridad de Naciones Unidas.

Afganistán y Siria son dos crisis, en las que en Bruselas, la Unión Europea, celebró conferencias principales, para demostrar qué queremos comunicar en términos prácticos, apoyo humanitario, resiliencia y procesos políticos, muy pocas regiones tienen tanto potencial como nosotros. Otra solución práctica de Estrategia global son los Compact en África, en los países de origen, para resolver la migración en ese ámbito. Expresa su interés en este debate, que se va a producir en el día de mañana, con los Ministros, sobre el futuro de las relaciones con Turquía y la globalización y los desafíos actuales en el mundo. Sólo podemos luchar contra los desafíos que presenta la globalización juntos. Hay países que piden soberanía, pero nuestros interlocutores son áreas de tamaño continental como China, de modo que una de las formas de devolver soberanía a la gente es con la fortaleza que da el tamaño.

También es la forma de conseguir gobernanza a gran escala. Ni el proteccionismo ni el aislacionismo es una solución, sólo pueden dar lugar a guerras comerciales. Después del *brexit*, seremos el primer mercado, la segunda principal economía del mundo, quizá la primera, y el principal donante humanitario. Debemos establecer reglas que puedan marcar un orden mundial basado en asociaciones firmes para lograrlo.

Seguidamente la Presidencia abre el Debate, asignando minuto y medio por intervención.

Portugal. Sr. Carlos COSTA NEVES. Pregunta por sus reuniones con Rusia; la OTAN, repartir la carga, el 2%.

Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Eugen FREUND. Debería haber más iniciativas en la crisis de Oriente Medio.

Parlamento Europeo. Sra. Anna GOMES. De acuerdo con el Fondo europeo. Pregunta si podemos seguir negando la relación entre desarrollo y cleptocracia, como enfrentar los retos

de Erdogan, de los refugiados de Siria y del acuerdo con Turquía y respecto de Moscú, se pregunta si no somos lo suficientemente activos frente a su amenaza.

Reino Unido. Sr. Crispin BLUNT. El Reino Unido seguirá teniendo la Unión Europea en el centro de su interés nacional, seguirán en la OTAN, y del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas. Va en interés del Reino Unido y los 27 crear una asociación adaptada entre el Reino Unido y la Unión Europea.

Parlamento Europeo. Sra. Sabine Barbara LÖSING. Se necesitan nuevas capacidades militares. Se pregunta por el gasto en defensa, en particular, si los ciudadanos han mandatado que los recursos de cooperación y seguridad, deban gastarse en defensa.

Noruega. Sra. Oyvind HALLEHAKER. Su país es miembro activo de la Unión económica y de Schengen. También de la OTAN, y apunta que los riesgos de la seguridad son también importantes en el Ártico, y en las aguas de los mares del Norte, por parte de Rusia.

Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Ioan Mircea PASCU. Pide profundizar en el nexo entre seguridad y defensa.

Malta. Sr. Francis ZAMMIT DIMECH. Pregunta por las relaciones de la Unión Europea con la nueva administración americana.

Suecia. Sr. Peter JEPPSON pregunta por los acuartelamientos civiles y militares.

Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Tonino PICULA. Pregunta por el *brexit* junto a la negociación de nuevos candidatos a ingresar en la Unión Europea, y sobre los procesos de integración y adhesión en general.

Polonia. Sr. Rafal TRZASKOWSKI. Pregunta por el concepto de guerra híbrida. Asimismo, cuál es la posición oficial respecto de Turquía, en el entendido de que debe reevaluarse nuestra política exterior con Turquía.

Parlamento Europeo. Sra. Ramona MANESCU. Continúa con la cuestión de la guerra híbrida, e interesa valoración respecto de las armas rusas insidiosas contra la Unión Europea, la inversión de 200 millones de euros, la lucha contra la propaganda. En el Consejo de Seguridad no se ha reaccionado, a su juicio, debe reforzarse el funcionamiento del Consejo de Seguridad, y cómo la Unión Europea puede contribuir a ello.

Islandia. Sra. Jona Solveig ELINARDOTTIR. Sobre la igualdad de género en seguridad y defensa. Cuál es el estado actual de la labor de la Unión Europea para incluir a la mujer en los diálogos para la paz.

Parlamento Europeo. Sr Mario BORGHEZIO. Recrimina la detención de periodistas en Turquía, donde Europa ha actuado tarde.

Francia. Sr. Joaquim PUEYO. La cooperación permanente no ha conseguido logros tangibles en grupos de combatientes.

Parlamento Europeo. Sra. Zelgiana ZOVKO. Sobre la construcción de resiliencia en los países socios, y si la Alta Representante va a hacer algo para identificar posibles carencias o duplicidades en defensa para mejorar la resiliencia en estos países.

Eslovenia. Sr. Josef HORVAT. Reclama los valores comunes, y respetando asimismo los compromisos de la OTAN, en relación con la cuestión de la migración en los Estados miembros.

Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Michael GAHLAER El potencial de Tratado de Lisboa es enorme. Se congratula de los avances en la PCSD, desarrollo de capacidades, elementos capitales en la situación actual. Se refiere al problema de los Balcanes occidentales. La perspectiva de adhesión es difícil.

Lituania. Sr. Ojars Eriks KALNIS. Dudas en relación con el papel de la Unión Europea respecto de la administración americana.

Lituania. Sr. Vytautas BAKAS. Kaliningrado es el área más militarizada de toda Europa, la federación rusa utiliza todas sus capacidades contra sus países vecinos. Apunta retos: Comunicación estratégica, amenazas híbridas, ciberseguridad, fronteras exteriores, inmigración, nuevas fuentes de energía.

Rumanía. Sr. Cristian Sorin DUMITRESCU. Prestar atención a los conflictos y su simbiosis con los problemas energéticos, podría introducirse un capítulo para prestar atención a la zona del Mar Negro.

Kosovo. Sr. Elmi RECICA. La adhesión a Europa de los países de los Balcanes occidentales es una oportunidad de cara a la seguridad de la Unión Europea.

Lituania. Sr. Andronius AZUBALIS, sobre la política europea respecto de Bielorrusia. Pregunta a la **SRA. MOGHERINI** si reconsideraría la posición común de la Unión, en vista de su cooperación militar con Moscú.

Eslovaquia. Sr. Lubos BLAHA. Sobre la respuesta de la Comisión Europea sobre el bombardeo de Trump en Siria, sin contar con Naciones Unidas. Las sanciones respecto a Rusia son ineficaces si países como Alemania hacen negocios con Rusia.

Estonia. Sra. Kerstin Oudekki LOONE. Las políticas de la Unión Europea son hipócritas. Los flujos migratorios ponen en riesgo la retribución de los trabajadores, la inmigración redunda en sueldos baratos, los inmigrantes son los primeros en precarizar el empleo. Las cuotas no son la solución.

Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Knut FLECKENSTEIN. Pregunta sobre los nuevos Fondos para la Unión en defensa. Cuánto cuesta y de donde viene el dinero, y cuál es la vía práctica de la implementación de la Estrategia de defensa.

Alemania. Sr. Sevim DAGDELEN. Pregunta sobre el destino del 2% del PIB a la OTAN. Es bueno este rearme en Europa? Está de acuerdo con proseguir las conversaciones con Turquía que hoy bombardea a kurdos, y presta colaboración a la plataforma del islamismo combatiente?

Italia. Sr. Paolo ALLI. Recuerda a De Gasperi, y cree que al cabo de 60 años la **Sra. MOGHERINI** toma esta antorcha. Gastar mejor sí, pero gastar más. Qué instrumentos macroestructurales puede poner en juego la Unión Europea? Y recuerda que entre sus objetivos está acabar con la trata, pero debería interesarse su declaración en Naciones Unidas, como crimen contra la humanidad.

Suecia. Sr. Pyry NIEMI. LPregunta si la forma de financiación de esta Estrategia va a ser con mayor aportación de los Estados miembros? Señala y subraya la igualdad de género también, y pide que desarrolle más el tema de Bielorrusia.

Países Bajos. Sra. Salima BELHAJ. Pregunta si habrá debate con los partidos políticos que no creen en una mayor cooperación de la Unión Europea.

Parlamento Europeo. Sr. Tamas MESZERICKS. En el Grupo de los Verdes se felicitan por los avances de la PESC, pero con la advertencia que hoy se ha puesto de manifiesto, que es 50% del gasto americano, pero se traduce en 15 % de resultados, eso implica una organización poco eficiente, y, por tanto, se pregunta, para qué gastar más. Sobre el Centro de mando y las nuevas estructuras, hay que devolver soberanía a la gente, pero esto hay que hacerlo a base de mayor transparencia y control parlamentario.

Alemania. Sr. Wolfgang HELLMICH. Pregunta qué relaciones prevé con la OTAN, y se alegra de que haya mencionado la situación crítica en Afganistán.

La **Sra. MOGHERINI** en turno de réplica, contesta a las observaciones planteadas.

Afganistán. La Unión Europea tiene un papel importante. Se ha debatido con el Gobierno afgano sobre la agenda de reformas: igualdad de género, educación, seguridad, paz, e idénticamente con los interlocutores chinos, indios, rusos. Deben respetarse los logros constitucionales en lo que sigue siendo un entorno de seguridad muy frágil.

Rusia. En 2012 visitó, como Alta Representante, a este Estado, fue muy temprana su visita y su interés. La anexión de Crimea, Ucrania, todo ello estaba en la Agenda. La posición de la Unión Europea era firme y unida. Ciertamente, se ha cooperado con Rusia. Y también esta cooperación aporta resultados. Por ejemplo, el logro de Irán, en el conflicto Israel y Palestina, compartimos posición, una cooperación constructiva con la Federación rusa en la lucha contra el terrorismo y cambio climático; hay por supuesto fricciones como Siria y Libia.

Sobre el 2%. Esto no es un debate de la Unión Europea, porque esto le compete a la OTAN. Esto depende también de los Parlamentos nacionales. Lo que está en nuestras manos es la mejora en la eficiencia del gasto militar. Lo que podemos es apoyar a los Estados miembros en esta eficacia. Gastar juntos para gastar mejor. Podría ser el lema. El trabajo ha avanzado mucho tras la cumbre de Varsovia.

Respecto de la nueva administración americana, hay un contacto fluido, el Secretario de Estado, como VicePresidente, es su contraparte en la Casa Blanca, y ha venido de visita en sus primeros días de mandato a la Unión Europea. La lucha contra el terrorismo, el gasto en

defensa, son cuestiones en las que estamos cerca, hay otras cosas en las que discrepamos. La actitud respecto del multilateralismo, por ejemplo, es diferente. Respecto del cambio climático o ayuda humanitaria, su posición es diferente. Cuando finalicen la revisión de sus políticas ya tendremos un cuadro más claro, ahora es prematura cualquier evaluación.

Africa. Totalmente de acuerdo en que hay que ir más allá del Sahel; China, India, Rusia, todos quieren a la Unión Europea como socio en seguridad, defensa, clima, comercio, etc. Importancia de hacer cada vez más Unión.

Siria. Si bien por un lado decimos que nuestro poder es el poder blando, por otra parte, si no hay una interlocución de defensa no hay interlocución en absoluto. Somos un interlocutor político de primera magnitud. Si no estuviéramos allí, no sería lo mismo, en absoluto: apoyamos los contactos de Ginebra, trabajamos con la sociedad civil… estamos ayudando humanitariamente, otros bombardean, nosotros salvamos, educamos, estamos salvando vidas.

Reino Unido. Perderá más el Reino Unido con el *brexit* de lo que perderá la Unión Europea. Este país contribuye un 5% en presupuesto militar, un 3% en civil. Podremos sobrevivir sin ellos, podrán colaborar, pero sin voz ni voto. El marco de cooperación en defensa será la OTAN.

Tenemos varias sedes en la Unión Europea para la PESC-PCSD. Hay sedes europeas. Hay 15 operaciones, deben coordinarse en un mismo lugar. Una planificación eficiente de la actividad requiere mayor concentración.

Balcanes occidentales. El futuro de la Unión Europea es a más de 27. Pero no puede decirse si esto será en 5 o 10 años, por eso tenemos con nosotros a los Ministros de los países candidatos en el día de mañana. Empezamos ya a trabajar conjuntamente. Forman parte de Europa. Es un camino hacia la integración.

Consejo de Naciones Unidas. Debemos actuar coordinadamente para reforzar el sistema de seguridad.

Sobre igualdad de género, es importante, trabajamos mucho en este tema en la Unión Europea, incluyendo la Unión Africana y la Liga Árabe.

Sobre lucha contra el terrorismo, la mayor parte de los atentados que se han perpetrado en Europa lo han hecho ciudadanos europeos, totalmente de acuerdo en que hay que prevenir, en las prisiones y en Internet. La colaboración y el intercambio de información y mejores prácticas con otros países es fundamental en este ámbito.

Sobre el reconocimiento del tráfico de personas como crimen contra la humanidad, estamos trabajando en Sofía sobre estas cuestiones. Son otras formas de esclavitud y el marco legal está actualmente obsoleto.

Los ciudadanos se alejan de la Unión Europea, sí, a primera vista puede decirse que hay desafección porque las promesas de bienestar no se han cumplido, pero visto desde fuera,

hemos cumplido y con creces, no solo 60 años de paz, mejores condiciones de la población, el Estado de derecho y los derechos humanos, sino que se ha profundizado en la Unión, hay mecanismos de toma de decisiones comunes con los poderes de los Estados miembros. Hay mucho por hacer, pero no podemos negar logros. También hay que cambiar políticas, a veces se cuestiona al actor, cuando hay que cuestionar la acción.

Viernes 28 de abril de 2017.

Se desarrollan tres talleres simultáneamente (ver Programa en **Anexo 0**).

El taller 1 sobre la política migratoria de la Unión Europea en 2017 y más allá (ver Nota en **Anexo VII.A**)

El taller 2 sobre combatir la propaganda y la guerra informativa (ver Nota en **Anexo VII.B**)

El taller 3 sobre el Plan de Acción Europeo de Defensa y las Relaciones OTAN-UE (ver Nota en **Anexo VII.C**)

Este último es el taller al que asiste el Presidente de la Delegación junto con la Letrada, por lo que se da cuenta del mismo a continuación.

El moderador del debate**, Sr. GAHLER (Parlamento Europeo)**, indica que el Parlamento Europeo está preparando una resolución sobre este Plan.

Interviene en primer lugar el **Sr. Jorge DOMEQ** (Director Ejecutivo de la Agencia de Defensa Europea). Subraya la simbiosis entre la Estrategia Global y el Plan de Acción de Defensa. En la Declaración conjunta se asegura que no se van a duplicar esfuerzos entre la OTAN y la Unión Europea.

Sobre el Plan de Acción de Defensa, el Consejo de Defensa acordó ofrecer una serie de propuestas, y la Comisión ha dado un paso adelante, porque es una primera vez que la Comisión ha protagonizado un proyecto piloto, y la Agencia va a ser un actor principal en la gestión de los fondos, para asegurar que los Estados miembros mejoren en la coordinación de la defensa.

El papel del Parlamento Europeo ha sido clave en acoger este proyecto. Ejerce una función presupuestaria pero también de cara a la investigación. El Fondo de defensa europeo debe emplear la innovación y desarrollo aprovechando la red de conocimientos que ya existen. Debe centrarse en programas y proyectos prioritarios, a través del proyecto de desarrollo de capacidades.

La Agencia está trabajando con la OTAN para que el proyecto de desarrollo de capacidades evite duplicidades. Pero nuestra filosofía es diferente, es de creación de capacidades a largo plazo y de cooperación, en la idea de que las capacidades en las que trabajamos en la Agencia, como la ciberdefensa, respondan a lagunas que existen tanto en el sistema de defensa europeo como en la OTAN. Tenemos la revisión anual de defensa, será presentada por la Alta Representante a los Ministros en junio. La Agencia está liderando este proceso. En primer

lugar hará una panorámica de la situación actual de capacidades en base a la información recibida de los Estados miembros y de nuestros socios, y posteriormente evaluaremos la coordinación de defensa. Queremos que exista coherencia entre los gastos nacionales y los europeos. También jugará aquí el análisis de las políticas de la Unión Europea, para asegurar que todas ellas sean coherentes en orden a la defensa.

La Agencia también realiza un análisis y registro en armas químicas, clave tanto para la Unión Europea como para la OTAN.

Termina señalando la importancia del papel de la Agencia, recordando que se fundó hace 30 años, y que siempre ha cumplido su mandato de contribuir a la defensa con una buena base industrial y asistir al Consejo en capacidades y armamento.

Sr. Gabor IKLODY, Director de Gestión de Crisis y Planificación.

Las cuestiones de seguridad están en la prioridad de las agendas políticas de los Estados miembros. La seguridad se ha convertido en parte crucial de nuestras vidas. Por ejemplo los problemas del Este, Rusia, y también por los efectos del terrorismo y la radicalización, ya sea procedente del sur, del este, o bien de nuestras mismas sociedades europeas.

Europa está expuesta a varios retos, de los cuales, el *brexit* nos sitúa en un escenario de incertidumbre a corto plazo. Existe gran división entre los Estados miembros en relación con la cuestión de la migración. Hoy necesitamos una historia de éxito, transmitir confianza en las Instituciones europeas, y en su proceso de integración, porque podemos proteger y defender a nuestros ciudadanos. La seguridad es clave.

Hay actualmente hay tres vehículos principales, que avanzan en paralelo: la ejecución de la Estrategia Global, los planes OTAN y la colaboración OTAN-UE, y todo ello son elementos que se refuerzan. Sin fondos no podemos llevar a cabo iniciativas concretas. La interacción con la OTAN es imprescindible. Hay que animar a los países a un mayor gasto y colaboración en capacidades, y que se concentren en los resultados de los esfuerzos, para justificar las nuevas inversiones.

El efecto de la política de defensa tendrá efectos en la propia integración europea, y en el vínculo trasatlántico, y por tanto sobre la OTAN. Existe una gran oportunidad para hacer avanzar a una nueva fase la relación con la OTAN. Varsovia fue un hito. Existen 7 ámbitos identificados en Varsovia, en diciembre se consensuaron 42 áreas tras el acuerdo de los líderes europeos. Hace notar la importancia de las revisiones sobre los resultados adquiridos, informar sobre lo que se ha hecho, en qué se ha avanzado.

Destacar tres ámbitos:

1) Célula de fusión híbrida, constituida en la Unión Europea y en la OTAN. Para recoger info de las instituciones de los EM y de las instituciones europeas, para poder concretar situaciones de alerta superior, conjunta, en la OTAN y en la Unión Europea. Poderse concentrar en quién hace cada cosa, como aliados.

2) En cuanto al intercambio de información, hay obstáculos, porque hay información clasificada. El Centro de excelencia Helsinki, investiga en temas híbridos. Es una institución que no solo es de la Unión Europea sino de la OTAN, hay 9 signatarios, 7 Estados miembros de la Unión europea y 2 de la OTAN no europeos.
3) El tercer aspecto es la resiliencia, que es donde somos más punteros, a través de normas comunitarias. La infraestructura crítica. Es aquí donde la Unión Europea puede marcar la diferencia.

Otro aspecto es la seguridad marítima. En Varsovia la OTAN decidió prestar apoyo a la operación Sofía. También en intercambio de información en el Egeo. La OTAN y FRONTEX han intercambiado información, incluso aquellas dificultades en este ámbito, por la clasificación de la información, se pudieron gestionar a través de oficinas de enlace.

En el Mediterráneo, la operación Sofía, es una oportunidad de rebajar el nivel de operación a uno pragmático, a través de los mandos.

Sobre los ejercicios, si estamos hablando de un entorno híbrido, es básico que haya ejercicios para poder tomar acciones coordinadas y tomar rápidas decisiones.

Sobre el reparto de la carga, el 25 de mayo habrá una mini-cumbre de la OTAN, primera oportunidad en que Trump va a acudir a Bruselas, y el tema central en la Agenda es el reparto de la carga. Se habla del refuerzo mutuo, la decisión del Consejo Europeo de diciembre pasado, para que haya recursos suficientes, respaldando la petición de la OTAN de invertir más. El actual esfuerzo trata de capacidades nacionales que luego la OTAN utilizará, no tanto de desarrollar capacidades conjuntas en Europa. El reto es asegurar coherencia entre las capacidades.

Gastamos 200 mil millones de euros a año. El problema es cómo se reparte la carga. A ambos lados del Atlántico, no solo se trata de 2% para cooperar mejor, cada Estado envía 107.000 soldados al año como fuerza de mantenimiento de la paz, 80. 000 millones de euros, el 69% viene de la Unión Europea, y pensemos en las 15 misiones desplegadas a lo largo del mundo. Eso no lo está desplegando la OTAN. Hay una enorme oportunidad para ambas organizaciones de colaborar. El reparto de la carga es una posibilidad que no va a estar abierta siempre, hay que contar con los Parlamentos y la sociedad civil.

A continuación, el **Sr. Krispin BLUNT (Reino Unido)** sobre el papel del Gran Bretaña cuando dejen de ser miembros de la Unión Europea, aboga por una asociación fuerte. La **Sra. Federica MOGHERINI** habló de que se gasta el 50% de los EEUU y se alcanza un 15 % de los resultados de este país. La declaración conjunta de la OTAN, Varsovia, refuerza tanto la Unión Europea en defensa como la OTAN. Lo que pide EEUU es más inversión por parte de los Estados miembros. Actualmente, el 2% del PIB. Las estructuras de cooperación permanente aportan una base para que esto se vea bien por los Estados miembros, y que puedan crearse sinergias.

La guerra cibernética, el ataque de Rusia, justifican también el Centro de excelencia de Riga y el Centro de excelencia en Tallin, involucrando a 7 miembros de la OTAN. Otro peligro es el

brexit. Reino Unido seguirá al frente de los grupos creados, por ejemplo el acuerdo de Lancaster, la cooperación con Francia y con Polonia. Podemos seguir formando parte de la política común de seguridad y defensa con acuerdos específicos, que estructuren la cooperación con UK, en la formulación de la política y en la gestión de capacidades civiles y militares.

Hace una propuesta para ello, publicada en su página web: "Post-*Brexit* EU-UK Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy" (Cooperación entre la Unión Europea y el Reino Unido en Política Exterior y de Seguridad tras el *brexit*).
https://www.blunt4reigate.com/sites/www.blunt4reigate.com/files/2017-04/Post-*Brexit*%20EU-UK%20cooperation%20on%20foreign%20%26%20security%20policy%20April%202017.pdf

No es una posición formal del Parlamento británico ni del partido conservador sino que es una iniciativa personal, una idea de mecanismo de cooperación post-*brexit*. Si vuelve a salir elegido Presidente de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores de la Cámara de los Comunes, seguirá trabajando en esta propuesta.

Existe un interés común entre el Reino Unido y la Unión Europea: valores comunes, paz y seguridad en base al derecho internacional, desafíos de la migración, y muy similares amenazas internas y exteriores. Respecto de Rusia, es fundamental que el Reino Unido sea un interlocutor destacado, con 5 décadas de relación con Europa y su liderazgo. La situación intergubernamental, la PESC y la PSDC, forman parte del acervo británico, respetando la autonomía del Reino Unido y de las Instituciones de la Unión Europea.

Los pilares de esta colaboración son: participación, colaboración máxima del Reino Unido con la Comisión de Seguridad y Defensa, a través de un status de observador permanente en la PCSD, que podamos asociarnos con las conclusiones del consejo de PCSC. Que se reúnan los embajadores y que se sigan de cerca las misiones. Diálogo político de alto nivel, *Foreign Office* y Consejo de Exteriores de la Unión Europea, con frecuencia mensual. Parece haber buena voluntad, en lo que yo he detectado. Este documento oficioso se puede ir afinando.

Todo ello en el marco de la declaración conjunta UE-OTAN de Varsovia, una OTAN y una Unión Europea que se refuerzan mutuamente y pueden aportar una seguridad conjunta mucho mayor.

Debate.

Alemania. Es un campo amplio el que hoy debatimos, como europarlamentario y también portavoz de su Grupo parlamentario, representa a una posición minoritaria. Pero hace una observación, hemos elaborado conclusiones alternativas, que los medios para investigación militar se debatan en la sociedad, que el empleo de medios militares sea un debate abierto en la sociedad.

Eslovaquia. Es un asunto muy actual la cooperación OTAN-UE. Teniendo en cuenta lo que hoy ocurre en el mundo esto no es una opción sino una obligación, deben eliminarse las barreras

artificiales. Respecto de la defensa europea, en la Cumbre de la OTAN (Chicago 2012) se abordó un concepto de defensa inteligente, hay que ser realistas. En Estonia se tratará sobre inversiones y gastos, debe tenerse cuidado con no duplicar. Se ha ejecutado lo decidido en Varsovia, se están dando resultados reales de creación de valor.

Otro **interviniente de Eslovaquia**. Todos conocemos la necesidad de gastar más, al menos 1.6 % PIB del año próximo en nuestro caso. Pregunta para el **Sr. DOMEQ**: cómo podemos alentar a los Estados miembros a que cooperen en la defensa. Ha mencionado un cuestionario para los gobiernos nacionales, es una buena iniciativa.

Sr. Joan PASCU (Parlamento europeo). Pregunta por una paradoja, hay colaboración, pero también rechazo a compartir entre la OTAN y la Unión Europea. Debemos analizar lo que afecta la guerra híbrida a las instituciones y procesos democráticos, cómo podemos proteger la democracia porque esta guerra ocurre en el propio proceso electoral, y afecta al corazón de las instituciones decisoras. Cruzar las fronteras dentro de Europa es mucho más difícil de lo que puede parecer. También apunta que el **Sr. BLUNT** y el **Sr. GAHLER**, se han referido a que existe un cierto entusiasmo a la preservación de la colaboración con Gran Bretaña, pero no debe olvidarse que ustedes han decidido irse.

Un **miembro del Parlamento Europeo** recuerda que estuvo aquí en Malta dos semanas después de la caída del muro de Berlín, y que entonces se producía la reunión entre Bush y Gorvachov, para debatir el nuevo orden mundial y el efecto del final de la partición de Europa, y lo hicieron sin ninguna institución que representase a Europa. Tiene la impresión de que no existe suficiente presencia de Europa en la política exterior europea. La política de defensa es necesaria, Europa tiene todas las herramientas para una política exterior sólida. Pero en muchos casos nos estamos apoyando en EEUU, que primero crea problemas y luego los soluciona: Siria, Oriente Medio, etc. Sin olvidar el problema de los refugiados, somos un continente de 500 millones de personas. Se pregunta cómo es que no nos hemos anticipado. Que no ocurra como en 1989, que otros poderes decidan nuestro destino.

En turno de réplica, el **Sr. Jorge DOMECQ** señala que el presupuesto europeo está dedicado a la investigación en defensa. Hay países que están pidiendo una mayor seguridad. También hay personal ocupado en la tecnología. La línea entre seguridad interior y exterior no es clara, y esto es evidente respecto del ciberespacio.

Tenemos que gastar más y mejor en defensa. Sin que haya una mayor cooperación, estos gastos pueden tener efectos nocivos. Queremos un 2% pero también inversión en interoperabilidad, invertir en algo que sea aprovechable desde un punto de vista transnacional, por lo que son necesarios criterios comunes.

Muchos de los Estados miembros tienen un gran potencial. Pero en la Agencia, Noruega está participando 4 veces más que muchos de los Estados miembros. Sobre concreciones en lo que podemos hacer para convencer a la ciudadanía, habría dos instrumentos posibles para maximizar la eficacia de la inversión. 1) La exención del IVA para estos conceptos. En la Agencia, en 2015, por ejemplo, exención IVA para proyectos importantes, en el marco de la

Agencia, hay 33 proyectos por valor de 136 millones de euros, la exención del IVA supondría ahorro por valor de 13 millones. 2) La existencia de un mecanismo de cooperación, de modo que la falta de sincronización entre proyectos no dé lugar a una situación de bloqueo, sino que exista un mecanismo financiero, para que puedan suministrarse fondos de los Estados miembros de modo temporal que sirva para hacer un puente para que los proyectos puedan lanzarse.

Finaliza expresando su deseo de que Gran Bretaña permanezca cerca de nuestra Agencia.

Sr. IKLODY. Sobre la defensa inteligente. Gastar más y mejor. En el debate ministerial en la OTAN, el Secretario General, **STOLTENBERG**, dijo se trata de gastar 2% y bien. Sabemos que hay divisiones políticas, por lo que la experiencia del Mediterráneo es necesaria. Sobre los híbridos, por ejemplo, la manipulación en elecciones, hay que intervenir, cuando han sido identificados ataques cibernéticos en EEUU, en Francia, en Dinamarca. Hay que intervenir en estos problemas.

La política de defensa común implica una mejor coordinación.

Sr. BLUNT. La historia de relación entre el Reino Unido y la Unión Europea puede ser resumida, quizá, en adelante, del siguiente modo: como la historia de un miembro reticente convertido en un colaborador entusiasta. Reino Unido es un socio básico, mejor que estemos a que no. Se refiere de nuevo a su documento oficioso e insta a su consideración.

Sesión de clausura. (12-13.30h)

Se presentan las conclusiones de los tres talleres

Sr. NART (Parlamento Europeo). Presenta las Conclusiones del Taller 1. Fue ponente **Anna GOMES (Parlamento Europeo)**, se trató la distinción migrante-refugiado; El **Sr. GABRICI** se refirió a la necesidad de un planteamiento conjunto, se vio que algunos Estados miembros tenían reticencias, lo cual debilitaba la posición común. Por eso es necesario un planteamiento intermedio, por ejemplo en el caso de la situación de Túnez. Pero es complicado. En el caso de Libia, Polonia, Eslovaquia, Eslovenia no concuerdan con esta posición común.

Sra. Anna FOTYGA (Parlamento Europeo). Presenta las Conclusiones Taller 2. Fue ponente el **Sr. Marco MIHKELSON (Estonia)**, que señaló que vivimos en la era de la desinformación. Se partió del informe del Parlamento Europeo. Hay que distinguir entre las fuentes de la propaganda, y áreas geográficas, instrumentos, herramientas, actores no estatales (Rusia y región del sur). Se evidencia la necesidad de incrementar la información a nivel europeo y nacional. El **Sr. GONZATO** (Director de Asuntos Generales) presentó la actividad de la Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior. Abordó el tema de los ciberataques en 2007, la OTAN decidió que una de sus instituciones estuviese en Tallin para hacer frente a la amenaza, y esto es un logro, inspirado por la Alta Representante, **Sra. MOGHERINI**. El Parlamento Europeo destaca la necesidad de aportar y cotejar la información procedente de diversos agentes, un poco en la línea del periodismo de calidad**. El Sr. LINTMEIJER** ha señalado que de 10 informaciones que nos llegan, 6 no son comprobadas en sus fuentes, y esto da idea de la responsabilidad de los

editores, de los medios de comunicación, sobre todo a raíz de la importancia de las redes sociales; Facebook ha salido mucho en el debate. Es una muestra del nivel de desinformación. Ha habido ejemplos de la delegación sueca, el ejemplo de Noruega, Países Bajos, Hungría y Eslovaquia.

Sr. DUMITRESCU presenta las conclusiones del taller 3. Se partió de la declaración del Consejo Europeo y de la Comisión, sobre la adopción de un Plan de Acción europeo en Defensa, un conjunto de medidas adoptadas en relación con los desafíos actuales, acompañado de fondos. Los ponentes han hablado del refuerzo de la capacidad de defensa de la Unión Europea, y la consolidación de la Agencia europea, el plan de acción permitirá que cada Estado miembro progrese en investigación. La Agencia evalúa el uso de los recursos de manera coherente, se identifican prioridades, Rusia, amenazas terroristas, guerra híbrida. Se ha manifestado la necesidad de mayor colaboración UE-OTAN, y evitar solapamientos. Sobre la guerra híbrida, se demanda mayor rapidez en la toma de decisiones. Gran Bretaña seguirá siendo un país importante en colaboración, en los tres frentes: Rusia, guerra híbrida y lucha contra el terrorismo. Al respecto, el **Sr. BLUNT** ha hablado del estatus del Reino Unido como observador de la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común y de la Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa. También se ha hablado sobre los fondos, y la importancia del presupuesto asignado a defensa.

El **Presidente** da cuenta de que como consecuencia de la apertura del nuevo plazo de enmiendas, hasta las 7 de la tarde del día de ayer, se recibieron enmiendas de Alemania, Eslovaquia, Italia, Parlamento Europeo, Polonia, Lituania, Hungría, Países Bajos, Dinamarca. (Ver **Anexo V** a este Informe), que pasan a defenderse.

En primer lugar se retira su enmienda por la **representación alemana**, queda como estaba el punto 5. La **delegación eslovaca** no tiene consenso, entre sí, a la hora de defender su enmienda, por lo que también se retira dicha enmienda. **Suecia** no está de acuerdo, sin embargo, con esa eliminación. **Dinamarca** señala que el que el jefe de la delegación eslovaca esté en contra del resto de su delegación, no debería suceder. Se aceptan las nuevas enmiendas al párrafo 9 y 10. Sobre el párrafo 12, la **delegación sueca** se opone a la enmienda del Parlamento Europeo, es una cuestión de procedimiento, no por el contenido. El resto de las enmiendas se refieren a asuntos que ya se han debatido, pero este es un asunto nuevo (sobre las relaciones de cooperación en infraestructuras entre Marruecos y Argelia con la Unión Europea). Un interviniente señala que el punto se ha debatido en los talleres de esta mañana. También ayer, durante la política de vecindad, se refirió a ello el ponente. El **Sr. NART (Parlamento Europeo)** señala que si no hay una objeción al contenido, debería aprobarse. Finalmente la **delegación sueca** se reafirma en su objeción, la enmienda no se acepta.

En el controvertido párrafo 16 (actual 17) en cuanto a refugiados, el **Sr. Konstantinos DOUZINAS (Grecia)**, señala que en la reunión de Jefes de delegación se aceptó la enmienda griega en el sentido de establecer un sistema de compensación si no se cumple con las cuotas. La solidaridad es un valor que debe plasmarse. Aquellos refugiados que se han quedado en Grecia y Italia, que se reasignen. Esto es una decisión que ya forma parte de la normativa comunitaria, que los que no cumplan, compensen, paguen, para que otros Estados como

Grecia, con 65.000 refugiados, puedan aliviar un tanto su carga. Finalmente, a propuesta de la delegación danesa, se acuerda admitir sólo una parte de la enmienda, una referencia genérica al concepto de "solidaridad".

La enmienda al párrafo 18 (actual 19) es defendida por **Polonia**, que señala que no es solo polaca, sino de la República checa, Estonia, Letonia, Eslovaquia, Hungría. En la línea totalmente opuesta a la de la enmienda anterior. Señala la enmienda "la participación de la Unión Europea y los Estados miembros en sostener el gravamen de los inmigrantes irregulares que entran en Europa debería ser voluntaria y basada en los principios de responsabilidad, solidaridad y proporcionalidad". La enmienda se rechaza por ir en contra de la normativa comunitaria vigente.

El resto de las enmiendas al párrafo 19 (actual 20) se aceptan, y se retira la enmienda al párrafo 21.

Las Conclusiones de esta Conferencia pueden consultarse en el **Anexo VIII** al presente Informe y en la citada página:

http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do?id=082dbcc55898c90b01589adfe78c014b

Finalmente, el **Sr. MIKHELSON**, en representación de **Estonia**, que presidirá la próxima Conferencia interparlamentaria de la PESC-PCSD, invita a los miembros de esta Conferencia Interparlamentaria a Tallin, a principios de septiembre. Anuncia que habrá un pronunciamiento sobre Reglamento, e incluso consideran la posibilidad de que no haya Conclusiones, sino que un mero intercambio de información.

Palacio del Congreso de los Diputados, a 24 de julio de 2017.

Sara Sieira Mucientes
Letrada de la delegación de las Cortes Generales en la Conferencia para la PESC-PCSD

ANEXO 0

Draft dated 25 April 2017

MALTA EU2017
PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION

Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy

Draft Programme

26 – 28 APRIL 2017
MALTA

Wednesday, 26 April 2017

14:00 – 19:00	Arrival of delegations and registration at the hotels
14:30	Departure by bus from the hotels to the meeting venue
15:00 – 16:30	**Meeting of the Representatives of the Presidential Troika and the European Parliament**
16:30	Departure by bus from the hotels to the meeting venue
17:15 – 18:00	**Meeting of the Heads of Delegations**
17:45	Departure by bus from the hotels to the meeting venue
18:15 – 19:00	**Meeting of the Political Groups (no opportunity to return to the hotels before dinner**
19:00	Departure to social event
	Walking tour of Mdina
20:30	**Dinner hosted by Hon. Luciano Busuttil, *Chairperson of the Foreign and European Affairs Committee***
	Venue: The Xara Lodge, Triq il-Belt, Rabat
22:30	Return to the hotels by bus

Thursday, 27 April 2017

08:30	Departure by bus from the hotels to the Hilton Malta, St Julian's
09:00	Arrival of participants and registration for the meeting
09:30 – 10:00	**Opening Session**
	Welcome address by Hon. Ċensu Galea, *Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives of Malta*
	Introductory remarks by Hon. Luciano Busuttil, *Chairperson of the Foreign and European Affairs Committee*
	Introductory remarks by Mr David McAllister, *Chair of the Comittee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament*
10:00 – 11:45	**Session I: State of Play of the European Neighbourhood Policy**
	Keynote Speaker: Hon. George Vella, *Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta*
	Debate
11:45	**Official Photo**
12:00	**Lunch**

13:30 – 15:00	**Session II: European Response to the Instability and Threats in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East** Keynote speaker: Mr Gilles de Kerchove, *EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator* Keynote speaker: Mr Kahin Ismail, *UN High Commissioner for Refugees Representative in Malta* Speaker: Mr Valerio de Divitiis, *International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law Foundation* Debate
15:00	**Coffee Break**
15:30 – 17:30	**Session III: Exchange of Views on the Priorities and the Strategies of the EU in the area of CFSP and CSDP** Opening remarks by Hon. Carmelo Abela, *Minister for Home Affairs and National Security of Malta* Keynote Speech by Ms Federica Mogherini, *High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission* Debate
17:30	Departure to the hotels by bus
19:00	Departure from the hotels to reception
19:30	**Reception hosted by Hon. Ċensu Galea, *Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives*** *Venue: The Gazebo, Hilton Malta, Portomaso, St Julian's*
22:00	Return to the hotels by bus

Friday, 28 April 2017

08:30 Departure by bus from the hotels to the Hilton Malta, St Julian's

09:00 – 10:30 **Workshops (in parallel)**

Workshop 1: EU's Migration Policy in 2017 and beyond

Moderator: Mr Paolo Alli (MP, Italy)

Rapporteur: Mr Javier Nart (MEP)

Address by Mr Leonello Gabrici, *Head of Division for Migration and Human Security (EEAS)*

Address by Ms Ana Gomes (MEP)

Workshop 2: Fighting Propaganda and Information Warfare

Moderator: Mr Marko Mihkelson (MP, Estonia)

Rapporteur: Ms Anna Fotyga (MEP)

Address by Mr Frits Lintmeijer (MP, Netherlands)

Address by Mr Silvio Gonzato, *Director for General Affairs (EEAS)*

Workshop 3: European Defence Action Plan and EU-NATO relations

Moderator: Mr Michael Gahler (MEP)

Rapporteur: Mr Cristian Sorin Dumitrescu (MP, Romania)

Address by Mr Crispin Blunt (MP, United Kingdom)

Address by Mr Jorge Domecq, *Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency*

Address by Mr Gabor Iklody, *Director for Crisis Management and Planning (EEAS)*

10:30 **Coffee Break**

11:00 – 12:00	**Final Session**
	Presentation of workshop results and adoption of the conclusions
	Closing remarks by Mr David McAllister, *Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament*
	Closing remarks by Hon. Luciano Busuttil, *Chairperson of the Foreign and European Affairs Committee*
12:00	**Lunch**
13:30	Departure of delegations

ANEXO 0

MALTA EU2017

DIMENSIÓN PARLAMENTARIA

Conferencia Interparlamentaria sobre Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común y Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa

Programa provisional

26-28 de abril de 2017

MALTA

Miércoles, 26 de abril de 2017

14:00-19:00	Llegada de las delegaciones y registro en los hoteles
14:30	Salida en autobús de los hoteles al lugar de la reunión
15:00-16:30	**Reunión de los Representantes de la Troica Presidencial y del Parlamento Europeo**
16:30	Salida en autobús de los hoteles al lugar de la reunión
17:15-18:00	**Reunión de los Jefes de Delegación**
17:45	Salida en autobús de los hoteles al lugar de la reunión
18:15-19:00	**Reunión de los grupos políticos (les rogamos tengan en cuenta que no está previsto volver al hotel antes de la cena)**
19:00	Salida hacia el lugar de la cena
19:30	**Cena ofrecida por el Excmo. Luciano Busuttil, *Presidente de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores y Europeos***
22:30	Regreso a los hoteles en autobús

Jueves, 27 de abril de 2017

08:30	Salida en autobús de los hoteles hacia el Hotel Hilton Malta, St. Julian's
09:00	Llegada de los participantes e inscripción en la reunión
09:30-10:00	**Sesión de apertura**
	Alocución de bienvenida del Excmo. Sr. Ċensu Galea, *Vicepresidente de la Cámara de Representantes de Malta*
	Comentarios introductorios a cargo del Excmo. Sr. Luciano Busuttil, *Presidente de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores y Europeos*
	Comentarios introductorios a cargo del Sr. David McAllister, *Presidente de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores y Europeos del Parlamento Europeo*
10:00-11:45	**Sesión I - Situación actual de la Política de Vecindad Europea**
	Alocución principal a cargo del Excmo. Sr. George Vella, *Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores (Malta)*
	Alocución principal: p/c
	Debate

11:45	**Foto de familia**
12.00	**Almuerzo**
13:30-15:00	**Sesión II - La respuesta europea a la inestabilidad y las amenazas en el sur del Mediterráneo y en Oriente Medio** Alocución principal a cargo del Sr. Filippo Grandi, *Alto Comisionado de la ONU para los Refugiados* Alocución principal del Sr. Gilles de Kerchove, *Coordinador del Centro Antiterrorista de la UE* Alocución principal del Sr. Valerio de Divitiis, *Instituto Internacional para la Justicia y el Estado de derecho* Debate
15:00	**Pausa café**
15.30-17.30	**Sesión III: Intercambio de opiniones sobre las prioridades y estrategias de la UE en el ámbito de la PESC y la PCSD** Observaciones preliminares, por el Excmo Sr. Carmelo Abela, *Ministro de Interior y Seguridad Nacional de Malta* Alocución principal a cargo de la Sra. Federica Mogherini, *Alta Representante de la Unión Europea para los Asuntos Exteriores y la Política de Seguridad y Vicepresidenta de la Comisión Europea* Debate
17:30	Salida de las delegaciones
19:00	Salida hacia el lugar de la cena
19:30	**Cena ofrecida por el Excmo. Sr. Ċensu Galea, *Vicepresidente de la Cámara de Representantes***
22:00	Regreso a los hoteles en autobús

Viernes, 28 de abril de 2017

08:30 Salida en autobús de los hoteles hacia el Hotel Hilton Malta, St. Julian's

09:00-10:30 **Talleres (en paralelo)**

Taller 1: La política migratoria de la UE en 2017 y más allá

Modera: Sr. Paolo Alli (diputado, Italia)

Ponente: Sr. Olle Thorell (diputado, Suecia) (p/c)

Discurso del Sr. Leonello Gabrici, *Jefe de División Migración y Seguridad Humana (SEAE)*

Discurso de la Sra. Ana Gomes (eurodiputada)

Taller 2: Combatir la propaganda y la guerra informativa

Modera: Sr. Marco Mihkelson (diputado, Estonia)

Ponente: Sra. Anna Fotyga (eurodiputada)

Discurso del Sr. Frits Lintmeijer (diputado, Países Bajos)

Discurso del Sr. Silvio Gonzato, *Director de Asuntos Generales (SEAE)*

Taller 3: El Plan de Acción Europeo de Defensa y las relaciones OTAN-UE

Modera: Sr. Michael Gahler (eurodiputado)

Ponente: Sr. Cristian Sorin Dumitrescu (parlamentario, Rumanía)

Discurso del Sr. Crispin Blunt (parlamentario, Reino Unido)

Discurso del Sr. Jorge Domecq, *Director Ejecutivo de la Agencia de Defensa Europea*

Discurso del Sr. Gabor Iklody, *Director de Gestión de crisis y Planificación (SEAE)*

10:30 **Pausa café**

11:00-12:00 **Sesión de clausura**

Presentación de los resultados de los talleres y adopción de las conclusiones

Comentarios de clausura a cargo del Sr. David McAllister, *Presidente de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores y Europeos*

Comentarios de clausura a cargo del Excmo. Sr. Luciano Busuttil, *Presidente de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores y Europeos*

12:00 **Almuerzo**

13.30 Salida de las delegaciones

ANEXO D

MALTA EU2017
PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION

Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy

List of Participants

26 – 28 APRIL 2017
MALTA

Conférence interparlementaire sur la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune et la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune

Liste des Participants

26 – 28 AVRIL 2017
MALTE

MEMBER STATES – ÉTATS MEMBRES

AUSTRIA – AUTRICHE – ÖSTERREICH

National Council / Conseil National / Nationalrat

Mr / M. Reinhold Lopatka	Head of Delegation, Member of Parliament
Ms / Mme Barbara Rosenkranz	Member of Parliament
Mr / M. Peter Pilz	Member of Parliament
Ms / Mme Petra Rund	Head of the International Relations Department
Ms / Mme Sandra Kusmierczyk	EU and International Services

Federal Council / Conseil Fédéral / Bundesrat

BELGIUM – BELGIQUE – BELGIË

House of Representatives / Chambre des Représentants / Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers

Mr / M. Dirk Van der Maelen	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations
Ms / Mme Karolien Grosemans	Chairperson of the Committee on Defence
Mr / M. Luc Peetermans	Secretary of the Committee on Defence

Senate / Sénat / Senaat

Ms / Mme Gerda Moors	Delegate

BULGARIA – BULGARIE – БЪЛГАРИЯ

National Assembly / Assemblée Nationale / Narodno sabranie

CROATIA – CROATIE – HRVATSKA

Parliament / Parlement / Hrvatski sabor

Mr / M. Miro Kovač	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Joško Klisović	Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Josip Đakić	Deputy Chairman of the Defence Committee
Ms / Mme Martina Kušnjačić	Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Barbara Tartaglia Roca	Interpreter

CYPRUS – CHYPRE – ΚΎΠΡΟΣ

House of Representatives / Chambre des Représentants / Vouli ton Antiprosopon

Mr / M. Aristos Damianou	Head of Delegation
Ms / Mme Eleni Stavrou	Delegate
Mr / M. Zacharias Koulias	Delegate
Ms / Mme Sophie Tsouris	Official

CZECH REPUBLIC – RÉPUBLIQUE TCHÈQUE – ČESKÁ REPUBLIKA

Chamber of Deputies / Chambre des Députés / Poslanecká Sněmovna

Mr / M. Karel Schwarzenberg	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Rom Kostřica	Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Veronika Cihelkova	Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Martin Kuta	Adviser

Senate / Sénat / Senát

Mr / M. Frantisek Bublan	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security
Ms / Mme Alena Dolezalova	Secretary of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security

DENMARK – DANEMARK – DANMARK

Parliament / Parlement / Folketinget

Mr / M. Soren Espersen	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee
Ms / Mme Eva Esmarch	Secretary of the Delegation

ESTONIA – ÉSTONIE – EESTI

Parliament / Parlement / Riigikogu

Mr / M. Marko Mihkelson	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Hannes Hanso	Chairman of the National Defence Committee
Ms / Mme Keit Pentus-Rosimannus	Deputy Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Henn Põlluaas	Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Kerstin-Oudekki Loone	Member of the National Defence Committee
Ms / Mme Marianne Mikko	Member of the National Defence Committee
Ms / Mme Birgit Keerd-Leppik	Head of the Secretariat of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Liivi Turk	Adviser to the National Defence Committee
Ms / Mme Teele Vares	Adviser to the European Union Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Laura Särg	Consultant to the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Grete Toompere	Consultant to the National Defence Committee
Ms / Mme Heli Kuik	Project Manager

FINLAND – FINLANDE – SUOMI

Parliament / Parlement / Eduskunta

Mr / M. Matti Vanhanen	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Foreign

	Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Tiina Elovaara	Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Tiina Larvala	Counsel to the Foreign Affairs Committee

FRANCE – FRANCE

National Assembly / Assemblée Nationale

Mr / M. Joaquim Pueyo	Head of Delegation, Member of Parliament
Mr / M. Julien Bardot	Administrator

Senate / Sénat

GERMANY – ALLEMAGNE – DEUTSCHLAND

German Bundestag / Bundestag Allemande / Bundestag

Mr / M. Wolfgang Hellmich	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Defence Committee
Ms / Mme Julia Stephanie Obermeier	Member of the Defence Committee
Mr / M. Dirk Vöpel	Member of the Defence Committee
Ms / Mme Doris Wagner	Member of the Defence Committee
Mr / M. Thomas Grimm	Secretary to the Delegation
Ms / Mme Birte Gaeth	Political Adviser
Mr / M. Harald Berwanger	Official
Ms / Mme Ellinor Talmeier	Official
Ms / Mme Vivi Bentin	Interpreter
Mr / Frank Graef	Interpreter
Mr / M. Marcus Grauer	Interpreter
Mr / M. Alexander Schmitt	Interpreter

GREECE – GRÈCE – Ελλάδα

Hellenic Parliament / Parlement Hellénique / Vouli ton Ellinon

Mr / M. Konstantinos Douzinas	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Foreign Affairs
Mr / M. Ioannis Kefalogiannis	Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Foreign Affairs
Mr / M. Giorgos Kyritsis	Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Foreign Affairs
Ms / Mme Peggy Smyrnioti	Official

HUNGARY - HONGRIE – MAGYARORSZÁG

National Assembly / Assemblée Nationale / Országgyűlés

Mr / M. Attila Csaba Mesterházy	Head of Delegation, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Ms / Mme Réka Ágota Csizi	Adviser to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Ms / Mme Adrienn Zsigmond-Varga	Adviser to the EU Department, Directorate for Foreign Relations

IRELAND - IRLANDE – ÉIRE

Parliament / Parlement / Houses of the Oireachtas

Mr / M. Noel Murphy	Clerk to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade

ITALY - ITALIE – ITALIA

Chamber of Deputies / Chambre des Députés / Camera dei Deputati

Mr / M. Paolo Alli	Head of Delegation, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Massimo Artini	Member of the Defence Committee
Ms / Mme Marietta Tidei	Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Dr / Mme Francesca Piazza	Secretary to the Foreign Affairs Committee

Dr / M. Stefano Marrone	Interpreter

Senate / Sénat / Senato

Mr / M. Nicola Latorre	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence
Ms / Mme Ornella Bertorotta	Member of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Emigration
Ms / Mme Stefania Giannini	Member of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Emigration
Mr / M. Francesco Gilioli	Clerk
Mr / M. Claudio Olmeda	Interpreter

LATVIA - LETTONIE – LATVIJA

Parliament / Parlement / Saeima

Mr / M. Ojars Eriks Kalnins	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Ainars Latkovskis	Chairman of the Defence, Internal Affairs and Corruption Prevention Committee
Mr / M. Edvards Smiltēns	Member of the European Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Ieva Barvika	Senior Adviser to the Defence, Internal Affairs and Corruption Prevention Committee
Ms / Mme Sanita Bankova	Adviser to the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Kristine Gailite	Adviser to the European Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Girts Ostrovskis	Representative to the Parliament of Latvia to the EU

LITHUANIA - LITUANIE – LIETUVA

Mr / M. Juozas Bernatonis	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Vytautas Bakas	Chairman of the Committee on National Security and Defence

Mr / M. Audronius Ažubalis	Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Jonas Jarutis	Member of the Committee on National Security and Defence
Ms / Mme Milda Petrokaitė	Adviser to the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Rasa Šidlauskaitė	Official

Parliament / Parlement / Seimas

LUXEMBOURG - LUXEMBOURG – LËTZEBUERG

Chamber of Deputies / Chambre des Députés

Mr / M. Henri Kox	Head of Delegation, Chair to the CFSP/CSDP Delegation of Luxembourg
Ms / Mme Claudia Dall'Agnol	Member of the Delegation
Mr / M. Yves Carl	Secretary to the Delegation

MALTA - MALTE – MALTA

House of Representatives / Chambre des Représentants / Kamra tad-Deputati

Dr / M. Luciano Busuttil	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Foreign and European Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Andrè Vella	Research Analyst
Ms / Mme Karen Mamo	Research Analyst

NETHERLANDS – PAYS-BAS – NEDERLAND

House of Representatives / Chambre des Représentants / Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal

Dr / M. Frits Lintmeijer	Head of Delegation, Member of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation
Dr / M. Menno Knip	Member of the Standing Committee on

	Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation
Mr/ M. Luuk Van Luijk	Clerk of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation

Senate / Sénat / Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal

Mr / M. Raymond De Roon	Head of Delegation, Member of Parliament
Mr / M. Thierry Baudet	Member of Parliament
Ms / Mme Salima Belhaj	Member of Parliament
Mr / Jeffrey van Haaster	EU Adviser

POLAND – POLOGNE – POLSKA

Parliament / Parlement / Sejm

Mr / M. Wojciech Skurkiewicz	Head of Delegation, Vice Chairman of the National Defence Committee
Mr / M. Szymon Szynkowski vel Sek	Member of the European Union Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Rafal Trzaskowski	Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Kaja Krawczyk	Head of the European Union Division
Mr / M. Jacek Zientarski	Secretary of the National Defence Committee

Senate / Sénat / Senat

Mr / M. Jaroslaw Rusiecki	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the National Defence Committee
Mr / M. Adam Bielan	Member of the Foreign and EU Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Bogdan Klich	Member of the Foreign and EU Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Melchior Szczepanik	Clerk of the Foreign and EU Affairs Committee

PORTUGAL – PORTUGAL – PORTUGAL

Assembly of the Republic / Assemblée de la République / Assembleia da República

Mr / M. Carlos Costa Neves	Head of Delegation, Member of Parliament
Mr / M. Luís Campos Ferreira	Member of Parliament
Mr / M. Vitalino Canas	Member of Parliament
Ms / Mme Ângela Guerra	Member of Parliament
Mr / M. José Miguel Medeiros	Member of Parliament
Mr / M. Sérgio Sousa Pinto	Member of Parliament
Ms / Mme Maria João Costa	Permanent Representative to the EU
Ms / Mme Catarina Ferreira Antunes	Parliamentary Adviser

ROMANIA – ROUMANIE – ROMÂNIA

Chamber of Deputies / Chambre des Députés / Camerei Deputaţilor

Mr / M. Dorel-Gheorghe Caprar	Head of Delegation, Chairperson of the Committee on Defence, Public Order and National Security
Ms / Mme Rozália-Ibolya Biro	Chairperson of the Committee for Foreign Affairs
Mr / M. Mihai Weber	Vice Chairperson of the Committee for Defence, Public Order and National Security
Ms / Mme Natalia-Elena Intotero	Vice Chairperson of the Committee for Foreign Affairs
Ms / Mme Daria-Anca Cotoc	Parliamentary Counsellor

Senate / Sénat / Senat

Mr / M. Cristian Sorin Dumitrescu	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Nicu Falcoi	Secretary of the Committee on Defence, Public Order and National Security
Mr / M. Marian Popa	Counsellor to the EU Division

SLOVAKIA – SLOVAQUIE – SLOVENSKO

National Council / Counseil National / Národná rada

Mr / M. Lubos Blaha	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the European Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Juraj Droba	Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Martin Fedor	Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Katarina Kokavcova	Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Peter Vodraska	Official

SLOVENIA – SLOVÉNIE – SLOVENIJA

National Assembly / Assemblée Nationale / Državni zbor

Mr / M. Jožef Horvat	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Policy
Mr / M. Marjan Dolinšek	Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Defence
Ms / Mme Anja Bah Žibert	Member of the Committee on Defence
Ms / Mme Katja Jerman	Secretary of the Committee on EU Affairs

National Council/ Conseil National / Državni svet

Mr / M. Alojz Kovšca	Head of Delegation, Member of the National Council
Dr / M. Dušan Štrus	Deputy Secretary of the National Council

SPAIN – ESPAGNE – ESPAÑA

Congress of Deputies / Congrès des Députés / Congreso de los Diputados

Mr / M. Carlos Rojas	Head of Delegation, Member of Parliament
Mr / M. Pablo Bustinduy	Member of Parliament

Mr / M. Juan Carlos Campo	Member of Parliament
Ms / Mme Almudena López	Official

Senate / Sénat / Senat

Mr / M. Ander Gil	Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Sara Sieira	Legal Adviser

SWEDEN – SUÈDE – SVERIGE

Parliament / Parlement / Riksdag

Mr / M. Olle Thorell	Head of Delegation, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Ms / Mme Sofia Arkelsten	Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Mr / M. Pyry Niemi	Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Mr / M. Peter Jeppsson	Member of the Committee on Defence
Ms / Mme Lotta Olsson	Member of the Committee on Defence
Mr / M. Roger Richtoff	Member of the Committee on Defence
Mr / M. Martin Brothén	Official
Ms / Mme Moa Larsson	Official

UNITED KINGDOM – ROYAUME-UNI

House of Commons / Chambre des Communes

Mr / M. Crispin Blunt	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee
Sir / M. William Cash	Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee
Mr / M. Bob Stewart	Member of the Defence Committee
Mr / M. Stephen Twigg	Member of Parliament
Dr / Mme Ariella Huff	Senior Committee Specialist, UK Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Sarah Hartwell-Naguib	Clerk of the International Development Committee

Mr / M. David Nicholas	Official

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS) – SERVICE EUROPEEN POUR L'ACTION EXTERIEURE (SEAE)

Mr / M. Gabriele Visentin	Head of Unit
Mr / M. Silvio Gonzato	Director
Mr / M. Matteo Gomirato	European Parliament Affairs Officer

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT - PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN

Mr / M. David James McAllister	Head of Delegation, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committees
Mr / M. Ioan Mircea Pascu	Vice-President of the European Parliament
Mr / M. Mario Borghezio	Member of the European Parliament
Mr / M. Arnaud Danjean	Member of the European Parliament
Mr / M. Knut Fleckenstein	Member of the European Parliament
Ms / Mme Anna Elzbieta Fotyga	Member of the European Parliament
Mr / M. Eugen Freund	Member of the European Parliament
Mr / M. Michael Gahler	Member of the European Parliament
Ms / Mme Ana Gomes	Member of the European Parliament
Ms / Mme Sabine Barbara Lösing	Member of the European Parliament
Ms / Mme Ramona Manescu	Member of the European Parliament
Ms / Mme Tamas Meszerics	Member of the European Parliament
Mr / M. Javier Nart Penalver	Member of the European Parliament
Mr / M. Tonino Picula	Member of the European Parliament
Ms / Mme Zeljana Zovko	Member of the European Parliament
Ms / Mme Anja Richter	Administrator
Mr / M. Alexandre Gérard Stutzmann	Director for external policies – Parliamentary Committees
Ms / Mme Armelle Douaud	Head of the Secretariat
Mr / M. Julien Crampes	Adviser
Ms / Mme Joanna Kaminska	Adviser
Mr / M. Alexandre Krauss Correia Rosa	Policy Adviser

Mr / M. Robert Andrzej Golanski	Foreign Affairs Adviser – EPP Group
Mr / M. Ciprian Matei	S&D Political Adviser
Ms / Mme Sophie Rauszer	GUE – NGL
Mr / M. Richard Jon Hazlewood	Political Adviser
Ms / Mme Barbara Mazzotti	Political Adviser
Ms / Mme Maria Soledad Guirao Galdon	S&D Staff NP Relations
Mr / M. Oliver Krentz	Delegate Support Staff

CANDIDATE COUNTRIES - PAYS CANDIDATS

ALBANIA – ALBANIE – SHQIPËRI

Parliament / Parlement / Kuvendi i Shqipërisë

MONTENEGRO – MONTÉNÉGRO – ЦРНА ГОРА

Parliament / Parlement / Skupština

SERBIA – SERBIE – СРБИЈА

National Assembly / Assemblée Nationale / Norodna Skupština

TURKEY – TURQUIE – TÜRKIYE

Grand National Assembly of Turkey / Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie / Türkiye Büyuk Millet Meclisi

OTHER PARTICIPANTS – AUTRES PARTICIPANTS

EUROPEAN COMMISSION – COMMISSION EUROPÉENNE

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION – CONSEIL DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE

GEORGIA – GÉORGIE – საქართველო

Parliament / Parlement / პ ა რ ლ ა მ ე ნ ტ ი

ICELAND – ISLANDE – ÍSLAND

Parliament

Ms / Mme Jóna Sólveig Elínardóttir	Head of Delegation, Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Steinunn Thora Árnadóttir	Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Vilhjálmur Bjarnason	Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms / Mme Asta Guðrún Helgadóttir	Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr / M. Stígur Stefánsson	Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee

KOSOVO – KOSOVO

Mr / M. Elmi Recica	Head of Delegation, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Mr / M. Daut Haradinaj	Chairman of the Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Supervision of the Kosovo Security Force
Ms / Mme Valdete Bajrami	Vice Chairperson of the Committee on European Integration
Ms / Mme Zana Bilalli Grubi	Interpreter

NORWAY – NORVÈGE – NORGE

Parliament / Parlement / Stortinget

Mr / M. Øyvind Halleraker	Head of Delegation, Vice Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence
Ms / Mme Sylvi Graham	Member of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence
Mr / M. Svein Roald Hansen	Member of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence
Mr / M. Christian Tybring-Gjedde	Member of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence
Mr / M. Rune Skjerve	Secretary of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence

SWITZERLAND – SUISSE – SCHWEIZ / SVIZZERA / SVIZRA

Federal Assembly / Assemblée Fédérale / Bundesversammlung / Assemblea Federale / Assamblea Federala

SPEAKERS – ORATEURS

OBSERVERS

Dr / M. Daniel Schade	Postdoctoral Researcher

Draft dated 26 April 2017

ANEXO I

MALTA EU2017
PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION

Draft Conclusions

Adopted by the Heads of Delegations

26 April 2017

Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy

26 - 28 April 2017
MALTA

The Inter-Parliamentary Conference,[1]

Having regard to the decision of the Conference of Speakers of European Union Parliaments taken in April 2012 in Warsaw regarding the establishment and mandate of this Conference;

Having regard to Title II of Protocol I (and articles 9 and 10) of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the Union;

Aware of the powers and instruments foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon for the European Union (EU) in the area of foreign, security and defence; being aware that the instruments create better opportunities for the Union to strengthen the cohesion and effectiveness of its external action aiming at greater EU international influence proportionate to its political and economic weight;

Conscious of the multi-layered decision-making process in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); aware that effective implementation of these policies must involve numerous policy actors at both the EU and national levels; conscious of the responsibility to engage in parliamentary scrutiny at the respective levels and advance interparliamentary cooperation in the areas of CFSP and CSDP;

Aware that the role of Parliaments as central actors of global decision making, with specific reference to conflicts and crises, has been strengthened;

Underscoring that the European External Action Service (EEAS), individual Member States and the European Union Special Representative for human rights should use every available political and diplomatic opportunity to uphold the respect of human rights as a priority objective of external relations, in accordance with the 2015-2019 Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy of 20 July 2015 and in keeping with the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in the Charter of the United

[1] Notes that these conclusions have been adopted by the Inter-parliamentary Conference with the Danish delegation abstaining.

Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international humanitarian law, the Treaty on European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Regrets but respects the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union.

Priorities and Strategies of the EU in the area of CFSP and CSDP

1. Sixty years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome, the Inter-Parliamentary Conference reaffirms that the European Union is one of the greatest achievements in European history and that it has brought peace, stability and prosperity to its citizens and that these need to be defended and strengthened for the benefit of future generations of Europeans; recalls that an effective common foreign and security policy is one of the main areas where European cooperation could deliver added value; welcomes in this context the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, which sets out proposals to implement the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in the area of security and defence and calls on all actors at EU and national level to support full implementation of this Plan;

2. Believes that the establishment of a coordinated annual review on defence (CARD) among Member States would be very useful and ~~could account for a "European semester" aimed at the convergence of national defence policies;~~ (PT, SE) welcomes the review by 2017 of the Athena mechanism;

3. Emphasises that the EU should strengthen its diplomatic, civilian, security and defence instruments and capabilities, as it can only use its full potential as a global power and responsible international stakeholder if it combines its unrivalled soft power with an adequate level of hard power; respects the role of NATO regarding collective defence for participating EU Member States as well as the will of certain Member States to remain neutral and/or militarily non-aligned; underlines, in this respect, the need for the European Union to achieve strategic autonomy; highlights that building resilience should be one of the main goals of the CFSP, which requires a comprehensive approach combining traditional approaches to foreign and security policy with the use of a wide range of diplomatic, security, defence, economic, communication, cyber, trade, development and humanitarian instruments, as well as increasing energy security independence; takes the view that the CFSP should be more assertive and values-based;

4. Urges the European Union and the United Kingdom to continue their full cooperation in the areas of foreign relations, defence and security.

Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy

5. Stresses the importance of continuous implementation of a more realistic strategy for the EU's relations with Russia, defined by the 5 principles suggested by HR Mogherini and approved by Foreign Affairs Council in March 2016 based on consensus and on the upholding of international norms and a credible deterrence, including against the use of hybrid warfare. This strategy also includes selective engagement with Russia in areas where there is a clear interest by the European Union for strengthened cooperation with and support for Russian civil society; supports the EU's imposition of restrictive measures against individuals and entities in Russia in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and military aggression in Eastern Ukraine and stresses that these measures should remain in force until the Minsk agreements are fully implemented; underlines its commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; emphasises the invalidity of elections and referenda held in the occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine;

6. Is of the opinion that the EU should significantly step up its cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries in order to strengthen their independence, democratic institutions and resilience, including capabilities to counter hybrid threats, capacity and capability building in the security and defence area; reaffirms the crucial necessity to support those who seek an ever closer relationship with the EU and stresses that the EU must substantially strengthen its support for implementation of the Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; recalls that respect for common values and implementation of the Association Agreements will define future developments in the EU's relations with these partner states; calls on the EU to play a more active and effective role as regards conflict resolution and peace-building in regions of conflict; supports the reform agendas in these countries in areas such as the rule of law, democracy, the economy, public administration, the fight against corruption and protection of minorities.

European Response to the Instability and Threats in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East

7. Emphasises that ensuring peace and stability on our continent, in our neighbourhood and in Africa must now be at the heart of Europe's action; recognises that sustainable development is the condition for security, stability, social justice and democracy; takes the view that it is necessary to address the root causes leading to instability and forced and irregular migration, namely: poverty, the lack of economic opportunities, armed conflicts, bad governance, climate change, and human rights abuses;

8. Recognises that the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean have been the epicentre of new conflicts as a result of political, demographic, economic change, geographical and climatic challenges in the region; underlines the need to urgently address the root causes fuelling terrorism and radicalisation, which equally affect West Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and Europe at an unprecedented level; urges the EU to undertake concerted diplomatic efforts to put an end to the tragic conflicts in Syria and Yemen and to convince partners in the region of the need for a common and legally based strategy towards these global challenges;

9. Condemns the indiscriminate suffering of innocent civilians and believes the use of chemical, incendiary and other ammunitions against civilian targets and infrastructure equate to war crimes; Underlines the urgent need for focused international and regional efforts in order to solve the Syrian crisis and further condemns Russia for vetoing numerous UN Security Council Resolutions on the conflict of Syria;

10. Believing that the EU should adopt a more active role in promoting the peace process and facilitating negotiations for a political solution to the conflict; emphasises that any political solution of the Syrian conflict should involve full respect for the human and political rights of Syrians;

11. Underlines that the solution to the Libyan crisis is a prerequisite for stability in the Mediterranean; in this respect, invites the United Nations to appoint a new Special Representative and to authorise the start of the third phase of operation EUNAVFOR MED – SOPHIA; urges the EU to work in cooperation with the UN and other international institutions, such as the Arab League and the African Union, in order to

achieve an adequate and stable solution; stresses the need of a more effective national dialogue on reconciliation among Libyan stakeholders and urges the EU Member States to engage in dialogue with the Libyan Government of National Accord on how to support it in its efforts to address the security crisis;

12. Notes that the deeper regional economic cooperation between the EU's southern neighbouring countries could lead to increased trade among them and subsequently more potential for stability and prosperity, and therefore calls on the establishment of such sub-regional initiatives;

13. Believes that more resources should be made available for the Easters and Southern dimensions, in order to increase stability in the European neighbourhood.

14. **Recognises the importance of selective engagement and, whenever the situation allows, dialogue with Russia to ensure accountability and maintain the option to cooperate on resolving global crises where there is a clear European Union interest; (DE)**

EU's Migration Policy in 2017 and beyond

15. Recalls the 2015 Valletta Action Plan and recognises that the sharp increase in flows of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants into Europe, from Africa and the Middle East, in recent years entails undue suffering, abuse and exploitation particularly for vulnerable people and the unacceptable loss of life in the desert and sea, and places the most affected countries under severe pressure; recognises the serious humanitarian consequences and security challenges, the first priority in this context should be to save lives and do everything possible to rescue and protect migrants whose lives are at risk;

16. Accepts that member States in Southern Europe are being put under strain by the refugee and the economic crises causing massive and lasting unemployment and conflict afflicted neighbouring countries. None of these challenges can be dealt with by single States acting alone and efforts should be made to develop a common policy; **any country not receiving the refugees allocated to it under the European Commission refugee quotas must contribute to a system of compensation for those that do (EL);**

17. Calls for the establishment of a genuine, human rights-based common European migration policy based on the principle of solidarity and shared responsibility with the securing of the EU's external borders; stresses the importance of reviewing the existing asylum regime (Dublin III) and adequate legal channels for safe and orderly migration, as a sustainable long-term policy to promote growth and cohesion within the EU, in order to set a clear framework for EU relations with third countries; emphasises that the link between migration and development policies should be strengthened and bring about a genuine and truly effective cooperation, without development aid being made conditional on cooperation in migration matters such as border management and readmission agreements; calls on the EU and the Member States to develop new, concrete initiatives ahead of the EU-Africa summit to be held in Abidjan in November 2017, based on: universal values and principles, providing better opportunities for trade, agricultural development, investment, access to energy and economic growth, including through close cooperation between European and local small and medium-sized enterprises and supporting African countries in building democratic, transparent and effective institutions and measures to mitigate the impact of climate change; considers the International Cooperation and Development policies as a fundamental instrument to achieve such objectives and urges the EU to improve the efficient and effective allocation and use of EU funding and to promote synergies with other International organisations;

18. Acknowledges that further efforts should be made to advance legal migration and mobility possibilities including at bilateral level, by fostering well-managed mobility between and within the continents as well as encouraging policies that promote regular channels for migration and providing the possibility for migrants to apply for asylum in the countries of origin and transit through these countries with support of international and non-governmental organisations. The EU and the Member States must share proportionately the burden of irregular migrants arriving in Europe. Adequate financial aid must be allocated to border management, registration, distribution and settlement of refugees; welcomes the Malta Declaration which focuses on measures to stem the flow of irregular migrants from Libya; emphasizes the need to help reduce the pressure on Libya's land border by enhancing Libya's border management capacity and by working with neighbouring countries currently enjoying better social and political

stability; welcomes the intention of the Maltese Presidency to present a concrete plan for implementation to the Council at the earliest opportunity, to take work forward and to ensure close monitoring of results;

Fighting Propaganda and Information Warfare

19. Emphasizes the vital necessity to strengthen internal resilience of the European Union institutions and its Member States; stresses the need to address potential cyber threats to the energy, transport and space infrastructures, financial systems and public health; calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to strengthen their capacity to counter hybrid warfare such as the misinformation and propaganda campaigns, including via StratCom East reaching people in the EU and its neighbours; urges the Council, the Commission and the Member States to enhance strategic communication aimed at making EU values and external action more visible; recognises that information and cyber warfare, as one of the hybrid threats, is a deliberate attempt at state and non-state level to destabilise and discredit political, economic, and social structures; believes that the EU should engage with its partners and step up its assistance for capacity-building in the fields of information warfare, cybersecurity and the fight against cybercrime and cyber terrorism; welcomes the foundation of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats showing much needed synergy between the EU and NATO countries and calls on both organisations to participate in the activities of the Centre.

Strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy

20. Welcomes the Rome declaration and the expression of political will to strengthen European Defence and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; welcomes in this regard the intention to set-up a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) which ~~needs to~~ **may** (SE, LV) be considered as the first step towards a strategic civilian and military headquarters; welcomes the publication of the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP); is convinced that the effective implementation of the plan requires strong support and political commitment from the Member States and the EU institutions; underlines the necessity of inclusiveness and transparency of the process; calls on Member States and EU institutions to ensure that EDAP's implementation is

beneficial to all Member States; is convinced that using EU funds to increase defence cooperation is a clear expression of the EU's solidarity and willingness to stand together on defence, taking into account the fact that not all EU Member States are NATO Member States; recalls that the European Defence Action Plan while avoiding any duplication of the existing cooperation platforms should be a strategic tool to foster cooperation in defence at European level; notes the contribution that the EDAP will make to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; urges the Commission to present ambitious proposals to establish the capability window of the fund by the end of the year that would stimulate balanced development of the EU's defence across all EU regions and countries; is strongly opposed to using the EU funds designated for crisis prevention, development or research for purposes of defence cooperation or military capability building in partner countries; considers that the European Defence Agency (EDA) capabilities and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) should be used to their full potential.

21. Supports the Joint EU-NATO Declaration of 8 July 2016 and its implementation proposals and encourages further practical cooperation between the EU and NATO. Acknowledges that information sharing and coordinated action between the EU and NATO will produce results in such areas as response to hybrid threats, situational awareness, resilience building, strategic communications, cyber-security and capacity building of the EU's partners.

ANEXO II

III SUMMIT OF SOUTHERN EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES MADRID DECLARATION

Madrid, April 10 2017

Nota de prensa

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain, have met in Madrid for the third Summit of the Southern European Union Countries on 10 April 2017.
Following the first Summit in Athens on 9 September 2016 and the second Summit in Lisbon on 28 January 2017, we have again met, this time in Madrid, to reaffirm our commitment to working together for a strong and united European Union. Together, we wish to reflect upon our shared project and contribute to the current debate concerning our shared future. We declare our commitment to continue this process at a new meeting in Cyprus.
2. We welcome the results of the Rome Summit of 25 March. From the Declaration signed in Rome, we underscore the steadfast defence of the Union's unity of action, its institutions, its common values—freedom, democracy, human rights, solidarity and the rule of law—and the endorsement of our system of social protection and welfare. We fully support the Rome Agenda contained in the Declaration, and its priorities: a safe and secure Europe; a prosperous and sustainable Europe; a social Europe; and a stronger Europe on the global scene. As stated in the Declaration, we reaffirm our commitment to working together within the European Council and among our institutions to implement the agenda.
3. As part of the debate on the future of the Union, the Commission's White Paper is a valuable contribution. We look forward to the presentation by the Commission of the reflection papers, as announced in the White Paper. These papers should contribute to the debate on the options that lie ahead of us as we move forward together in the process of integration.
4. We reaffirm the statement made by the European Council on 29 March 2017, after the United Kingdom gave notification of its intention to leave the Union. We regret the United Kingdom's decision, but respect its will. In view of the upcoming start of negotiations, we stress the importance of the common principles the 27 agreed in the Declarations of 29 June 2016 and of 15 December 2016. We reaffirm the importance of maintaining the

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unity of the 27 and of preserving the interests of the European Union in the negotiations, which must be based on a phased approach. We restate our support and trust in the negotiator Michel Barnier. In the future, we hope to have the UK as a close partner of the EU.

5. In keeping with the Athens and Lisbon Declarations, we reaffirm the importance of strengthening cooperation across the Mediterranean basin and with African countries. We reaffirm that migration requires a comprehensive approach. This involves: strengthening dialogue and cooperation with countries of origin, transit and destination of migration, especially with Mediterranean and African countries, in line with the principles of the Joint Valletta Action Plan, as well as with Asian countries; stepping up the fight against human traffickers and smugglers; fostering the readmission of irregular migrants; promoting a truly European return policy and the full operationalization of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX); reinforcing external border control, improving surveillance and taking advantage of new technological tools such as the Entry-Exit System and European Travel Information and Authorization System; and continuing to guarantee international protection for those who qualify for it.

EU Migration Policy must be based on shared responsibility and solidarity with those countries affected by migratory pressure due to their geographical location at the external borders of the Union, especially with regard to the ongoing reform of the Common European Asylum System. Currently, the Central Mediterranean route is under extreme migratory pressure, as reflected in the Declaration on the external aspects of migration adopted at the Malta Summit held in February; other migratory routes, such as those that run through the Eastern and Western Mediterranean also require our full attention. Indeed, the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean remains volatile, and the continued, full, sustained and non-discriminatory implementation of the 18 March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement is necessary.

6. We agree on the need to promote sustainable growth and employment and to preserve and further develop our social models of welfare state. Economic convergence among Member States deserves a new impetus. Fighting unemployment and, in particular, long term and youth unemployment is a political priority for us. The internal market and the euro are powerful tools for economic growth and social progress. We have to ensure that they work efficiently and that their benefits reach all citizens.

In the short term, in line with the Bratislava agenda, we reaffirm our commitment towards completing the single market, in particular in the energy and digital areas; promoting growth and investment; and fostering competitiveness. We reiterate our support to the Investment Plan for

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Europe and the extension of the European Fund for Strategic Investment. We are also fully committed to an open and rules-based trade policy as free and fair trade is an essential driver for competiveness, jobs and prosperity.

The social dimension of the European Union calls for citizens to remain at the centre of our integration project. For Europeans to take full advantage of the benefits of the single market, labour mobility should be enhanced, in a framework that ensures full respect of social and labour rights, and of national competences. To promote upward social convergence, options can be explored for enhanced coordination of education and social security systems and for improvements in the portability of social benefits and entitlements. A European pillar of social rights, based on the European social and labor acquis, could be a contribution to this end. Properly functioning national labour markets with adequate levels of social protection and European cohesion policy play a central role to reduce inequalities and poverty and to foster social inclusion, in particular through employment creation. In addition, further investments in education and vocational training are essential to reduce the risk of unemployment and to prepare European workers for the challenges of the future, in particular through skills development, especially digital skills.

Furthermore, decisive progress should be made on the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union, in line with the Rome Declaration. We call on the swift completion of the Banking Union, including by the creation of a European Deposit Insurance System. Economic policy coordination should foster convergence, in the long term, proceeding towards further integration, in particular fiscal integration whilst ensuring full respect of national competences, which is also important for an efficient development of the social dimension of the European Union.

7. The security of our citizens is our main priority and depends to a large extent on peace and stability beyond our borders. Cooperation among Law Enforcement Authorities is crucial both between European Union countries and, where appropriate, with third States, particularly those in our immediate neighbourhood. We welcome the immediate entering into force of a set of new European Union rules that contribute to this goal, such as the new Directive on Terrorism, the Fire Arms Directive, and the reform of the Schengen Borders Code, which extends systematic checks also to European citizens crossing external borders.

It is imperative to reinforce measures to stem the financing of terrorism and disrupt the revenue stream towards terrorist groups. Our countries have been calling for a strengthened international framework to combat the unlawful destruction of cultural heritage, religious sites and artefacts, and the smuggling of cultural property by terrorist groups during armed

conflict. We welcome the recent adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2347(2017) in this respect.
Efforts to prevent radicalization should be strengthened. At the same time, more and urgent attention should be paid to the issue of foreign terrorist fighters, especially returnees. EU measures to combat the financing of terrorism and to prevent radicalization should be reinforced. Victims of terrorism deserve special attention from the EU.
In this context, we firmly condemn the recent terrorist attacks in Russia, Sweden and Egypt and express our solidarity with their people.
8. We want the EU to become a real security and defence provider, a credible force to counter our security challenges. In this regard, we express our commitment to fully implement the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2016 and the conclusions by the President of the European Council of 9 March 2017, enhancing the EU's strategic autonomy and its capacity to act, becoming more involved in the protection of Europe and its citizens, sharing more responsibilities with NATO, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, and reinforcing cooperation to enhance the effectiveness of the CSDP and the development of Member States' defence capabilities, supported by the establishment of a European Defence Fund. Moreover, economic stability, growth and convergence stemming from EMU reform might also contribute to the strengthening of European defence capabilities. We are convinced that increasing Europe's resilience and advancing towards a real defence cooperation and common security will allow Europe to better contribute to peace and stability in its neighbourhood and beyond, particularly in the Mediterranean and Africa, including by deepening its support in the area of capacity building for security and development.
9. We believe that the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) plays a central role in the consolidation of Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation, as an expression of co-ownership in the management of our common regional agenda in order to effectively and collectively address our current challenges. Moreover, the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy highlighted the EU's political will to further strengthen the UfM. We welcome the success of the Second Regional Forum, held in Barcelona in January, and maintain our support for the UfM and for the Secretary-General.
10. We closely follow and we reiterate our support to the process for the reunification of Cyprus, without guarantees, in line with UNSC Resolutions and the EU acquis. We recall that the Republic of Cyprus is and will remain a member of our Union after the settlement, and that EU membership is the best safeguard for a reunified Cyprus.

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11. The Southern European Union countries condemn in the strongest terms the air strike with chemical weapons on April 4th in Idlib (Syria). The repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria, both by the Assad regime since 2013 and by Daesh constitute war crimes. All identified perpetrators must be held accountable for this violation of international law and should be sanctioned within the framework of the United Nations. The strike launched by the United States on Shayrat Airfield in Syria had the understandable intention to prevent and deter the spread and use of chemical weapons and was limited and focused on this objective. We will continue to support the efforts and the work of the OPCW and the UN with regard to the investigation of the use of chemical weapons. The Southern European Union countries reiterate that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Syria. Only a credible political solution, as defined in UNSCR 2254 and the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, will ensure peace and stability in Syria and enable a decisive defeat of Daesh and other UN-designated terrorist groups in Syria. We reiterate our support to the UN-mediated intra-Syrian talks in Geneva to reach a political solution in Syria.

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Draft dated as at 25 April 2017

ANEXO III

Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy

Amendments tabled to the draft conclusions

26-28 April 2017

CONCLUSIONS		
Draft Conclusions	**Written amendments received by Presidency until by 21 April 2017 deadline**	**Proposed Presidency Compromise Text**
The Inter-Parliamentary Conference, *Having regard to the decision of the Conference of Speakers of European Union Parliaments taken in April 2012 in Warsaw regarding the establishment and mandate of this Conference;*		The Inter-Parliamentary Conference, *Having regard to the decision of the Conference of Speakers of European Union Parliaments taken in April 2012 in Warsaw regarding the establishment and mandate of this Conference;*
Having regard to Title II of Protocol I (and articles 9 and 10) of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the Union;		*Having regard to Title II of Protocol I (and articles 9 and 10) of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the Union;*
Aware of the new powers and instruments foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon for the European Union (EU) institutions in the area of foreign, security and defence policy; being aware that the new instruments create better opportunities for the Union to wield an international influence proportionate to its political and economic weight;	*Aware of the ~~new~~ powers and instruments foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon for the European Union (EU) ~~institutions~~ in the area of foreign, security and defence ~~policy~~; being aware that the ~~new~~ instruments create better opportunities for the Union to strengthen the cohesion and effectiveness of its external action aiming at greater EU's ~~wield an~~ (PL 1, Sejm) international influence proportionate to its political and economic weight;* POLONIA.	*Aware of the powers and instruments foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon for the European Union (EU) in the area of foreign affairs, security and defence; being aware that the instruments create better opportunities for the Union to* ***strengthen the cohesion and effectiveness of its external action aiming at greater EU~~'s~~*** *international influence proportionate to its political and economic weight;*
Conscious of the multi-layered decision-making process in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); aware that effective		*Conscious of the multi-layered decision-making process in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); aware that effective*

implementation of these policies must involve numerous policy actors at both the EU and national levels; conscious of the responsibility to engage in parliamentary scrutiny at the respective levels and advance interparliamentary cooperation in the areas of CFSP and CSDP;		*implementation of these policies must involve numerous policy actors at both the EU and national levels; conscious of the responsibility to engage in parliamentary scrutiny at the respective levels and advance interparliamentary cooperation in the areas of CFSP and CSDP;*
Aware that the evolution of the international scenario has strengthened the role of Parliaments as central actors of global decision making, with specific reference to conflicts and crises;	*Aware that ~~the evolution of the international scenario has strengthened~~ the role of Parliaments as central actors of global decision making, with specific reference to conflicts and crises has been strengthened (EL 1);* GRECIA	*Aware that the role of Parliaments as central actors of global decision making, with specific reference to conflicts and crises,* ***has been strengthened****;*
Underscoring that the European External Action Service (EEAS), individual Member States and the European Union Special Representative for human rights should use every available political and diplomatic opportunity to uphold the respect of human rights as a priority objective of external relations, in accordance with the 2015-2019 Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy of 20 July 2015 and in keeping with the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, the Treaty on European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.	*Underscoring that the European External Action Service (EEAS), individual Member States and the European Union Special Representative for human rights should use every available political and diplomatic opportunity to uphold the respect of human rights as a priority objective of external relations, in accordance with the 2015-2019 Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy of 20 July 2015 and in keeping with the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (EL 2) international humanitarian law, the Treaty on European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.* GRECIA	*Underscoring that the European External Action Service (EEAS), individual Member States and the European Union Special Representative for human rights should use every available political and diplomatic opportunity to uphold the respect of human rights as a priority objective of external relations, in accordance with the 2015-2019 Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy of 20 July 2015 and in keeping with the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,* ***the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,*** *international humanitarian law, the Treaty on European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.*
	Emphasising that EU Member States are under strain by the refugee emergency and by the	Se han parado al pto 16 (sl Inmigración). Aceptada.

	wars and conflicts that are afflicting neighbouring countries; (EL 3) *Believing that none of these challenges can be dealt by States on their own demands solidarity from all Member States and a collective effort to develop a common agenda to overcome them; (EL 4)*	
	Recognising that conditions for the construction of a Common European Defence have never been so favourable in the past 60 years and that early steps in this direction should therefore be taken as soon as possible. (IT 1, Senate) *	
	Regrets but respects the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. (EL 5)	***Regrets but respects the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union;***
Priorities and Strategies of the EU in the area of CFSP and CSDP 1. Sixty years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome, the Inter-Parliamentary Conference reaffirms that the European Union is one of the greatest achievements in European history and that it has brought peace, stability and prosperity to its citizens and that these need to be defended and strengthened for the benefit of future generations of Europeans; recalls that European citizens see an effective common foreign and security policy as a priority area of action for the EU and that this is one of the areas where European cooperation could deliver	**Priorities and Strategies of the EU in the area of CFSP and CSDP** SEJM POLACO 1. Sixty years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome, the Inter-Parliamentary Conference reaffirms that the European Union is one of the greatest achievements in European history and that it has brought peace, stability and prosperity to its citizens and that these need to be defended and strengthened for the benefit of future generations of Europeans; recalls that ~~European citizens see~~ an effective common foreign and security policy as ~~a priority area of action for the EU and that this~~ is one of the areas where European cooperation could deliver	**Priorities and Strategies of the EU in the area of CFSP and CSDP** 1. Sixty years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome, the Inter-Parliamentary Conference reaffirms that the European Union is one of the greatest achievements in European history and that it has brought peace, stability and prosperity to its citizens and that these need to be defended and strengthened for the benefit of future generations of Europeans; recalls that an effective common foreign and security policy as is one of the main areas where European cooperation could deliver added value; welcomes in this context the Implementation Plan on

* Senado Italiano
Ya estaba en
otro artículo

* Se rechaza xq no
mejoran textos

most added value; welcomes in this context the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, which sets out proposals to implement the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in the area of security and defence and calls on all actors at EU and national level to support an early and full implementation of this Plan;	~~most~~ added value; welcomes in this context the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, which sets out proposals to implement the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in the area of security and defence and calls on all actors at EU and national level to support ~~an early and~~ proper and (PL 2, Sejm) full implementation of this Plan;	Security and Defence, which sets out proposals to implement the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in the area of security and defence and calls on all actors at EU and national level to support ~~**proper and**~~ full implementation of this Plan; (accepting only the deletion of the Polish amendment).
	2. Believes that the establishment of a coordinated annual review on defence (CARD) among Member States would be very useful and could account for a "European semester" aimed at the convergence of national defence policies; welcomes the review by 2017 of the Athena mechanism and recommends that expenditure connected with the deployment of battlegroups be co-funded; further recommends that Member States wishing to commit themselves to closer defence cooperation trigger the procedures established by the treaty to constitute permanent structured cooperation (PESCO); (IT 2, Senate)	2. **Believes that the establishment of a coordinated annual review on defence (CARD) among Member States would be very useful and could account for a "European semester" aimed at the convergence of national defence policies and welcomes the review by 2017 of the Athena mechanism;**
2. Emphasises that the EU must strengthen its security and defence capabilities, as it can only use its full potential as a global power if it combines its unrivalled soft power with an adequate level of hard power while respecting the will of certain member states to remain neutral; highlights that building resilience should be one of the main goals of the CFSP, which requires a comprehensive approach combining traditional approaches to foreign and security	3. Emphasises that the EU should ~~must~~ (SE 1) strengthen its diplomatic, civilian, security and defence instruments and capabilities, as it can only use its full potential as a global power and responsible international stakeholder (DE 1, Bundestag) if it combines its unrivalled soft power with an adequate level of hard power while respecting the role of NATO regarding collective defence for most of the EU Member States as well as the will of certain ~~M~~member	3. Emphasises that the EU **should** strengthen its **diplomatic, civilian**, security and defence **instruments and** capabilities, as it can only use its full potential as a global power **and responsible international stakeholder** if it combines its unrivalled soft power with an adequate level of hard power while respecting the **role of NATO regarding collective defence for participating EU Member States as well as the** will of certain Member

policy with the use of a wide range of diplomatic, security, defence, economic, communication, cyber, trade, development and humanitarian instruments, as well as increasing energy security independence; takes the view that the CFSP should be more assertive and values-based.	Sstates (PL 3, Sejm) to remain military non-aligned ~~neutral~~ (SE 2); underlines, in this respect, the need for the European Union to achieve strategic autonomy; (IT 3, Senate) highlights that building resilience should be one of the main goals of the CFSP, which requires a comprehensive approach combining traditional approaches to foreign and security policy with the use of a wide range of diplomatic, security, defence, economic, communication, cyber, trade, development and humanitarian instruments, as well as increasing energy security independence; takes the view that the CFSP should be more assertive and values-based;	States to remain neutral and/or **militarily non-aligned; underlines, in this respect, the need for the European Union to achieve strategic autonomy**; highlights that building resilience should be one of the main goals of the CFSP, which requires a comprehensive approach combining traditional approaches to foreign and security policy with the use of a wide range of diplomatic, security, defence, economic, communication, cyber, trade, development and humanitarian instruments, as well as increasing energy security independence; takes the view that the CFSP should be more assertive and values-based;
	4. Urges the European Union and the United Kingdom to continue their full and close cooperation in the areas of foreign relations, defence and security. (EL 6)	4. **Urges the European Union and the United Kingdom to continue their full ~~and close~~ cooperation in the areas of foreign relations, defence and security.**
State of Play of the European Neighbourhood Policy	**State of Play ~~of~~ the European Eastern Neighbourhood ~~Policy~~ (LT 1) [or] EU's relations with Russia (PL 4, Sejm)** POLONIA	**Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy**
	5. Believing that the EU should adopt a more active role in promoting the peace process and facilitating negotiations for a political solution to the conflict; emphasises that any political solution of the Syrian conflict should involve full respect for the human and political rights of Syrians; encourages member states to refrain from any actions that may prolong the Syrian conflict. (EL 7)	se mueven a la siguiente sección "vecindad del sur" (13)
t3. Believes that it is time to define a more	6. With a view to improving relations with "our	5. **Stresses the importance of continuous**

TÍTULO. Aceptado.

realistic strategy for the EU's relations with Russia, based on a non-compromising upholding of international norms and a credible deterrence. This strategy would also include dialogue in areas of common interest; underlines at the same time the importance of cooperating with and supporting Russian civil society; fully supports the EU's imposition of restrictive measures against individuals and entities in Russia in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula and destabilisation of Ukraine; underlines its commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and Georgia; emphasises the invalidity of elections held in the occupied territories of Crimea;	neighbours' neighbours" (IT 4, Senate) ~~believes that it is time to define~~ Stresses the importance of continuous implementation of a more realistic (LT 2) a more ~~realistic~~ principled strategy for the EU's relations with Russia, defined by the 5 principles suggested by HR Mogherini and approved by Foreign Affairs Council in March 2016 (LT 3) based on the principle of consensus and on the ~~a non-compromising~~ (EL 7) upholding of international norms and a credible deterrence, including against the use of hybrid warfare (PL 5, Sejm). This strategy ~~would~~ also includes selective engagement with Russia in area where there is a clear European Union's interest and strengthening of cooperation with and support for ~~dialogue in areas of common interest; underlines at the same time the importance of cooperating with and supporting~~ (LT 4) Russian civil society (SE 3)[1]; ~~fully~~ (IT 5, Senate) supports the EU's imposition of restrictive measures against individuals and entities in Russia in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and military aggression in Eastern Ukraine and stresses that these measures should remain in force until the Minsk agreements are fully implemented (LT 5) which must however account for a flexible tool ~~and destabilisation of Ukraine~~ (IT 6, Senate); recalls that any	**implementation of a more realistic strategy** for the EU's relations with Russia, defined by the 5 principles suggested by HR Mogherini and approved by Foreign Affairs Council in March 2016 based on consensus and on the upholding of international norms and a credible deterrence, **including against the use of hybrid warfare.** This strategy also includes **selective engagement with Russia in areas where there is a clear interest by the European Union for strengthened cooperation with and support for** Russian civil society; supports the EU's imposition of restrictive measures against individuals and entities in Russia in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula **and military aggression in Eastern Ukraine; stresses that these measures should remain in force until the Minsk agreements are fully implemented** and underlines its commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia **and Moldova**; emphasises the invalidity of elections and referenda held in the occupied territories **of Georgia and Ukraine;**

No acepta Suecia hasta que se refleje el texto respecto de otras enmiendas de otras delegaciones. Suecia está de acuerdo.

Ita se acepta

[1] Amendment by the Swedish delegation to remove the highlighted text.

	substantial change in the EU's policy towards Russia implicitly requires the implementation of the Minsk Agreements; (DE 2, Bundestag) underlines its commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine ~~and~~, ~~Georgia~~ (IT6, Senate) and Moldova (LT 6; EP); emphasises the invalidity of the so-called (LT 7) elections and referenda held in the occupied territories of ~~Crimea~~ Georgia and Ukraine (LT 7), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (EP 1);	
4. Is of the opinion that the EU should step up its cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries in order to strengthen their democratic institutions, resilience and independence; calls on the EU to play a more active and effective role as regards conflict resolution and peace-building in particular as regards Nagorno-Karabakh; supports the reform agendas in these countries in areas such as the rule of law, the economy, public administration, the fight against corruption and protection of minorities.	7. Is of the opinion that the EU should significantly (LT 8) step up its cooperation with the ~~Eastern~~ (IT 7, Senate) Partnership countries in order to strengthen their independence, democratic institutions and~~,~~ resilience, including capabilities to counter hybrid threats ~~and independence~~ (PL 6, Sejm) capacity and capability building in the security and defence area; reaffirms crucial necessity to support those who seek an ever closer relationship with the EU and stresses that the EU must substantially strengthen its support for implementation of the Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; recalls that respect for common values and implementation of the Association Agreements will define future progressive developments in the EU relations with these partner states (LT 8); calls on the EU to play a more active and effective role as regards conflict resolution and peace-building ~~in particular as~~	6. Is of the opinion that the EU should **significantly** step up its cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries in order to strengthen their **independence**, democratic institutions and resilience, including capabilities to counter hybrid threats, **capacity and capability building in the security and defence area; reaffirms the crucial necessity to support those who seek an ever closer relationship with the EU and stresses that the EU must substantially strengthen its support for implementation of the Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; recalls that respect for common values and implementation of the Association Agreements will define future ~~progressive~~ developments in the EU's relations with these partner states;** calls on the EU to play a more active and effective role as regards conflict

	~~regards Nagorno Karabakh~~ (IT 8 Senate; LT 9) as well as in other conflicts in the region (PL 6, Sejm); supports the reform agendas in these countries in areas such as the rule of law, democracy (LT 10) the economy, public administration, the fight against corruption and protection of minorities; believes that more resources should be made available for the Southern Partnership, in order to increase stability of the Mediterranean (IT 9, Senate).	resolution and peace-building in regions of conflict.; supports the reform agendas in these countries in areas such as the rule of law, **democracy,** the economy, public administration, the fight against corruption and protection of minorities.
European Response to the Instability and Threats in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East 5. Emphasises that ensuring peace and stability on our continent, in our neighbourhood and in Africa must now be at the heart of Europe's action; recognises that sustainable development is the condition for security, stability, social justice and democracy; takes the view that it is necessary to address the root causes leading to instability and forced and irregular migration, namely: poverty, the lack of economic opportunities, armed conflicts, bad governance, climate change, and human rights abuses;		**European Response to the Instability and Threats in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East** 7. Emphasises that ensuring peace and stability on our continent, in our neighbourhood and in Africa must now be at the heart of Europe's action; recognises that sustainable development is the condition for security, stability, social justice and democracy; takes the view that it is necessary to address the root causes leading to instability and forced and irregular migration, namely: poverty, the lack of economic opportunities, armed conflicts, bad governance, climate change, and human rights abuses;
6. Recognises that the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean have been the epicentre of new conflicts as a result of political, demographic, economic change, geographical and climatic challenges in the region; underlines	9. Recognises that the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean have been the epicentre of new conflicts as a result of political, demographic, economic change, geographical and climatic challenges in the region; underlines	8. Recognises that the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean have been the epicentre of new conflicts as a result of political, demographic, economic change, geographical and climatic challenges in the region; underlines

the need to urgently address the root causes fuelling terrorism and radicalisation, which equally affect West Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and Europe at an unprecedented level; urges the EU to undertake concerted diplomatic efforts to convince partners in the region of the need for a common and legally based strategy towards these global challenges;	the need to urgently address the root causes fuelling terrorism and radicalisation, which equally affect West Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and Europe at an unprecedented level; urges the EU to undertake concerted diplomatic efforts to put an end to the tragic conflicts in Syria and Yemen and to (IT 10, Senate) convince partners in the region of the need for a common and legally based strategy towards these global challenges;	the need to urgently address the root causes fuelling terrorism and radicalisation, which equally affect West Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and Europe at an unprecedented level; urges the EU to undertake concerted diplomatic efforts to **put an end to the tragic conflicts in Syria and Yemen and to** convince partners in the region of the need for a common and legally based strategy towards these global challenges;
	12. Condemns the indiscriminate suffering of innocent civilians and believes the use of chemical, incendiary and other ammunitions against civilian targets and infrastructure equate to war crimes; Underlines the urgent need for focused international and regional efforts in order to solve the Syrian crisis and further condemns Russia for vetoing numerous UN Security Council Resolutions on the conflict of Syria. (EP 2)	9. **Condemns the indiscriminate suffering of innocent civilians and believes the use of chemical, incendiary and other ammunitions against civilian targets and infrastructure equate to war crimes; Underlines the urgent need for focused international and regional efforts in order to solve the Syrian crisis and further condemns Russia for vetoing numerous UN Security Council Resolutions on the conflict of Syria.**
		10. Believes that the EU should adopt a more active role in promoting the peace process and facilitating negotiations for a political solution to the conflict; emphasises that any political solution of the Syrian conflict should involve full respect for the human and political rights of Syrians;
	10. Underlines that the solution to the Libyan crisis is a necessary prerequisite for stability in	11. **Underlines that the solution to the Libyan crisis is a prerequisite for stability**

D. Griefa preambulo

	the Mediterranean: in this respect, invites the United Nations to appoint a new Special Representative and to authorize the start of the third phase of operation Eunavfor Med – Sophia. (IT 11, Senate) Recognizing that the conflict in Syria and the long-lasting instability in Libya calls for a political and multilateral approach; urges the EU to work in cooperation with the UN and other international institutions, such as the Arab League and the African Union, in order ot achieve an adequate and stable solution; (IT 11.25, Camera) Stresses the need of a more effective national dialogue on reconciliation among Libyan stakeholders and urges the EU Member States to engage in dialogue with the Libyan Government of National Accord on how to support it in its efforts to addresses the security crisis and to exercise full sovereignty and control of Libyan territory and territorial waters; (IT 11.50, Camera)	**in the Mediterranean; in this respect, invites the United Nations to appoint a new Special Representative and to authorise the start of the third phase of operation EUNAVFOR MED – SOPHIA**; urges the EU to work in cooperation with the UN and other international institutions, such as the Arab League and the African Union, in order to achieve an adequate and stable solution; stresses the need of a more effective national dialogue on reconciliation among Libyan stakeholders and urges the EU Member States to engage in dialogue with the Libyan Government of National Accord on how to support it in its efforts to address the security crisis;
	Expresses concern about the alleged voting irregularities during the referendum in Turkey on the amendments to the Constitution, adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017, and about the permanence of the State of	

	Emergency; encourage Turkey to seek the broadest possible national consensus in the practice implementation of the constitutional amendments and to meet its obligations as a European Union candidate country and as a member of the Council of Europe. (IT 11.75, Camera)	
7. Notes that the deeper regional economic cooperation between the EU's southern neighbouring countries could lead to increased trade among them and subsequently more potential for stability and prosperity, and therefore calls on the establishment of such sub-regional initiatives.		12. Notes that the deeper regional economic cooperation between the EU's southern neighbouring countries could lead to increased trade among them and subsequently more potential for stability and prosperity, and therefore calls on the establishment of such sub-regional initiatives;
		13. Believes that more resources should be made available for the Eastern and Southern dimensions, in order to increase stability in the European neighbourhood ~~Mediterranean.~~
EU's Migration Policy in 2017 and beyond 8. Recalls the 2015 Valletta Action Plan and recognises that the sharp increase in flows of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants into Europe in recent years entails undue suffering, abuse and exploitation particularly for vulnerable people and the unacceptable loss of life in the desert and sea, and places the most affected countries under severe pressure;		**EU's Migration Policy in 2017 and beyond** 14. Recalls the 2015 Valletta Action Plan and recognises that the sharp increase in flows of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants into Europe, **from Africa and the Middle East,** in recent years entails undue suffering, abuse and exploitation particularly for vulnerable people and the unacceptable loss of life in the desert and sea, and places the most affected

recognising the serious humanitarian consequences and security challenges, the first priority in this context should be to save lives and do everything possible to rescue and protect migrants whose lives are at risk;		countries under severe pressure; recognising the serious humanitarian consequences and security challenges, the first priority in this context should be to save lives and do everything possible to rescue and protect migrants whose lives are at risk;
9. Calls for the establishment of a genuine, human rights-based common European migration policy based on the principle of solidarity with the securing of the EU's external borders and adequate legal channels for safe and orderly migration, as a sustainable long-term policy to promote growth and cohesion within the EU, in order to set a clear framework for EU relations with third countries; emphasises that the link between migration and development policies should be strengthened, without development aid being made conditional on cooperation in migration matters such as border management or readmission agreements; underlines the need to develop a new approach towards Africa, based on universal values and principles, providing better opportunities for trade, investment, access to energy and economic growth and supporting African countries in building democratic, transparent and effective institutions and measures to mitigate	14. Calls for the establishment of a genuine, human rights-based common European migration policy based on the principle of solidarity and shared responsibility (SE 4) with the securing of the EU's external borders, a review of the existing asylum regime (Dublin III) (IT 12, Senate) and adequate legal channels for safe and orderly migration, as a sustainable long-term policy to promote growth and cohesion within the EU, in order to set a clear framework for EU relations with third countries; emphasises that the link between migration and development policies should be strengthened and bring about a genuine and truly effective cooperation (PL 7, Sejm), without development aid being made conditional on cooperation in migration matters such as border management and (PL 7, Sejm) ~~or~~ readmission agreements (LT 11)[2]; calls on the EU and the member states to develop a new concrete initiatives ahead of the EU-Africa summit to be held in Abidjan in	15. Calls for the establishment of a genuine, human rights-based common European migration policy based on the principle of solidarity **and shared responsibility** with the securing of the EU's external borders, **stresses the importance of reviewing the existing asylum regime (Dublin III)** and adequate legal channels for safe and orderly migration, as a sustainable long-term policy to promote growth and cohesion within the EU, in order to set a clear framework for EU relations with third countries; emphasises that the link between migration and development policies should be strengthened **and bring about a genuine and truly effective cooperation,** without development aid being made conditional on cooperation in migration matters such as border management and readmission agreements; **calls on the EU and the Member States to develop ~~a~~ new, concrete initiatives ahead of the EU-Africa summit to be held in**

[2] Amendment by the Lithuanian delegation to remove the highlighted text.

the impact of climate change;	November 2017~~underlines the need to develop a new approach towards Africa~~ (EP 3), based on universal values and principles, providing better opportunities for trade, agricultural development, the implementation of services, (IT 13, Senate) investment, access to energy and economic growth through close cooperation between European and local small and medium-sized enterprises (IT 14, Senate) and supporting African countries in building democratic, transparent and effective institutions and measures to mitigate the impact of climate change; considers the International Cooperation and Development policies as a fundamental instrument to achieve such objectives and urges the EU to improve the efficient and effective destination and use of EU funding and to promote synergies with other International organizations; (IT 14.5, Camera)	**Abidjan in November 2017**, based on universal values and principles, providing better opportunities for trade, **agricultural development, ~~the implementation of services,~~** investment, access to energy and economic growth including **through close cooperation between European and local small and medium-sized enterprises** and supporting African countries in building democratic, transparent and effective institutions and measures to mitigate the impact of climate change; considers the International Cooperation and Development policies as a fundamental instrument to achieve such objectives and urges the EU to improve the efficient and effective ~~destination~~allocation and use of EU funding and to promote synergies with other International organi~~s~~zations;
	15. Accepts that Member States in Southern Europe are being put under strain by the refugee emergency, the economic crisis causing massive and lasting unemployment, and by the wars and conflicts afflicting neighbouring countries. None of these challenges can be dealt with by single States acting alone. The EU and the Member States must share proportionately the burden of receiving, caring, relocating and settling refugees and migrants arriving in Europe. Financial aid	**16. Accepts that Member States in Southern Europe are being put under strain by the refugee emergency, the economic crisis causing massive and lasting unemployment and conflict afflicted~~ing~~ neighbouring countries. None of these challenges can be dealt with by single States acting alone and efforts should be made to develop a common policy;**

	must be allocated to border management, the registration, distribution and settlement of refugees. Any country not receiving the refugees allocated to it under the European Commission refugee quotas must contribute to a system of compensation for those that do. (EL 8)	
10. Acknowledges that further efforts should be made to advance legal migration and mobility possibilities including at bilateral level, by fostering well-managed mobility between and within the continents as well as encouraging policies that promote regular channels for migration; welcomes the Malta Declaration which focuses on measures to stem the flow of irregular migrants from Libya; emphasizes the need to help reduce the pressure on Libya's land border by enhancing Libya's border management capacity and by working with neighbouring countries; welcomes the intention of the Maltese Presidency to present a concrete plan for implementation to the Council at the earliest opportunity, to take work forward and to ensure close monitoring of results.	16. Acknowledges that further efforts should be made to advance legal migration and mobility possibilities including at bilateral level, by fostering well-managed mobility between and within the continents as well as encouraging policies that promote regular channels for migration with pre-established yearly quotas and providing the possibility for migrants to apply for asylum in the countries of origin and transit through the support of international and non-governmental organizations (IT 15, Senate); welcomes the Malta Declaration which focuses on measures to stem the flow of irregular migrants from Libya; emphasizes the need to help reduce the pressure on Libya's land border by enhancing Libya's border management capacity and by working with neighbouring countries currently enjoying greater social and political stability (IT 16, Senate); welcomes the intention of the Maltese Presidency to present a concrete plan for implementation to the Council at the earliest opportunity, to take work forward and to ensure close monitoring of results.	17. Acknowledges that further efforts should be made to advance legal migration and mobility possibilities including at bilateral level, by fostering well-managed mobility between and within the continents as well as encouraging policies that promote regular channels for migration **and providing the possibility for migrants to apply for asylum in the countries of origin and transit through these countries with the support of international and non-governmental organiszations. The EU and the Member States must share proportionately the burden of irregular migrants arriving in Europe. Adequate financial aid must be allocated to border management, registration, distribution and settlement of refugees;** welcomes the Malta Declaration which focuses on measures to stem the flow of irregular migrants from Libya; emphasizes the need to help reduce the pressure on Libya's land border by enhancing Libya's border management capacity and by working with neighbouring countries **currently enjoying better social and political stability**; welcomes the intention

		of the Maltese Presidency to present a concrete plan for implementation to the Council at the earliest opportunity, to take work forward and to ensure close monitoring of results;
	17. Acknowledging that the biggest migratory challenges stem from Africa and the Middle East, underlines the necessity of adopting a geographically balanced migration policy framework as well as continuation and enhancement of migratory cooperation with other partners as focus on one region only could entail negative reception of EU actions among other EU partners. (PL 8, Sejm)	
Fighting Propaganda and Information Warfare 11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen their capacity to counter the misinformation and propaganda campaigns reaching people in the EU and its neighbours; urges the Council, the Commission and the Member States to make EU values and external action more visible; recognises that information and cyber warfare is a deliberate attempt at state and non-state level to destabilise and discredit political, economic, and social structures; believes that the EU should engage with its partners and step up its assistance for capacity-building in the fields of information warfare, cybersecurity and the fight against cybercrime and cyber terrorism.	**Fighting Propaganda and Information Warfare** 18. Emphasizes the vital necessity to strengthen internal resilience of the European Union and its Member States; while building it, stresses the need to address potential strategic and critical sectors, such as cyber security, energy, transport and space infrastructures, financial system, public health and countering of violent extremism and radicalisation; (LT 12) calls on the Commission, European External Action Service (LT 13) and the Member States to strengthen their capacity to counter hybrid warfare such as (SE 5) the misinformation and propaganda campaigns reaching people in the EU and its neighbours; urges the Council, the Commission and the Member States to enhance	**Fighting Propaganda and Information Warfare** 19. **Emphasizes the vital necessity to strengthen internal resilience of the European Union institutions and its Member States; stresses the need to address potential cyber threats to the energy, transport and space infrastructures, financial systems and public health**; calls on the Commission, the **European External Action Service** and the Member States to strengthen their capacity to counter **hybrid warfare such as** the misinformation and propaganda campaigns including **via StratCom East** reaching people in the EU and its neighbours; urges the Council, the Commission and the Member States to **enhance**

	strategic communication aimed at making ~~make~~ (LT 14) EU values and external action more visible; calls for the significant reinforcement with human and financial resources of the StratCom East ensuring the exploitation of its full potential; (LT 15) recognises that information and cyber warfare, as one of the hybrid threats, (LT 16) is a deliberate attempt at state and non-state level to destabilise and discredit political, economic, and social structures; believes that the EU should engage with its partners and step up its assistance for capacity-building in the fields of information warfare, cybersecurity and the fight against cybercrime and cyber terrorism; welcomes the foundation of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats showing a much needed synergy between the EU and NATO countries and calls both organisations to participate in the activities of the Centre (LT 17).	**strategic communication aimed at making** EU values and external action more visible; recognises that information and cyber warfare, **as one of the hybrid threats**, is a deliberate attempt at state and non-state level to destabilise and discredit political, economic, and social structures; believes that the EU should engage with its partners and step up its assistance for capacity-building in the fields of information warfare, cybersecurity and the fight against cybercrime and cyber terrorism; **welcomes the foundation of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats showing ~~a~~ much needed synergy between the EU and NATO countries and calls on both organisations to participate in the activities of the Centre.**
European Defence Action Plan 12. Welcomes the publication of the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP); is convinced that the effective implementation of the plan requires strong support and political commitment from the Member States and the EU institutions; is convinced that using EU funds to increase defence cooperation is a clear expression of the EU's solidarity and willingness to stand together on defence; recalls that the European Defence	~~**European Defence Action Plan**~~ **Strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy (EP 4)** 19. Welcomes the Rome declaration and the expression of political will to strengthen European Defence and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; welcomes in this regard the intention to set-up a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) which needs to be considered as the first step towards	**Strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy** 20. **Welcomes the Rome declaration and the expression of political will to strengthen European Defence and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; welcomes in this regard the intention to set-up a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) which needs to be considered as the first step**

Action Plan should be a strategic tool to foster cooperation in defence at European level; notes the contribution that the EDAP will make to strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; urges the Commission to present ambitious proposals to establish the capability window of the fund in the first half of 2017.	a strategic civilian and military headquarters; (EP 5) Welcomes the publication of the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP); is convinced that the effective implementation of the plan requires strong support and political commitment from the Member States and the EU institutions; underlines the necessity of inclusiveness and transparency of the process; calls on Member States and EU institutions to ensure that EDAP's implementation is beneficial to all Member States by contributing to more jobs and economic growth across the EU (PL 9, Sejm) is convinced that using existing (SE 6) EU funds to increase defence cooperation, including possible exceptions to the Stability and Growth Pact for defence investments (IT 16.5, Camera) is a clear expression of the EU's solidarity and willingness to stand together on defence, taking into account the fact that not all EU Member States are NATO Member States (SE 7) and considers in this context as necessary a further increase of the contribution to the EU budget (EP 6); recalls that the European Defence Action Plan while avoiding any duplication of the existing cooperation platforms, (PL 10, Sejm) should be a strategic tool to foster cooperation in defence at European level; firmly anchored to the principles of conflict resolution and peace; stronger cooperation in the defence sector should be aimed at eliminating useless duplications and waste, in order to promote standardization of	**towards a strategic civilian and military headquarters;** welcomes the publication of the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP); is convinced that the effective implementation of the plan requires strong support and political commitment from the Member States and the EU institutions; **underlines the necessity of inclusiveness and transparency of the process; calls on Member States and EU institutions to ensure that EDAP's implementation is beneficial to all Member States;** is convinced that using EU funds to increase defence cooperation is a clear expression of the EU's solidarity and willingness to stand together on defence, **taking into account the fact that not all EU Member States are NATO Member States;** recalls that the European Defence Action Plan **while avoiding any duplication of the existing cooperation platforms,** should be a strategic tool to foster cooperation in defence at European level; notes the contribution that the EDAP will make to strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; urges the Commission to present ambitious proposals to establish the capability window of the fund **by the end of the year that would stimulate balanced development of the EU's defence across all EU regions and countries; is strongly opposed to using the EU funds designated for crisis prevention,**

	equipment, savings and economic of scale; calls for improved relations and synergies between EU and NATO, starting from the 42 common actions agreed on December 2016; (IT 17, Senate and Camera) notes the contribution that the EDAP will make to strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; urges the Commission to present ambitious proposals to establish the capability window of the fund by the end of the year that would stimulate balanced development of the EU defence across all EU regions and countries (PL 11, Sejm) [or] in the first half of 2017 (LT 18)[3] by exploring all opportunities to use the Union's budget to this end, subject to the provisions of the treaties, and simultaneously foreseeing that Member State contributions are considered one-off measures for the purposes of the Stability Pact; emphasizes that the fund should be managed in such a way so as to enable European Defence Agency to continue to play a key role, in compliance with Articles 42 and 45 of the Treaty on the European Union (IT 18, Senate); is strongly opposed to using the EU funds designated for crisis prevention, development or research for purposes of defence cooperation or military capability building in partner countries	**development or research for purposes of defence cooperation or military capability building in partner countries; considers that the European Defence Agency (EDA) capabilities and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) should be used to their full potential.**

[3] Amendment by the Lithuanian delegation to remove the highlighted text.

	(DE 3, Bundestag); considers that the European Defence Agency (EDA) capabilities and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) potential should be used (EP 7).	
	20. Express full support for the Joint EU-NATO Declaration and its implementation proposals and encourage to use the moment to progress further and to continue practical cooperation between the EU and NATO. Acknowledges that information sharing and coordinated action between EU and NATO will produce results in the areas as response to hybrid threats, situational awareness, resilience building, strategic communications, cyber-security and capacity building of the partners. (LT 19)	21. **Supports the Joint EU-NATO Declaration of 8 July 2016 and its implementation proposals and encourages ~~progress to continue~~further practical cooperation between the EU and NATO. Acknowledges that information sharing and coordinated action between the EU and NATO will produce results in such areas as response to hybrid threats, situational awareness, resilience building, strategic communications, cyber-security and capacity building of the EU's partners.**

SK EU2016
Slovak Presidency of the Council of the European Union

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

ANEXO IV

INTERPARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE FOR THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

2 – 4 SEPTEMBER 2016, BRATISLAVA

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The Interparliamentary Conference,

Having regard to the decision of the Conference of Speakers of European Union Parliaments taken in April 2012 in Warsaw regarding the establishment and mandate of this Conference;

Having regard to Title II of Protocol I (and Articles 9 and 10) of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the Union;

Cognisant of the new powers and instruments foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon for the European Union (EU) institutions in the area of foreign, security and defence policy; being aware that the new instruments create better opportunities for the Union to wield an international influence commensurate with its political and economic weight;

Conscious of the multi-layered decision-making process in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); aware that effective implementation of these policies must involve numerous policy actors at both the EU and national levels; conscious of the responsibility to engage in parliamentary scrutiny at the respective levels and advance interparliamentary cooperation in the areas of CFSP and CSDP;

Aware that the evolution of international affairs calls for further strengthening the role of Parliaments as central actors of global decision making, with specific reference to conflicts and crises;

The EU as a global player: Looking for an effective multilateral diplomacy model

1. Notes with concern that the EU is faced with an unprecedented set of challenges, both internally and externally; emphasises that the EU and its Member States need to focus their efforts on restoring and maintaining peace and stability in Europe and its neighbourhood; emphasising that EU Member States are under strain by the refugee emergency and by the wars and conflicts that are afflicting neighbouring countries, highlights that none of these challenges can be dealt by one State alone and demands solidarity

from all Member States and a collective effort to develop a common agenda to overcome them, in accordance with EU principles and decisions;

2. Points out that the EU has all the means to be an influential global player if it acts together; stresses the need to enhance cooperation with other global and regional powers on global threats and challenges emphasising the importance of the transatlantic bond; underlines the important role of regional organisations in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, crisis management, peacekeeping and stabilisation; states that the EU and its Member States should make further efforts to strengthen these organisations and help them build capacities and trust necessary to rebuild the European security architecture on the basis of OSCE rules and principles;

3. Welcomes the EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy presented by the Vice-President of the Commission and High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy on 28 June 2016; underlines the importance of promoting through this strategy the common interests of EU citizens as well as the values and principles of the EU; stresses that an effective implementation of this strategy requires strong commitment and support of the Member States; highlights that the appropriate resources need to be allocated to the implementation of this strategy; underlines the need to follow-up on the Global Strategy and break down its objectives and priorities into more concrete sectoral and regional sub-strategies, notably in the area of security;

4. Believes that the EU must step up its efforts to strengthen global governance; calls for a comprehensive reform of the UN system with a view to strengthening its legitimacy, transparency, accountability and effectiveness, including by revitalising its General Assembly; considers that the UN Security Council needs to be reformed, particularly regarding its composition and its voting procedures, so as to bring it in line with the realities of the 21st century and to increase its capacity to act decisively in tackling global security challenges, beyond the purely military, addressing issues such as refugees, sustainable development and the fight against pandemics; believes that the EU and its Member States should position themselves to influence the debate and steer action in the global fora, such as the UN, on the governance of those domains where EU strategic interests and security unfold;

5. Calls for the ratification of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by all member states emphasising its contribution to non-proliferation and welcomes the EU's efforts in this context;

6. Notes that the distinction between internal and external security has become less clear; emphasises the need for the EU to address threats emanating from instability in the South and East through an integrated approach that connects all security policies, interior and exterior, and correlative instruments; recalls the need to accelerate the development and consolidation of the structures and processes of European intelligence coordination;

ANEXO V

Original text as agreed by the Heads of Delegations on 26.04.2017	Revised text following amendments submitted by 7.00pm 27.04.17
5. Stresses the importance of continuous implementation of a more realistic strategy for the EU's relations with Russia, defined by the 5 principles suggested by HR Mogherini and approved by Foreign Affairs Council in March 2016 based on consensus and on the upholding of international norms and a credible deterrence, including against the use of hybrid warfare. This strategy also includes selective engagement with Russia in areas where there is a clear interest by the European Union for strengthened cooperation with and support for Russian civil society; supports the EU's imposition of restrictive measures against individuals and entities in Russia in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and military aggression in Eastern Ukraine and stresses that these measures should remain in force until the Minsk agreements are fully implemented; underlines its commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; emphasises the invalidity of elections and referenda held in the occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine;	5. Stresses the importance of continuous implementation of a more realistic strategy for the EU's relations with Russia, defined by the 5 principles suggested by HR Mogherini and approved by Foreign Affairs Council in March 2016 based on consensus and on the upholding of international norms and a credible deterrence, including against the use of hybrid warfare. This strategy also includes selective engagement with Russia in areas where there is a clear interest by the European Union for strengthened cooperation with and support for Russian civil society and whenever the situation allows, dialogue with Russia (DE, Bundestag); supports the EU's imposition of restrictive measures against individuals and entities in Russia in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and military aggression in Eastern Ukraine and stresses that these measures should remain in force until the Minsk agreements are fully implemented; underlines its commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; emphasises the invalidity of elections and referenda held in the occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine;

14. Recognises the importance of selective engagement and, whenever the situation allows, dialogue with Russia to ensure accountability and maintain the option to cooperate on resolving global crises where there is a clear European Union interest; (DE)	~~14. Recognises the importance of selective engagement and, whenever the situation allows, dialogue with Russia to ensure accountability and maintain the option to cooperate on resolving global crises where there is a clear European Union interest; (DE)~~
5. Stresses the importance of continuous implementation of a more realistic strategy for the EU's relations with Russia, defined by the 5 principles suggested by HR Mogherini and approved by Foreign Affairs Council in March 2016 based on consensus and on the upholding of international norms and a credible deterrence, including against the use of hybrid warfare. This strategy also includes selective engagement with Russia in areas where there is a clear interest by the European Union for strengthened cooperation with and support for Russian civil society; supports the EU's imposition of restrictive measures against individuals and entities in Russia in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and military aggression in Eastern Ukraine and stresses that these measures should remain in force until the Minsk agreements are fully implemented; underlines its commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; emphasises the invalidity of elections and referenda	5. Stresses the importance of continuous implementation of a more realistic strategy for the EU's relations with Russia, defined by the 5 principles suggested by HR Mogherini and approved by Foreign Affairs Council in March 2016 based on consensus and on the upholding of international norms and a credible deterrence, including against the use of hybrid warfare. This strategy also includes selective engagement with Russia in areas where there is a clear interest by the European Union for strengthened cooperation with and support for Russian civil society; ~~supports the EU's imposition of restrictive measures against individuals and entities in Russia in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and military aggression in Eastern Ukraine and stresses that these measures should remain in force until the Minsk agreements are fully implemented~~; stresses that the Minsk agreements should be fully implemented (SK) underlines its commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of

held in the occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine;	Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; emphasises the invalidity of elections and referenda held in the occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine;
9. Condemns the indiscriminate suffering of innocent civilians and believes the use of chemical, incendiary and other ammunitions against civilian targets and infrastructure equate to war crimes; Underlines the urgent need for focused international and regional efforts in order to solve the Syrian crisis and further condemns Russia for vetoing numerous UN Security Council Resolutions on the conflict of Syria;	9. Condemns the indiscriminate suffering of innocent civilians and believes the use of chemical, incendiary and other ammunitions against civilian targets and infrastructure equate to war crimes; Underlines the urgent need for focused international and regional efforts in order to solve the Syrian crisis and ~~further condemns Russia for vetoing numerous UN Security Council Resolutions on the conflict of Syria~~; to defeat the Da'esh (SK)
	9A. Recognises that trafficking in human beings has become one of the most lucrative criminal activities, is the cause of the death of thousands of people every year and produces serious regional instability; commits itself to proposing to the United Nations to recognise the organised trafficking of human beings, often associated to migrant smuggling, as a crime against humanity. (IT, Camera)

10. Believing that the EU should adopt a more active role in promoting the peace process and facilitating negotiations for a political solution to the conflict; emphasises that any political solution of the Syrian conflict should involve full respect for the human and political rights of Syrians;	10. Believing that the EU should adopt a more active role in promoting the peace process and facilitating negotiations for a political solution to the conflict; emphasises that any political solution of the Syrian conflict should involve full respect for the human, ~~and~~ political and social rights of Syrians; (SK)
12. Notes that the deeper regional economic cooperation between the EU's southern neighbouring countries could lead to increased trade among them and subsequently more potential for stability and prosperity, and therefore calls on the establishment of such sub-regional initiatives;	12. Notes that the deeper regional economic cooperation between the EU's southern neighbouring countries could lead to increased trade among them and subsequently more potential for stability and prosperity, and therefore calls on the establishment of such sub-regional initiatives; Calls on Morocco and Algeria after Morocco joined the AU to overcome the stalemate in their relations and to develop a cooperation agenda starting with the opening of borders and the planning of long-term infrastructure programmes in cooperation with the EU; (EP)

16. Accepts that member States in Southern Europe are being put under strain by the refugee and the economic crises causing massive and lasting unemployment and conflict afflicted neighbouring countries. None of these challenges can be dealt with by single States acting alone and efforts should be made to develop a common policy; any country not receiving the refugees allocated to it under the European Commission refugee quotas must contribute to a system of compensation for those that do;	16. Accepts that member States in Southern Europe are being put under strain by the refugee and the economic crises causing massive and lasting unemployment and conflict afflicted neighbouring countries. None of these challenges can be dealt with by single States acting alone and efforts should be made to develop a common policy; ~~any country not receiving the refugees allocated to it under the European Commission refugee quotas must contribute to a system of compensation for those that do;~~ based on the principle of flexible and effective solidarity which would serve to create a common basket of support composed of the widest possible range of forms of engagement and contributions (PL Sejm)
16. Accepts that member States in Southern Europe are being put under strain by the refugee and the economic crises causing massive and lasting unemployment and conflict afflicted neighbouring countries. None of these challenges can be dealt with by single States acting alone and efforts should be made to develop a common policy; any country not receiving the refugees allocated to it under the European Commission refugee quotas must contribute to a system of compensation for those that do;	16. Accepts that member States in Southern Europe are being put under strain by the refugee and the economic crises causing massive and lasting unemployment and conflict afflicted neighbouring countries. None of these challenges can be dealt with by single States acting alone and efforts should be made to develop a common policy; ~~any country not receiving the refugees allocated to it under the European Commission refugee quotas must contribute to a system of compensation for those that do;~~ (SK)

18. Acknowledges that further efforts should be made to advance legal migration and mobility possibilities including at bilateral level, by fostering well-managed mobility between and within the continents as well as encouraging policies that promote regular channels for migration and providing the possibility for migrants to apply for asylum in the countries of origin and transit through these countries with support of international and non-governmental organisations. The EU and the Member States must share proportionately the burden of irregular migrants arriving in Europe. Adequate financial aid must be allocated to border management, registration, distribution and settlement of refugees; welcomes the Malta Declaration which focuses on measures to stem the flow of irregular migrants from Libya; emphasizes the need to help reduce the pressure on Libya's land border by enhancing Libya's border management capacity and by working with neighbouring countries currently enjoying better social and political stability; welcomes the intention of the Maltese Presidency to present a concrete plan for implementation to the Council at the earliest opportunity, to take work forward and to ensure close monitoring of results;	18. Acknowledges that further efforts should be made to advance legal migration and mobility possibilities including at bilateral level, by fostering well-managed mobility between and within the continents as well as encouraging policies that promote regular channels for migration and providing the possibility for migrants to apply for asylum in the countries of origin and transit through these countries with support of international and non-governmental organisations. ~~The EU and the Member States must share proportionately the burden of irregular migrants arriving in Europe~~. The participation of EU and Member States while sharing the burden of irregular migrants arriving in Europe should be voluntary and based on principles of responsibility, solidarity and proportionality. (LT, HU, PL, Sejm, SK) Adequate financial aid must be allocated to border management, registration, distribution and settlement of refugees; welcomes the Malta Declaration which focuses on measures to stem the flow of irregular migrants from Libya; emphasizes the need to help reduce the pressure on Libya's land border by enhancing Libya's border management capacity and by working with neighbouring countries currently enjoying better social and political stability; welcomes the intention of the Maltese Presidency to present a concrete plan for implementation to the Council at the earliest opportunity, to take work forward and to ensure close monitoring of results;

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19. Emphasises the vital necessity to strengthen internal resilience of the European Union institutions and its Member States; stresses the need to address potential cyber threats to the energy, transport and space infrastructures, financial systems and public health; calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to strengthen their capacity to counter hybrid warfare such as the misinformation and propaganda campaigns, including via StratCom East reaching people in the EU and its neighbours; urges the Council, the Commission and the Member States to enhance strategic communication aimed at making EU values and external action more visible; recognises that information and cyber warfare, as one of the hybrid threats, is a deliberate attempt at state and non-state level to destabilise and discredit political, economic, and social structures; believes that the EU should engage with its partners and step up its assistance for capacity-building in the fields of information warfare, cybersecurity and the fight against cybercrime and cyber terrorism; welcomes the foundation of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats showing much needed synergy between the EU and NATO countries and calls on both organisations to participate in the activities of the Centre.	19. Emphasises the vital necessity to strengthen internal resilience of the European Union institutions and its Member States; stresses the need to address potential cyber threats to the energy, transport and space infrastructures, financial systems and public health; calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to strengthen their capacity to counter hybrid warfare such as the misinformation and propaganda campaigns, including via StratCom East reaching people in the EU and its neighbours; urges the Council, the Commission and the Member States to enhance strategic communication aimed at making EU values and external action more visible; stresses that it is also crucial that citizens, especially youths, are trained to distinguish facts from alternative facts, whereby the role of government is to strengthen their ability to do so; (NL) recognises that information and cyber warfare, as one of the hybrid threats, is a deliberate attempt at state and non-state level to destabilise and discredit political, economic, and social structures; believes that the EU should engage with its partners and step up its assistance for capacity-building in the fields of information warfare, cybersecurity and the fight against cybercrime and cyber terrorism; welcomes the foundation of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats showing much needed synergy between the EU and NATO countries and calls on both organisations to participate in the activities of the Centre.

19. Emphasises the vital necessity to strengthen internal resilience of the European Union institutions and its Member States; stresses the need to address potential cyber threats to the energy, transport and space infrastructures, financial systems and public health; calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to strengthen their capacity to counter hybrid warfare such as the misinformation and propaganda campaigns, including via StratCom East reaching people in the EU and its neighbours; urges the Council, the Commission and the Member States to enhance strategic communication aimed at making EU values and external action more visible; recognises that information and cyber warfare, as one of the hybrid threats, is a deliberate attempt at state and non-state level to destabilise and discredit political, economic, and social structures; believes that the EU should engage with its partners and step up its assistance for capacity-building in the fields of information warfare, cybersecurity and the fight against cybercrime and cyber terrorism; welcomes the foundation of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats showing much needed synergy between the EU and NATO countries and calls on both organisations to participate in the activities of the Centre.	19. Emphasises the vital necessity to strengthen internal resilience of the European Union institutions and its Member States; stresses the need to address potential cyber threats to the energy, transport and space infrastructures, financial systems and public health; calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to strengthen their capacity to counter hybrid warfare such as the misinformation and propaganda campaigns, including via StratCom East reaching people in the EU and its neighbours; urges the Council, the Commission and the Member States to enhance strategic communication aimed at making EU values and external action more visible; recognises that information and cyber warfare, as one of the hybrid threats, is a deliberate attempt at state and non-state level to destabilise and discredit political, economic, and social structures; confirms our dedication to the freedom of media and respect for the plurality of different opinions in society; (SK) believes that the EU should engage with its partners and step up its assistance for capacity-building in the fields of information warfare, cybersecurity and the fight against cybercrime and cyber terrorism; welcomes the foundation of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats showing much needed synergy between the EU and NATO countries and calls on both organisations to participate in the activities of the Centre.

20. Welcomes the Rome declaration and the expression of political will to strengthen European Defence and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; welcomes in this regard the intention to set-up a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) which may be considered as the first step towards a strategic civilian and military headquarters; welcomes the publication of the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP); is convinced that the effective implementation of the plan requires strong support and political commitment from the Member States and the EU institutions; underlines the necessity of inclusiveness and transparency of the process; calls on Member States and EU institutions to ensure that EDAP's implementation is beneficial to all Member States; is convinced that using EU funds to increase defence cooperation is a clear expression of the EU's solidarity and willingness to stand together on defence, taking into account the fact that not all EU Member States are NATO Member States; recalls that the European Defence Action Plan while avoiding any duplication of the existing cooperation platforms should be a strategic tool to foster cooperation in defence at European level; notes the contribution that the EDAP will make to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; urges the	20. Welcomes the Rome declaration and the expression of political will to strengthen European Defence and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; welcomes in this regard the intention to set-up a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) which may be considered as the first step towards a strategic civilian and military headquarters; welcomes the publication of the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP); is convinced that the effective implementation of the plan requires strong support and political commitment from the Member States and the EU institutions; underlines the necessity of inclusiveness and transparency of the process; calls on Member States and EU institutions to ensure that EDAP's implementation is beneficial to all Member States; is convinced that using EU funds to increase defence cooperation is a clear expression of the EU's solidarity and willingness to stand together on defence, taking into account the fact that not all EU Member States are NATO Member States; recalls that the European Defence Action Plan while avoiding any duplication of the existing cooperation platforms should be a strategic tool to foster cooperation in defence at European level; notes the contribution that the EDAP will make to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; urges the

Commission to present ambitious proposals to establish the capability window of the fund by the end of the year that would stimulate balanced development of the EU's defence across all EU regions and countries; is strongly opposed to using the EU funds designated for crisis prevention, development or research for purposes of defence cooperation or military capability building in partner countries; considers that the European Defence Agency (EDA) capabilities and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) should be used to their full potential.	Commission to present ambitious proposals to establish the capability window of the fund by the end of the year that would stimulate balanced development of the EU's defence across all EU regions and countries; ~~is strongly opposed to using the EU funds designated for crisis prevention, development or research for purposes of defence cooperation or military capability building in partner countries~~ EU funds designated for crisis prevention, development or research, have to be strictly monitored if used for purpose of defence cooperation or military capability building in partner countries (EP, DE Bundestag); considers that the European Defence Agency (EDA) capabilities and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) should be used to their full potential.

ANEXO VI.A

SEIMAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SEIMAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DECISION
ON APPROVING THE INITIATIVE "A NEW EUROPEAN PLAN FOR UKRAINE"

3 March 2017
Vilnius

The Committee on European Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the Committees),

having discussed the parliamentary hearings on Ukraine organised by the Committees on 20 February 2017,

having approved their Decision on the fundamental principles of the position of the Republic of Lithuania on Ukraine and Lithuania's support measures for Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the Decision on Lithuania's Plan on Ukraine in 2017–2020), which lays down Lithuanian bilateral initiatives for strengthening Lithuania's support for Ukraine,

having considered the initiative titled A New European Plan for Ukraine presented and discussed during the hearings on Ukraine,

have decided to:

1. Approve A New European Plan for Ukraine and new international ideas and initiatives that are aimed at helping Ukraine and the Western community to maintain a long-term interest in the implementation and promotion of the necessary reforms in Ukraine to rapidly and irreversibly bring Ukraine closer to the Western community;

2. Call on the Lithuanian authorities responsible for the foreign and security policy of the Republic of Lithuania to implement A New European Plan for Ukraine by joining and coordinating their efforts;

3. Consider the implementation of A New European Plan for Ukraine as a strategic goal of the Committees' activities and provide for the coordination, monitoring and regular reporting measures for carrying out this Plan as defined by the Decision on Lithuania's Plan on Ukraine in 2017–2020.

Gediminas Kirkilas
Chair of the Committee on European Affairs

Juozas Bernatonis
Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

ANEXO VI. B

SEIMAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SEIMAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DECISION
ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE POSITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA ON UKRAINE AND LITHUANIA'S SUPPORT MEASURES FOR UKRAINE (LITHUANIA'S PLAN ON UKRAINE IN 2017–2020)

3 March 2017
Vilnius

The Committee on European Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the Committees),

recalling their Decision of 14 November 2014 on the fundamental principles of the position of the Republic of Lithuania on Ukraine and Lithuania's support measures for Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the Decision), which expressed unconditional support for Ukraine's pro-European choice and set out specific measures for Lithuania to implement this support,

having assessed Ukraine's remarkable progress with reforms over the last three years following the Maidan Revolution and, at the same time, its ability to contain Russia's aggression, which still persists and claims ever new victims,

highlighting that a number of important and complicated reforms are still ahead of Ukraine, particularly when striving for a breakthrough in the fight against corruption, and that the path of reform will be long and complicated, requiring not only wise political will of the Ukrainian leadership but also their ability to maintain the unflagging commitment of the Ukrainian people to reforms,

noting that, from the early 1990s, Lithuania and the whole Central Europe were helped to maintain the motivation of their societies for necessary reforms by the perspective of membership of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the EU) and NATO, which was offered early enough informally and then formally by the Western community on the condition that the reforms necessary for the membership were carried out; the tangible goal of the EU and NATO memberships helped our

states to build a national and political consensus that was essential for implementing complicated reforms,

underlining that today the Western community is faced with a more difficult internal situation than it was at the beginning of the 1990s, as the United States tend to focus more on domestic affairs and are looking for new geopolitical instruments following the recent elections, the EU is still recovering after the severe global financial crisis and the European refugee crisis and is going through an existential challenge posed to the entire European project by Brexit, and Russia has become significantly more aggressive and prone to breaking international rules of peaceful coexistence and respect for national sovereignty in order to preserve its dominance over Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries,

noting that, though above-mentioned circumstances make it hard to hope for the tangible perspective of membership of the EU or NATO to be offered to Ukraine in the coming decade, Lithuania must do its utmost for this perspective to remain a key strategic objective for all — Ukraine, Lithuania and the entire Western community,

emphasising that this long-term goal makes it important to keep not only the commitment of the Ukrainian people to reform, but also maintain and strengthen the motivation of the Western community in helping Ukraine to cope with the huge challenge of securing its territory, pro-European choice, and sovereignty of the state,

noting the obvious fact that today, by making use of the ongoing military aggression in eastern Ukraine and various soft and hybrid forms of information aggression or political aggression within both Ukraine and the Western community, Vladimir Putin's policy towards Ukraine is, first and foremost, aimed at undermining the commitment of Ukrainian people to pro-European reforms and the interest of the Western community in supporting reforms in Ukraine. Russia openly aims to make the West give in to "Ukrainian fatigue" so that Ukraine is left alone to counter the Kremlin's open attempts to regain political dominance over the whole of Ukraine. Russia has already managed to achieve this in Moldova, which elected a pro-Russian President; Ukraine is the next and most important target of the hybrid aggression,

emphasizing that it is in the vital interest of Lithuania that Russia is eventually able to bring about pro-European change into its own national life because this would be the only way to guarantee peaceful and mutually beneficial coexistence between Russia and all its neighbours, including Lithuania,

noting that Ukraine's success in implementing European reforms and the support for such reforms is the only instrument for the West to stimulate positive developments in Russia, because Ukraine's

success story could inspire ordinary Russian citizens to strive for the same pro-European change in Russia,

emphasising the support for the successful reforms in Ukraine as one of the key strategic objectives of the Lithuanian geopolitical security policy, which must be implemented not only by offering Lithuania's comprehensive bilateral support for Ukraine, but also by intensively exploiting the potential of Lithuania's membership in the organisations of the Western community to mobilise bilateral and multilateral support of other Western countries, the EU and NATO;

noting that the Summit Meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government held in Warsaw on 8–9 July 2016 approved the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine with a view to consolidating and strengthening NATO's support for Ukraine;

recalling the documents on Ukraine adopted by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania and its committees and *having regard to* the European Parliament's resolutions on the matter,

submit their opinion on the fundamental principles of the position of the Republic of Lithuania on Ukraine and Lithuania's support measures for Ukraine.

The Committees support the policies carried out by the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaitė, and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the Government) in response to the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine and the threat posed by the Russian Federation to the security of all the EU and NATO member countries.

The Committees call on the Government to continue to be guided by the following key provisions, which were also approved by the Decision of 17 November 2014 of the Committees, in the formulation and implementation of the policy of the Republic of Lithuania towards Ukraine and while expressing the position of the Republic of Lithuania regarding this matter in the EU, NATO, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and other international organisations and fora:

- to actively pursue the policy of support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, to stand firm regarding the non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea, and to continue an active non-recognition campaign;
- to strongly support Ukraine's aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as its right and freedom to decide on its future, choose foreign policies and adopt decisions on accession to any international organisation or alliance without any external pressure;

- to support the granting of the EU membership perspective to Ukraine under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union and the implementation of necessary reforms so as to strengthen the cooperation between NATO and Ukraine and bring Ukraine closer to the Alliance;
- to strongly condemn the Russian Federation for waging an undeclared war against Ukraine with the use of Russian armed forces; to consider the targeted actions of the Russian Federation that violate bilateral and multilateral agreements on ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine as posing a threat to not only the security of Ukraine and the neighbouring countries, but also the security of the EU and NATO member countries and stability across Europe;
- to adhere to the position that the relations between the EU and the Russian Federation cannot return to normal until Russia continues its aggression in Ukraine and illegal occupation of the Ukrainian territory;
- to consider, as particularly important, the international investigations conducted by the International Criminal Court on the aggression and occupation carried out by Russia and the findings of the preliminary examination, announced on 14 November 2016, which point to Russia's direct responsibility;
- to call on the Western community to build its relations with Russia on the results of this examination and Russia's ability to prove its commitment to implementing the decisions of the International Criminal Court concerning the aggression and occupation by Russia;
- to propose that the EU initiates establishment of a multilateral mechanism for registration and calculation of damage incurred as a result of the occupation and annexation of Crimea, so as to have an objective assessment of Ukraine's losses resulting from the unlawful actions by the Russian Federation;
- to pursue the swiftest possible ratification of the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, by Parliaments of all the EU Member States and promote coherent implementation of the Association Agreement in Ukraine;
- to support the swiftest possible implementation of the visa-free regime between the EU and Ukraine.

The Committees consider that the Western democratic community must be even more efficient and systematic in implementing a wide-ranging and long-term programme of bilateral and multilateral support measures for Ukraine, which would encompass direct military, humanitarian, and economic

assistance and support for Ukraine's democratic reform and for the implementation of Ukraine's long-term foreign policy objectives in realising its pro-European choice.

The Committees call on the Government and other Lithuanian public institutions to implement the following measures of support of the Republic of Lithuania for Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as Lithuania's Plan on Ukraine in 2017–2020):

1. **Political support through Lithuania's membership in international organisations and bilateral contacts in the Western capitals**

1.1. Lithuania takes the initiative to mobilise the international group of friends of A New European Plan for Ukraine (see the initiative of the Committees of 3 March 2017 on A New European Plan for Ukraine) in order to accelerate as much as possible the consideration of the Plan by major international institutions in the West (EU, International Monetary Fund, donor countries) and search for ways to implement the Plan. For this purpose, efforts, first and foremost, are pooled among the efficient regional fora such as the Baltic Assembly, the Nordic–Baltic (NB8) parliamentary fora, the Assembly of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania and the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland, and the Assembly of Members of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; intensive use is made of Lithuania's scope for action at the European Parliament, COSAC, and joint conferences of the committees of EU national Parliaments.

1.2. Support for the perspective of EU membership for Ukraine. Lithuania seeks to ensure that the Eastern Partnership Summit, due to take place in Brussels during the Estonian Presidency of the Council of the EU, thoroughly discusses A New European Plan for Ukraine and looks for ways to implement it, and that respective plans are drafted and approved in respect of other associated Eastern Partnership countries (Georgia and Moldova).

1.3. Support for Ukraine's rapprochement with NATO. Lithuania actively supports stronger cooperation between NATO and Ukraine and therefore actively exploits the potential of the Lithuanian Embassy to Ukraine to provide the Ukrainian public with more detailed information on NATO and implement NATO initiatives supporting Ukraine.

1.4. Making use of contacts in the West. Lithuania makes use of its contacts in the USA, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany to gain more intensive Western support for Ukraine, including for the implementation of A New European Plan for Ukraine. The traditional partnership among the Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Polish, and Ukrainian migrant communities in the abovementioned countries is effectively used to achieve the set political objectives and more intensive support for

Ukraine. For the purpose of implementing A New European Plan for Ukraine, Lithuania will focus in particular on involvement of Canada, where the Ukrainian community is particularly strong, and of the new US administration, which should be a key pillar of Western policy in Ukraine over the next eight years. This period will probably be of utmost importance for the consolidation of Ukraine's position in the transatlantic community. Therefore, Lithuania has to make maximum use of all available instruments of influence (diplomacy, community and parliamentary activities, business, the media) in the USA to form a broad coalition in support of Ukraine in Washington and other major US cities and states. Events and donor conferences in the framework of A New European Plan for Ukraine have to take place regularly on the other side of the Atlantic, and the USA and Canada should become, alongside Brussels and other European capitals, the key supporters of the Plan.

1.5. Decision of the International Criminal Court on compensation for damages caused by the aggression and occupation carried out by Russia. Lithuania supports the Government of Ukraine in raising the issue of assessment, by the International Criminal Court, of the military conflict and annexation of a part of its territory and the issue of compensation, at international organisations and courts, for damages caused by these international crimes.

1.6. Strengthening of the Intermarium partnership. Lithuania actively participates in and launches Intermarium initiatives to encourage, in particular, Lithuanian, Polish, Ukrainian, and Romanian partnership in this region.

2. Parliamentary cooperation and party diplomacy

2.1. Reinforcement of the parliamentary cooperation between Lithuania and Ukraine. Through various initiatives at bilateral and multilateral levels, Lithuania continues to provide political support for Ukraine and share parliamentary experience of democratic reform, implementation of the rule of law, and transposition and consolidation of the EU law in order to achieve Ukraine's closer political association and economic integration with the EU and reinforced cooperation with NATO.

2.2. More effective use of the existing cooperation forms. It is essential to ensure that the meetings of the Assembly of Members of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as well as the meetings of the Assembly of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are organised at least biannually and that their decisions contribute to the promotion and implementation of democratic reforms in Ukraine. These parliamentary institutions are encouraged to cooperate with the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic–Baltic (NB8) parliamentary fora. Visits to key Western capitals such as Washington, Berlin, Brussels, and London are organised for joint delegations of various parliamentary assemblies by including representatives of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

The aim is to develop the activities of the Group for Inter-Parliamentary Relations of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania with Ukraine and the cooperation between Lithuanian and Ukrainian delegations at international parliamentary organisations, particularly the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Parliamentary committees in charge of individual sectors are strengthening their cooperation.

2.3. Development of party diplomacy. With the participation and mediation of its major (traditional) political parties, Lithuania undertakes and develops a long-term party diplomacy initiative, which is a state-funded platform for cooperation between Western political parties and Ukrainian political forces with a view to mobilising the political parties in Ukraine and promoting their reform along the Western lines.

2.4. Enhancement of cooperation with the European Parliament. Lithuania is strengthening the cooperation with the European Parliament in order to mobilise support for Ukraine and initiate the necessary actions of EU institutions.

3. Financial assistance

Marshall Plan for Ukraine

Lithuania, in cooperation with its partners, initiates without delay the necessary international consultations and backing to ensure provision of the financial support earmarked for investment into the Ukrainian economy in the short term, as defined in A New European Plan for Ukraine. The annual investment package of up to EUR 5 billion would guarantee the growth of 6–8% per year in the immediate term, instead of the current rate of 2–2.5%.

Lithuania initiates EU-level political discussions with the European Parliament, European political parties, EU Member States, the European Commission, and other EU institutions on the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework for 2020–2027. The objective is to achieve allocation of up to 3% of the currently projected overall EU budget of over EUR 1,000 billion for the implementation of the new Marshall Plan for Ukraine and thus set up a EUR 30 billion instrument for multiannual financial support for Ukraine.

4. Support for strengthening of the Ukrainian army

4.1. Enhancement of military cooperation between Lithuania and Ukraine. The aim is to assist Ukraine in reforming its armed forces in line with NATO standards, maintain the experience acquired and interoperability formed in operations, and become more actively involved in regional and Euro-Atlantic cooperation.

4.2. Training for Ukrainian soldiers. A large-scale training programme for Ukrainian soldiers is carried out, thus inviting them to constantly participate in joint exercises in Lithuania and organising military exercises in Ukraine. The Lithuanian, Polish and Ukrainian brigade LITPOLUKRBRIG is being trained in line with NATO standards for acting across the full spectrum of operations.

4.3. Training of military officers for the Ukrainian army. Ukrainian representatives are offered an increased number of places at Lithuanian military training institutions and the Baltic Defence College; additional courses are organised on demand; support for military training is coordinated with other countries.

4.4. Military assistance to Ukraine. Insofar as the available capacity permits, Lithuania directly provides the Ukrainian army with outfits, gear and equipment, and offers, in cooperation with NATO partners and in view of its capacities, the necessary assistance for Ukraine.

5. Support for democratic, economic and governance reforms in Ukraine and implementation of the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement

5.1. Offering of a package of support for reforms in Ukraine. Lithuania offers a package of support for reforms to Ukraine that includes a clear list of reforms, a system of expert services and their financing, and a system of reform measures. Financial and expert assistance is offered in the areas where Lithuania has the experience and knowledge needed, including, but not limited to, restructuring of state-owned enterprises, privatisation, regulation of monopolies, public procurement reform, legal reform, energy reform, reform of political party funding and financing of electoral campaigns, assurance of transparent business environment, and fight against corruption. Particular focus is given to the implementation of the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and consistency in Ukraine's economic regulation with EU standards. The Business Ombudsman Council of Ukraine, which leads these processes, should receive more Lithuanian, international and local support. Lithuania is determined to provide expert support at the sectoral level in particularly important areas of business regulation to ensure implementation of recommendations by the Business Ombudsman.

5.2. Specialised consultations by Lithuanian experts to Ukrainian authorities. A twinning programme is implemented in key directions of reform. The programme provides for assistance rendered by Lithuanian institutions working in the area of reform to the respective authorities in Ukraine by sending experts to Ukraine and providing long-term placements for Ukrainian officials at Lithuanian institutions. For this purpose, Lithuania will develop the necessary institutional framework to ensure smooth transfer of experience and skills to Ukraine and implementation of the whole package of support for reforms.

In order to secure EU funding, Lithuania consults the European Commission and the European External Action Service about the list of reforms contained in the package of support for reforms in Ukraine. By exploring the contribution and experience of Lithuanian experts placed in Ukraine in supporting democratic, economic and governance reforms in Ukraine and implementation of the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, Lithuania promotes better understanding and transfer of know-how among the EU institutions and EU Member States to ensure more effective use of support measures for Ukraine.

5.3. Support for the modernisation of civil service and public sector services. Lithuania will explore and promote ways of allocating EU support for the modernisation of Ukraine's civil service and public sector services.

6. Humanitarian aid

6.1. Aid to the injured Ukrainian soldiers and participants of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO). Lithuania continues to offer treatment and rehabilitation services to the Ukrainian soldiers and participants of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) injured during Russia's aggression in eastern Ukraine.

6.2. Humanitarian aid to widows and orphans. Lithuania provides support for the affected women, children, widows and orphans. Lithuania takes in up to 60 children left orphaned as a result of military action.

6.3. Support for non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Lithuania supports non-governmental organisations providing humanitarian and other assistance for Ukraine. Efforts are made to promote establishment of a permanent public centre under the auspices of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania to coordinate the activities of these organisations.

7. Economic cooperation and support for Ukrainian youth education

7.1. Attraction of investment and capital from Ukraine. Lithuania works towards developing mutually beneficial economic cooperation with Ukraine and creates favourable conditions for Ukrainian investors through the use of the image of Lithuania as a close and friendly country to Ukraine.

7.2. Provision of opportunities for skilled Ukrainian specialists and researchers to work, realise their potential, and gain experience in Lithuania. A special division under the auspices of the agency *Invest Lithuania* will be established to create opportunities for skilled Ukrainian professionals to be employed in Lithuania for up to 3 years, especially in healthcare, research, hi-tech and engineering institutions and companies.

7.3. Scholarships for Ukrainian students. Lithuania will envisage awarding of up to 200 scholarships of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) to gifted students from Ukraine to pursue bachelor's, master's and doctoral studies in Lithuanian universities.

7.4. Transfer of experience to young professionals. Lithuania runs a dedicated young leaders' training programme, similar to the *Create Lithuania* programme, offering up to one-year-long traineeships in Lithuanian public institutions, high-tech and other innovative companies to young Ukrainian professionals, especially to those who are graduates of Lithuanian educational establishments. By using mentoring instruments, Lithuania works, as a follow-up to the traineeships, towards returning the young professionals to Ukraine and ensuring effective use of their potential.

8. Capacity building of local self-government

Lithuania will encourage Ukrainian municipalities to take over the best practice of Lithuanian municipalities in connection with long-term planning and proper use of programmed funds by focusing in particular on projects on the renovation of infrastructure. Lithuania will encourage Lithuanian municipalities to cooperate with Ukrainian municipalities, particularly with those where the Lithuanian business has already made some investment, namely, Kyiv, Poltava, Mykolayiv and Chernihiv. Targeted use of funds from the Lithuanian development cooperation budget should also be ensured to promote cooperation of this kind. Cooperation with municipalities of eastern Ukraine that have been affected by the military aggression, namely, Mariupol, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, will also be promoted.

9. Europeanisation of Ukraine's historical memory

9.1. Targeted falsification of history serves as an instrument of Russia's hybrid ideological warfare. Lithuania will therefore mobilise the community of experts in the EU and the world to research into and assert Ukraine's culture, its European development and its identity.

9.2. Lithuania will advise Ukraine to establish an institution under the Presidential Administration of Ukraine that is similar to the International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania by engaging the most prominent historians and political and public figures from the US, Germany, Israel, Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom in its activities. Lithuania will propose that the museum workers and intellectuals working on Judaic heritage join their forces and organise a joint exhibition displaying original artefacts of the cultural heritage of Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Polish Jews.

9.3. Lithuania will work towards joining efforts with Ukraine in restoring by 2020 the demolished memorial gravestone of Kostiantyn Ostrogski, Duke of the Grand Dutchy of Lithuania and Grand Hetman of Lithuania, at the Uspensky Cathedral in the National Kyiv-Pechersk Historical Cultural Preserve in accordance with a coordinated timetable for works.

10. Other support measures

10.1. Support for civil society. Joint Lithuanian–Ukrainian NGO projects with the engagement of partners from other EU Member States, NATO member countries and Eastern Partnership countries are promoted and supported. The projects should contribute to the spread of democratic ideas and reinforcement of the non-governmental sector and civil society in Ukraine.

10.2. Fight against the Russian propaganda. By employing public diplomacy and awareness-raising initiatives, further opportunities are explored to offset the Russian propaganda in the public domain of both Ukraine and the Western world.

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The Committees call on the Government and other Lithuanian public institutions to make provisions for the necessary funds for the said support measures for Ukraine and take active steps in implementing the proposals contained in this Decision.

The Committees invite the Government to submit information on the implementation of the measures under this Decision to the joint committee meeting at least once per Seimas session.

The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania initiates establishment of a special group of Members of the Seimas with a shared interest and constant focus on the implementation of Lithuania's Plan on Ukraine in 2017–2020 both in Lithuania and Ukraine as well as in the Western community.

Other Western states, particularly those belonging to our region, and their parliaments as well as the parliamentary institutions of the EU and NATO are informed about Lithuania's Plan on Ukraine in 2017–2020 through diplomatic and interparliamentary channels. Other countries and international institutions are called upon to draft and implement similar bilateral and multilateral plans on support for Ukraine and exchange information on their implementation.

The Committees undertake to submit to the Seimas a summary report on the implementation of Lithuania's Plan on Ukraine at the start of each year. In the light of the results achieved and the changes in the situation in Ukraine and the Western community, the list of the measures under the Decision may be revised and re-approved at a joint meeting of the Committees.

Gediminas Kirkilas
Chair of the Committee on European Affairs

Juozas Bernatonis
Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

ANEKO VII.A

MALTA EU2017
PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION

Background Note
Workshop 1

Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy

26 – 28 APRIL 2017
MALTA

Workshop 1: EU's Migration Policy in 2017 and beyond

Europe continues to face mounting humanitarian, socio-economic and security challenges. This is in part the result of the inflow of third country nationals, but is also the result of the inter-linked criminal portfolio of human smuggling networks operating within and across borders.

When looking at the developments close to our region incorporating the Mediterranean and the Aegean seas, the figures depict a continuous tragic story. In an attempt to reach a stable, peaceful and prosperous Europe, men, women and children embark on rugged and untrustworthy embarkations. In most cases these are overcrowded and transport migrants in dangerous and inhumane conditions. Furthermore, migrants entrust their lives to smugglers who throughout the journey extort, abuse, torture and in some cases trade migrants as commodities.

The European Union continues to place migration at the centre of its agenda. In the 2016 State of the Union address, President Juncker included migration as one of the 10 priorities and emphasised the centrality of stepping up European action to first and foremost provide humanitarian assistance and save lives. Furthermore, policy needs to enable migrants and refugees to stay closer to home and promote the development of third countries' capability to address the root causes leading to irregular migration. More specifically the State of the Union proposes: the swift operationalisation of the European Border and Coast Guard, implementation of the EU-Turkey statement, stepping up relocation of refugees from Greece and Italy, continued resettlement from Turkey to the EU (including protection of unaccompanied minors), swift adoption by the co-legislators of the proposals to reform the common European asylum system (including the reform of the Dublin mechanism), implementation of the new migration partnership framework with third countries, follow-up to the

European agenda for migration and the implementation of a new resettlement framework.

The new Migration Partnership Framework is of particular importance as it shifts policy from a management by crisis approach towards a more systematic, legal and regulated system. The cardinal aspect of a new migration policy is based on sustained dialogue and prolonged cooperation with third-countries, particularly, with priority countries of origin and transit. The main objective is to develop win-win relationships with the European Union's partners and together address shared challenges of migration and development. In the form of 'compacts', these political frameworks aim to develop a durable and favourable partnership with third countries. Some of the short term measures include; the strengthening of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, with a total amount allocated of EUR2.38 billion and a pledge contribution of EUR2.4 billion for Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. From a long term perspective the European Innovations Partnership will mobilise up to EUR44 billion of investments.

The 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration held together with African and European partners, agreed on a sixteen priority action plan focusing on: addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, enhancing cooperation on legal migration and mobility, reinforcing the protection of migrants and asylum seekers, preventing and fighting irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, and working more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration. More recently, on 3 February 2017, members of the European Council agreed on a Malta Declaration addressing the Central Mediterranean Route. The Declaration proposed to strengthen cooperation with Libya and increase collective efforts to provide the necessary training and exchange of expertise in the fields of border control and coastguard training. Furthermore, it reaffirmed the importance to disrupt the business model of smugglers through information campaigns with

migrants and provide support for the economic and social development of local communities. The Declaration also proposed the development of adequate reception centres in host and transit countries and continued support for bilateral cooperation between European Member States and Libya.

Cooperation and dialogue with third countries is deemed as pivotal to ensure durable and long-term policy measures to address migration. Nonetheless, cooperation with third countries is sometimes overshadowed with human rights abuses and inhumane treatment of migrants.

The EU-Turkey agreement, although functioning in practice, and therefore moving from a 10,000 daily crossing in October 2015 to 100 crossings in 2017, continues to raise questions with regards to the level of human rights and freedoms enjoyed by migrants in Turkey.

More recently, the EU's cooperation with Libya, especially in terms of providing Libyan coastguard and border control officers with the necessary equipment to deter, detect and apprehend smuggled migrants and the setting up of reception centres in the country received considerable criticism and raised doubts on the level of human rights standards governing the operability of such cooperation. In a press release by the ***International Organisation for Migration*** published on 11 April 2017, the Director of Operation and Emergency, Mr Mohammed Abdiker described Libya as a 'vale of tears', with a 'migrant slave market' operating and trading people in Tripoli to be bought, sold and discarded when they have no more value for the smugglers. These and other reports highlight that instability in Libya seriously jeopardizes the implementation of a well-structured migration policy and raises questions on the EU's commitment to safeguard migrants' human rights.

ANEXO VII.B

MALTA EU2017
PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION

Background Note
Workshop 2

Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy

26 – 28 APRIL 2017
MALTA

Workshop 2: Fighting Propaganda and Information Warfare

Recent conflicts have generated much debate about the use and effectiveness of hybrid warfare: a type of warfare widely understood to blend conventional and unconventional, regular and irregular, and information and cyber warfare. Information warfare or propaganda can take the form of sending contradictory messages, biased interpretations of historical events and attempts to destabilise political stability by way of tapping into certain political forces on a daily basis. Such a definition predicts that hybrid warfare is difficult to deter with conventional means especially since it is perceived as an approach whereby less resourceful and powerful actors have a chance to prevail against more powerful ones.

How can countries protect themselves from such methods? Deterrence is better than confrontation and investing in cyber security defences is mandatory in the twenty-first century. Political parties and major newspapers are now targets as much as government premises and officials. EU Member States need to strengthen their capacities to counter the misinformation and propaganda campaigns reaching people in the EU and its neighbours. The European values have to be given more visibility to combat this threat. EU institutions need to recognise that strategic communication and information warfare is not only an external EU issue but also an internal one.

A strategy of anti-EU propaganda and disinformation by third countries may take various forms and involve, in particular, traditional media, social networks, school programmes and political parties, both within and beyond the European Union. Strategic communication efforts should be considered as a priority and therefore the EU needs to put out its positive messages about its successes, values and principles with determination. In this regard the EU Action Plan on Strategic Communication calls for the endorsement and implementation of its recommendations urgently. Competent EU

institutions and authorities need to monitor the sources of financing of anti-European propaganda and emphasize that more funding is necessary to support freedom of the media in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries within the scope of EU democracy instruments.

It is essentially for the EU to continue to actively promote through its external actions the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, including the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, the right to access information and the independence of the media.

ANEXO VII.C

MALTA EU2017
PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION

Background Note
Workshop 3

Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy

26 – 28 APRIL 2017
MALTA

Workshop 3: European Defence Action Plan and EU-NATO relations

European defence capabilities have evolved over the past decades. The main challenges include a near 11% reduction in defence expenditure over the decade from 2005 to 2015. The European Defence Action Plan supports the development of key capabilities for the security of the European Union and its citizens. The European Defence Action Plan has three main pillars that address different but complementary needs: launching a European Defence Fund; fostering investments in defence supply chains and reinforcing the single market for defence. The European Council conclusions of 26 June 2016 called for further enhancement of EU-NATO collaboration. Furthermore, on 8 July 2016 the President of the European Council Donald Tusk, the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Jens Stoltenberg signed a Joint Declaration on the strategic relationship between the EU and NATO in Warsaw. It gives new impetus and substance in the areas of countering hybrid threats, operational cooperation including at sea, irregular migration and defence. A common set of proposals for NATO and the European Union were endorsed by the European Council. The deepening of defence cooperation and delivering the required capabilities together was also included in the EU Global Strategy.

President Juncker called for the launch a European Defence Fund in his State of the Union Speech in 2016. This Fund would consist of two specific 'windows'; a research window to fund collaborative research projects at the EU level and a capability window to support the joint development of defence capabilities. The 'windows' will be complemented by a coordination mechanism in the form of a coordination board.

Defence research is key to safeguarding the defence sector's long term competitiveness and ultimately Europe's strategic autonomy. The European Commission intends to launch a preparatory action on defence research in 2017, as called for by the European Council, with a budget of €90 million for the period 2017-2019. If Member States agree with this action plan, the preparatory action will pave the way for the 'research window' to take the form of a European Defence Research Programme within the next multiannual financial framework post 2020.

The lack of coordination and joint capability planning at the EU level reduces efficiencies in public spending and Members States' investments, while resulting in unnecessary duplications. Lack of synchronisation of individual budget contributions and the increasing costs of complex defence capabilities may be prohibitive for Member States and the pooling of resources would lead to savings and the maximise the value of defence investments.

ANEXO VIII

MALTA EU2017
PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION

Final Conclusions

Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy

26 - 28 April 2017
MALTA

The Inter-Parliamentary Conference,[1]

Having regard to the decision of the Conference of Speakers of European Union Parliaments taken in April 2012 in Warsaw regarding the establishment and mandate of this Conference;

Having regard to Title II of Protocol I (and articles 9 and 10) of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the Union;

Aware of the powers and instruments foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon for the European Union (EU) in the area of foreign, security and defence; being aware that the instruments create better opportunities for the Union to strengthen the cohesion and effectiveness of its external action aiming at greater EU international influence proportionate to its political and economic weight;

Conscious of the multi-layered decision-making process in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); aware that effective implementation of these policies must involve numerous policy actors at both the EU and national levels; conscious of the responsibility to engage in parliamentary scrutiny at the respective levels and advance interparliamentary cooperation in the areas of CFSP and CSDP;

Aware that the role of Parliaments as central actors of global decision making, with specific reference to conflicts and crises, has been strengthened;

Underscoring that the European External Action Service (EEAS), individual Member States and the European Union Special Representative for human rights should use every available political and diplomatic opportunity to uphold the respect of human rights as a priority objective of external relations, in accordance with the 2015-2019 Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy of 20 July 2015 and in keeping with the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international humanitarian law, the Treaty on European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

Regrets but respects the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union.

[1] Notes that these conclusions have been adopted by the Inter-parliamentary Conference with the Danish delegation abstaining.

Priorities and Strategies of the EU in the area of CFSP and CSDP

1. Sixty years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome, the Inter-Parliamentary Conference reaffirms that the European Union is one of the greatest achievements in European history and that it has brought peace, stability and prosperity to its citizens and that these need to be defended and strengthened for the benefit of future generations of Europeans; recalls that an effective common foreign and security policy is one of the main areas where European cooperation could deliver added value; welcomes in this context the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, which sets out proposals to implement the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in the area of security and defence and calls on all actors at EU and national level to support full implementation of this Plan;

2. Believes that the establishment of a coordinated annual review on defence (CARD) among Member States would be very useful and welcomes the review by 2017 of the Athena mechanism;

3. Emphasises that the EU should strengthen its diplomatic, civilian, security and defence instruments and capabilities, as it can only use its full potential as a global power and responsible international stakeholder if it combines its unrivalled soft power with an adequate level of hard power; respects the role of NATO regarding collective defence for participating EU Member States as well as the will of certain Member States to remain neutral and/or militarily non-aligned; underlines, in this respect, the need for the European Union to achieve strategic autonomy; highlights that building resilience should be one of the main goals of the CFSP, which requires a comprehensive approach combining traditional approaches to foreign and security policy with the use of a wide range of diplomatic, security, defence, economic, communication, cyber, trade, development and humanitarian instruments, as well as increasing energy security independence; takes the view that the CFSP should be more assertive and values-based;

4. Urges the European Union and the United Kingdom to continue their full cooperation in the areas of foreign relations, defence and security.

Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy

5. Stresses the importance of continuous implementation of a more realistic strategy for the EU's relations with Russia, defined by the 5 principles suggested by HR Mogherini and approved by Foreign Affairs Council in March 2016 based on consensus and on the upholding of international norms and a credible deterrence, including against the use of hybrid warfare. This strategy also includes selective engagement with Russia in areas where there is a clear interest by the European Union for strengthened cooperation with and support for Russian civil society; supports the EU's imposition of restrictive measures against individuals and entities in Russia in response to the illegal annexation

of the Crimean peninsula, and military aggression in Eastern Ukraine and stresses that these measures should remain in force until the Minsk agreements are fully implemented; underlines its commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; emphasises the invalidity of elections and referenda held in the occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine;

6. Is of the opinion that the EU should significantly step up its cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries in order to strengthen their independence, democratic institutions and resilience, including capabilities to counter hybrid threats, capacity and capability building in the security and defence area; reaffirms the crucial necessity to support those who seek an ever closer relationship with the EU and stresses that the EU must substantially strengthen its support for implementation of the Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; recalls that respect for common values and implementation of the Association Agreements will define future developments in the EU's relations with these partner states; calls on the EU to play a more active and effective role as regards conflict resolution and peace-building in regions of conflict; supports the reform agendas in these countries in areas such as the rule of law, democracy, the economy, public administration, the fight against corruption and protection of minorities.

European Response to the Instability and Threats in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East

7. Emphasises that ensuring peace and stability on our continent, in our neighbourhood and in Africa must now be at the heart of Europe's action; recognises that sustainable development is the condition for security, stability, social justice and democracy; takes the view that it is necessary to address the root causes leading to instability and forced and irregular migration, namely: poverty, the lack of economic opportunities, armed conflicts, bad governance, climate change, and human rights abuses;

8. Recognises that the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean have been the epicentre of new conflicts as a result of political, demographic, economic change, geographical and climatic challenges in the region; underlines the need to urgently address the root causes fuelling terrorism and radicalisation, which equally affect West Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and Europe at an unprecedented level; urges the EU to undertake concerted diplomatic efforts to put an end to the tragic conflicts in Syria and Yemen and to convince partners in the region of the need for a common and legally based strategy towards these global challenges;

9. Condemns the indiscriminate suffering of innocent civilians and believes the use of chemical, incendiary and other ammunitions against civilian targets and infrastructure equate to war crimes; underlines the urgent need for focused international and regional efforts in order to solve the Syrian crisis and further condemns Russia for vetoing numerous UN Security Council Resolutions on the conflict of Syria;

10. Recognises that trafficking in human beings has become one of the most lucrative criminal activities, is the cause of the death of thousands of people every year and produces serious regional instability; commits itself to proposing to the United Nations to recognise the organised trafficking of human beings, often associated to migrant smuggling, as a crime against humanity;

11. Believes that the EU should adopt a more active role in promoting the peace process and facilitating negotiations for a political solution to the conflict; emphasises that any political solution of the Syrian conflict should involve full respect for the human, political and social rights of Syrians;

12. Underlines that the solution to the Libyan crisis is a prerequisite for stability in the Mediterranean; in this respect, invites the United Nations to appoint a new Special Representative and to authorise the start of the third phase of operation EUNAVFOR MED – SOPHIA; urges the EU to work in cooperation with the UN and other international institutions, such as the Arab League and the African Union, in order to achieve an adequate and stable solution; stresses the need of a more effective national dialogue on reconciliation among Libyan stakeholders and urges the EU Member States to engage in dialogue with the Libyan Government of National Accord on how to support it in its efforts to address the security crisis;

13. Notes that deeper regional economic cooperation between the EU's southern neighbouring countries could lead to increased trade among them and subsequently more potential for stability and prosperity, and therefore calls on the establishment of such sub-regional initiatives;

14. Believes that more resources should be made available for the Eastern and Southern dimensions, in order to increase stability in the European neighbourhood;

15. Recognises the importance of selective engagement and, whenever the situation allows, dialogue with Russia to ensure accountability and maintain the option to cooperate on resolving global crises where there is a clear European Union interest.

EU's Migration Policy in 2017 and beyond

16. Recalls the 2015 Valletta Action Plan and recognises that the sharp increase in flows of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants into Europe, from Africa and the Middle East, in recent years entails undue suffering, abuse and exploitation particularly for vulnerable people and the unacceptable loss of life in the desert and at sea, and places the most affected countries under severe pressure; recognises the serious humanitarian consequences and security challenges, the first priority in this context should be to save lives and do everything possible to rescue and protect migrants whose lives are at risk;

17. Accepts that member States in Southern Europe are being put under strain by the refugee and the economic crises causing massive and lasting unemployment and conflict afflicted neighbouring countries. None of these challenges can be dealt with by single States acting alone and efforts should be made to develop a common policy based on solidarity;

18. Calls for the establishment of a genuine, human rights-based common European migration policy based on the principle of solidarity and shared responsibility with the securing of the EU's external borders; stresses the importance of reviewing the existing asylum regime (Dublin III) and adequate legal channels for safe and orderly migration, as a sustainable long-term policy to promote growth and cohesion within the EU, in order to set a clear framework for EU relations with third countries; emphasises that the link between migration and development policies should be strengthened and bring about genuine and truly effective cooperation, without development aid being made conditional on cooperation in migration matters such as border management and readmission agreements; calls on the EU and the Member States to develop new, concrete initiatives ahead of the EU-Africa summit to be held in Abidjan in November 2017, based on: universal values and principles, providing better opportunities for trade, agricultural development, investment, access to energy and economic growth, including through close cooperation between European and local small and medium-sized enterprises and supporting African countries in building democratic, transparent and effective institutions and measures to mitigate the impact of climate change; considers the international cooperation and development policies as a fundamental instrument to achieve such objectives and urges the EU to improve the efficient and effective allocation and use of EU funding and to promote synergies with other international organisations;

19. Acknowledges that further efforts should be made to advance legal migration and mobility possibilities including at bilateral level, by fostering well-managed mobility between and within the continents as well as encouraging policies that promote regular channels for migration and providing the possibility for migrants to apply for asylum in the countries of origin and transit through these countries with the support of international and non-governmental organisations. Adequate financial aid must be allocated to border management, registration, distribution and settlement of refugees; welcomes the Malta Declaration which focuses on measures to stem the flow of irregular migrants from Libya; emphasises the need to help reduce the pressure on Libya's land border by enhancing Libya's border management capacity and by working with neighbouring countries currently enjoying better social and political stability; welcomes the intention of the Maltese Presidency to present a concrete plan for implementation to the Council at the earliest opportunity, to take work forward and to ensure close monitoring of results.

Fighting Propaganda and Information Warfare

20. Emphasises the vital necessity to strengthen internal resilience of the European Union institutions and its Member States; stresses the need to address potential cyber threats to the energy, transport and space infrastructures, financial systems and public health; calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to strengthen their capacity to counter hybrid warfare such as the misinformation and propaganda campaigns, including via StratCom East, reaching people in the EU and its neighbours; urges the Council, the Commission and the Member States to enhance strategic communication aimed at making EU values and external action more visible; stresses that it is also crucial that citizens, especially youths, are trained to distinguish facts from alternative facts, whereby the role of government is to strengthen their ability to do so; recognises that information and cyber warfare, as one of the hybrid threats, is a deliberate attempt at state and non-state level to destabilise and discredit political, economic, and social structures; confirms our dedication to the freedom of the media and respect for the plurality of different opinions in society; believes that the EU should engage with its partners and step up its assistance for capacity-building in the fields of information warfare, cybersecurity and the fight against cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism; welcomes the foundation of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats showing much needed synergy between the EU and NATO countries and calls on both organisations to participate in the activities of the Centre.

Strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy

21. Welcomes the Rome Declaration and the expression of political will to strengthen European Defence and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; welcomes in this regard the intention to setup a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) which may be considered as the first step towards a strategic civilian and military headquarters; welcomes the publication of the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP); is convinced that the effective implementation of the plan requires strong support and political commitment from the Member States and the EU institutions; underlines the necessity of inclusiveness and transparency of the process; calls on Member States and EU institutions to ensure that EDAP's implementation is beneficial to all Member States; is convinced that using EU funds to increase defence cooperation is a clear expression of the EU's solidarity and willingness to stand together on defence, taking into account the fact that not all EU Member States are NATO Member States; recalls that the EDAP while avoiding any duplication of the existing cooperation platforms should be a strategic tool to foster cooperation in defence at European level; notes the contribution that EDAP will make to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; urges the Commission to present ambitious proposals to establish the capability window of the fund by the end of the year that would stimulate balanced development of the EU's defence across all EU regions and countries; is strongly opposed to using the EU funds designated for crisis prevention, development or research for purposes of defence cooperation or military capability

building in partner countries; considers that the European Defence Agency (EDA) capabilities and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) should be used to their full potential;

22. Supports the Joint EU-NATO Declaration of 8 July 2016 and its implementation proposals and encourages further practical cooperation between the EU and NATO; Acknowledges that information sharing and coordinated action between the EU and NATO will produce results in such areas as response to hybrid threats, situational awareness, resilience building, strategic communications, cyber-security and capacity building of the EU's partners.